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SHILOH: 



THE ONLY CORRECT 



MILITARY HISTORY OF U. S. GRANT 



AND OF THE 



MISSINQ ARMY RECORDS, 



WHICH HE IS ALOiTE RESPONSIBLE, TO CONCEAL 
HIS ORGANIZED 

DEFEAT OF THE UNION ARMY AT SHILOH, 

APRIL 6, 1862. 



( 



BY T. ^VORTHINGTON, 

A West-Point Graduate or 1827. 



WASHINGTON CITY 

1872. 



EiiKMol nccrdiiig to A( i uf Congres.-, in the year 1872, by T. Woutiii.vgto.n', in tin- Office of 
the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 



[From the Washington Republican of May 24, 1872.] 

"SHILOH." 

Among the meanest of the agencies set in operation to defame, for the basest 
of political ends, the character and public reputation of eminent men whom 
the nation has delighted to honor, is a wretchedly-written pamphlet by the 
notorious Tom Worthington, of Ohio, a man known by everybody who knows 
him at all to be without a single title to respect other than his years, and they 
illy spent, may afibrd him. This pamphlet, printed and circulated at the cost 
of men who would be ashamed to have their connection with it publiclj'' 
known, professes to give an account of the Shiloh campaign in 1862, but it 
reveals nothing more than the malignant envy, hatred, and malice of its 
reputed author towards the men who had befriended him before his treachery 
and unworthiness were exposed, and who ceased not to visit him with acts 
of charity thereafter. 

Tom Worthington graduated from the Military Academy in 1827, and left 
the army a year afterwards. During the war with Mexico he served four 
months as a lieutenant in a regiment of volunteers, and again disajipeared 
from army view. In the early part of 1862 he became colonel of the 46tl! 
Ohio volunteers. It was at tliis time he fell under command of General 
Sherman, who, for old acquaintance' sake, sought to have him advanced in 
rank, but did not succeed. A few months after the battle of Shiloh he was 
summarily dismissed the service by the President, after escaping the sentence 
of a general court martial tlirough a legal informality, for repeated and hab- 
itual drunkenness on and oft' duty, attended, on more than one occasion, by 
disgraceful incidrnts wliich greatly scandalized the service, and for printing, 
for circulation m the Army of the Tennessee, "extracts" from a fictitious 
"diary," filled with abuse and slander of his commanding officers. Generals 
Grant and Sherman, and laudation of his own military talent and foresight. 
From the time of his dismissal onward he made unceasing efforts to get his 
dishonorable dismissal exchanged for a discharge by resignation, but Secre- 
tary Stanton, who knew him well, was inflexible, and it was only upon the 
personal solieitiition of General Grant that a qualified order of revocation 
was finally issued from the War Department, allowing him to stand recorded 
as oiii i>f MTviri- hy resignation. 

This Is I he mail who is now put forward under the impulse of the despair- 
ing cr}', "Any tiling to beat Grant!" and certainly, with such a record, nothing 
less tiian the expedients of a forlorn hope could justif}' his appearance even 
in such doubtful company as that where he is to be found. Not the least 
cause of censure upon this last recruit to the ranks of the reformers is his 
prostitution of the honored title of a "West Point graduate" to hide his per- 
sonality whenever he ventures into print. 



The material information for the above fiction must have been had from 
General Grant, as no one else could give it but Sherman. 

In 1846 General T. Worthington, of the Hocking county (Ohio) militia, re- 
cruited a company for the Mexicau war, itnder orders, because no one else in 
the county could do it. It cost him in the end a pending lawsuit, involving 
his patrimony of 1,800 acres of land. He becaiAe lieutenant of the company 
at Cincinnati, after failing an election as lieutenant colonel, to go as Colonel 
(now General) G. W. Morgan's adjutant of the 2d Ohio regiment. He was re- 
ported in this city rfearZ at Matamoros of fever, and came home from Camargo 
on sick leave. He resigned on account of health, broken by the lingering 
Rio Lirande fever. 

The record of his trial proves the "fictitious" diary true, and wanting in 
many charges against Grant, &c., established by the evidence. So Grant's 
information to his organ on tins point is one of his usual fictions. The record 
proves not less than forty lalsrlKHids in Sherman's evidence, for which Grant 
is responsible, by his approval of the whole affair. The " disgraceful inci- 
dents" are fictions, disgraceful only to Sliernian, their inventor. The oft'ense 
(Continued on page 15 of cover, i 



SHILOH, 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN OF 1862 



WRITTEN ESPECIALLY FOR THE 



ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE IN 1862 



AND FOR THE 



FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OF THOSE PATRIOT SOLDIERS, 
WHO SANK INTO THEIR GRAVES ON SHILOH'S FIELD 



UNKNELLED, UNNOTICED, AND UNKNOWN." 



'I believe every life lost that day was necessary." — Sherman. 
'Bury the dead on the field wherever they fell."— Same. 



\ 4 O -O W X w *., 



EY A COMRADE ON THAT BATTLE-FIELD 

AND 

A WEST-POINT GRADUATE OF 1827. 



WASHINGTON CITY: 

M'GILL a WITHEROW, printers and 3TERE0TTPER3. 

1872. 



'■V ^ 



'/i 



\N=i' 



TO 

THE THOUSANDS OF UNION SOLDIERS, 

WHO AI.ONE 

HELD THEIR GROUND AT SHILOH, AND HOLD IT YET, 

THE 

VICTIMS OF NEfJLIGENCE. OR THE MARTYRS OF DESIGN, 



ADMIllATION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE SACRIFICE THEY 
OFFERED UP, 



Wrrii IlEi.RET FOR ALL WHO FELL IN WHAT THEY BELIEVED 
TO liE A RIGHTEOUS CAUSE, 

<rhi.s( imperfect (iTommcntavy i.s geilJcalal 

BY A COMRADE IN BATTLE 

AN I) 

A West-Point Graduate of 1827. 

WASiiiM.TO.N, D. ('., April, IST'J. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



The writer of the following compendium, fully intend- 
ing to have it published about the 1st of April, 1862, was 
not assured till the last week in March of overt acts, by 
direction of a cabal in Washington, to protract the opera- 
tions of an invading army, though at the imminent ris.k, and 
indeed certainty, of defeat and slaughter of myriads of the 
Union troops. This occasioned his having to reject over 
half lie had written, and rewrite nearly the whole work. 

In the first week of April, after long search, he got to- 
gether Hal leek's dispatches of March 3d and 4th, plainly 
pointing to tlie instruments chosen for this purpose of in- 
terested desolation. This required further changes in the 
chapters, and may account for many points obscure and in- 
consistent, which may be corrected hereafter, if this com- 
mentary is found worthy of notice. 

He has been refused all information at the War Depart- 
ment, as the policy of protracting the war required the 
sujyprcssion or destruction of all special ariivj records, and the 
abrogation of all established principles of military law. 

W. P. G. 

Wasiungton, April, 1872. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Chapter. Page, 

Prefatorial — Halleck's intrigne exposed by himself. 

I. Introductory — Specimens of syntax by Grant and Sherman 

II. Orkiin of the Tennessek Expedition op 1SG2 

IV. EAf5TP0RT Expedition 

V. Into Camp at Shiloh 

VI. How Buell was Hurried up 

VII. How Buell was Kept Back 

VIII. Sherman's Evidence 

IX. Sherman's Cro;^s-exa.mination and Rki'.utting Evidence 

X. SftERMAiffVfeSBT-ihtMHW^E 

XI. Ok\V| iim; NfGHT BEF0'SE-'THE-&A'H'L*: 

XII. Grant on and off the Field and on nis Boat 

XIII. Appendix 



BADEAU'S MAP OF SHILOH. 



Corrected by Ghant and Sheeman, being the dotted lines.in: 
Corrected by \V. P. G.— (See Nos. 1-5, 10 and 12.) 
Scale of two miles. Figures 10 to 20. 




. Correct position of McHIe 
. J^herman'3 Division on Uadeaii'a M:ip. 
. McUlernand's Division on Badcau'3 Map. 
. Correct position of Ifhermaa'a 

. Rebel advance on S>h.Tinau. 7. ^hiloh Church. 

. Rebel odvaoce on the Gap. 0. Prentiis' jw^i ioa on Btvlcau's Map^ 
. Correct position of I'reutiss. 11. Hamburgh Rowi. 

Correct po«tion of Stuart's Brigade. 
" ■ of Hurlbut oa Badeau'a Map. 

[ of the 0th, and h-ad of the ravine. 
i of Smith on Badeau's Map. 
;of theCih. 
lin^ of ihe Gth. 13. Pittsburgh Landing. 
East Corinth Road, 21. Snake Creek. 



, Lew. Wallace 
Lew. Wallace 

, Gunboats, 



22. Uftmburgh. 23. Savannah. 24. Crump's Landing- 



EXPLANATION OF HALLECK'S DISPATCHES 
OF MARCH 3D AND 4TII. 



The writer, on consideration and advice^ that not one in- 
telligent reader in a thonsand would take any notice of 
the peculiarly opposite statcmenis in ITalleck's dispatches of 
March 4, 1862, has thought best to make an explanation. 
The whole of the dispatch of March 4, from Halleck to 
Buell, is given to show the extent of the fraud. 

Oencral Buell to General Halleck. 

Nashville, March 3, 1862. 
"General Halleck, St. Louis: 

" What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus? Remember, I 
am separated from you by the Tennessee river. Johnson is moving toward 
Decatur and burning the bridges as he goes. D. C. Buell." 

General Halleck to General Buell. 

" St. Louis, March 4, 1862. 
"General Buell, Nnshidllc: 

" It' Johnson has destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, he cannot 
return to attack you. Wiiy not come to the Tennessee and operate with me 
to cut Jolinson's Jine with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid. Columbus 
has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concentrating at New Madrid 
and Island No. 10. I am concentrating a force of twenty thousand against 
him. Grant with all available Jorce has gone up the Tennessee, to destroy 
connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. Estimated strength of enemy 
at New Madrid, Randol[>h, and Alemphis is fifty tliousand. It is of vital im- 
portance to separa!e them from Jolinson's army. Come over to Savannah 
or Florence, and wo can do it. We then can operate on Decatur or Memphis, 
or both, as may ajipear best. H. W. Halleck." 

This is ail entirely deceptive, and in part fictitious dis- 
patch, with false information of a trebly criminal character. 

1st. No expedition had gone up the Tennessee, nor did 
for a week after the 4th. 

2d. There was no intention of cutting railroad commu- 
nication at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, or any of 
tliose places, which were to be let alone especially. 

od. It was not the intention (though he says of vital im- 
portance) to ctit communication between A. S. Johnson and 
Memphis, but to leave the way open for an object, and a 
base one. 



12 EXPLANATION OF IIALLECK's DISPATCHES. 

4tli. It was not ITalleck's intention that Buell should 
mai'ch to Florence, when urging him to '•'•come over" to that' 
place, but to sfop the viarch, as lie did. 

5th. It is seen he does not notify Buell that he has dis- 
placed Grant as comniandei- of tlie Tennessee expedition; 
but, on the coji/rar//, having displaced liini, (as a sham or 
cover,) tells Buell he las r/ove u[» the Tennessee with an ex- 
pedition that did not start for a week after the date of the 
dispatch, and then under the command of C. F. Smith, as 
a cover. 

For any one of these acts of falsehor>d or deception, and 
especially for the false information, Halleck's life should 
have heen forfeited; and were he alive now any President 
fit for his position would, on the discovery of such con- 
duct, drop him from the rolls of the army in disgrace. Yet 
this man, because capable of such gross criminality, was 
virtually the director of the w^ar from November, ISHl, till 
it was over. Whatever were the particuhirs of the bai'gain 
between Ilalleck and the Washington cabal, it was a dia- 
bolical transfer of each to the other on both sides, Ilalleck 
having and keeping the advantage. These dispatches should 
be in the War Oftice, but the War Office dare not make 
them known officially without betrayal of the whole plot. 
And thus the War Office is estopped from giving any infor- 
mation wdiatever as to any event of the war, while the 
present Administration is in powder; and wdien it is out, all 
recoi'ds of that campaign will have disappeared — most 
have now. I^o such criminal occurrence is upon historical 
record, and no monarch on earth dare tnlie wnth the lives 
and treasure of the people as this plot proves the people of 
this Union have been trifled with, cheated, and deceived by 
the war administration in 1862, and no doubt during the 
war. The main object was to deceive Buell, and to effect, 
not i)revent, the junction of Johnson with Beauregard at 
Corinth. Buell had for three months been urging the seiz- 
ure of Florence, and by consequence the occupation of the 
upper Tennessee, which would have captured Chattanooga 
and Knoxville with scarce an effi)rt. He was, therefore, 



EXPLANATION OF HALLECK's DISPATCHES. 13 

anxious to see some use made of the Tennessee river for the 
furtherance of the Avar. lie had in his command over 
100,000 men, doing next to nothing. Grant, Ilalleck, and 
Sherman had heen together some da3's, according to I>adeau, 
the hist week in January, 1862, at St. Louis, when the outlines 
of the intrigue, of wliich the dispatches following furnish am- 
ple evidence, were then and there douhtless agreed upon, 
under instructions or contracts from Washington, inclosed 
of course to ITalleck, who was really '■'■ commainier-in-chief'' 
from and after the time he left Washington for St. Louis, 
in November, 1861, and came on as such in July, 1862. 
The seeming quarrel initiated between the chiefs of the 
jobbers would operate to silence future suspicion. Hence 
the dispatch to the War Office of the 3d, and the dispatch 
of the 4th to Grant, at Fort Henry, both intended for de- 
ceptive purposes, of which there is ample evidence, but for 
which there is here no room, even if, to a professional 
soldier, the deception was not plain upon the face of these 
productions of " Old Brains" (Halleck.) These dispatches, 
to be found in Grant's Badeau, page 59, excited exceeding 
surprise and sympathy for Grant among innocent histo- 
rians, such as Mansfield, &c. Grant was but nominalli/ out 
of command, to cover up the intrigue, one of its results 
'being Shiloii and its slaughter. 

Sniitli, as has been stated, was put in command to cover 
the plan of getting Sidney Johnson past Florence, as fast 
as possible, to Corinth. This, of course, would have been 
prevented if the expedition that stopped at Savannah on 
the 11th had kept on up that day to Florence, the point 
where the Charleston and Memphis railroad reaches tlie 
Tennessee river, near the foot of the Muscle Shoals, the 
head of river navigation, connected by railroad with De- 
catur, Alabama, where Johnson then was, March 11, 1862, 
about to move west. This stoppage at Savannah brought 
on the battle of Shiloh. The subsequent events of the 
campaign, and those of the war, plainly show the collusion 
between these officers themselves in the field, and some 



14 EXPLANATION OF IIALLECIv'S DISPATCHES. 

authority at Washington having the regulation of the cam- 
paign. 

How, then, is it possible or appropriate for a liistorian, 
and much less for a mere compiler, to maintain the proper 
'■'■dignity of Jdslory,^^ w\\Q\\ dealing with such mountebanks 
and their intrigues? And to have invested such men in such 
a way, and by such means, with almost absolute power 
over tlie lives and limbs of hundreds of thousands of patri- 
otic and unsuspecting citizens, is one of the most criminal 
and terrible episodes in the warlike annals of the world. 

A marble monument cannot be constructed of mud, or 
even unburnt brick. These three men had already shown 
how really worthless, for military enter[)rises,they were; yet 
these three men have held the most prominent positions in 
the war of the rebellion, not by really legitimate authority, 
however it seemed such, but plainly, as events have proved, 
by a collusion, which implies criminality by some authority 
at Washington never perhaps to be perfectly developed; 
but it should be answered for. Caligula invested his horse 
with the consulship; Domitian triumphed lor his defeat by 
the Dacians, as Sherman has been heroized for misconduct 
atShiloh; and Shakspearc makes Mark Antony treat his 
colleague, the simple soldier Lepidus, as nothing more 
than a well-trained war-horse. But this did not make the 
horse of the tyrant an able general, nor Domitian a great 
commander: no more did Shiloh make more than a sham 
of Sherman, nor did the words of Antony abate the merits 
of Lepidus as an able soldier. The elevation of these three 
men, as the fitting instruments for party objects, made 
them n()thin*g more than leaders for the time to carry out 
dishonest purposes. And they can only hold their ill- 
gotten reputations, now waning fast away, so long as the 
deception is maintained, by a ])revention of all investiga- 
tion. Into this general investigation they dare not go, nor 
into the slightest specifications against tliem in this imper- 
fect commentar3\ If they do not now express a willingness 
to go into such investigation, everything herein stated or 
charged must.be proven by default, as almost everything so 



EXPLANATION OF HALLECK'S DISPATCHES. 15 

charged is proven by tlieir own reports and letters, and the 
histories, of which they themselves have declared them- 
selves to be the true authority. The repression or destruc- 
tion of all the usual war records in relation to Shiloh was 
the result of that i)rotradive policy of which these men 
were the instruments. They have been suppressed or de- 
stroyed; if not, let these records be produced. Much 
of the true history of the campaign was suppressed by the 
suspension of the 34th article of the army regulations by 
Sherman, and perhaps other commanders in the field.* 
Let these facts, then, be borne in mind by the professional 
reader, who may condemn, as in bad taste, any badinage 
or jocularity, at the expense of these men, (me^ upholstery ^^^^^^ 
made-up commanders,) consider that the Government, 
during the war, has turned over for the consideration of 
the historian little else than mere pretenders and mounte- 
banks, carried through the war at the expense and indul- 
gence of the nation, in spite of themselves and blunders: 
their admirers and parasites not even believing in their 
own letters and reports, however derogatory to their char- 
acters as honest men and good soldiers, as this treatise will 
demonstrate. The writer, who claims nothing of the dig- 
nit}' of a historian, may mingle comical remarks to relieve 
his too tragical compilations, in which last he has indulged 
as little as truth will permit. No historian, at any rate, is 
bound down to the ^^ dignity of history, ^^ where the subjects 
offered afford no dignity in words or acts or character, on 
which to expatiate. lie then considers that he may, there- 
fore, be permitted the occasional expression of contempt 
and indignation, of which, for their acts and omissions, 
every honest mind must be conscious, and a professional 
soldier would be a hypocrite, such expression to suppress. 

W. P. G. 

Which may pass, when seen, for AVest Point Graduate. 

* The record of Buell's court of inquiry was not allowed to extend back of 
nor to include Shiloh, and that is gone ; and a court record touching the trial 
of Colonel Worthington, 4Gth Ohio, has been entirely suppressed; and no 
order-books at the War Office are allowed examination" by any one. 



A^ 'jt^V// ^^-^^ i.,...,.^^ J <V 








PREFATORIAL. 



A SYKOPSLS OF THE SHILOII CAMPAIGN. 

now HALLECK EXPOSES HIS 0^yN INTRIGUE. 

General Halleck to the War Office at Wa&hington. 

"St. Louis, March 3, 1862. 
"General Grant left his command without my authority and went to Nash- 
ville. I can get no returns or reports of any kind from him. I am tired 
and worn-out by this neglect and inefficiency." (The very qualities wanted 
by the junto. 1st act of the jugf/lcra, £c. W. P. G.) 

Halleck to Grant. 

"St. Louis, March 4, 1862.* 
" General U. S. Grant: 

"You will place General Smith in command of the Tennessee expedition, 

and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to 

report strength and position of your command? H.W. Halleck." {2d act 

of the jugglers ) 

General Halleck to General Buell. 

"St. Louis, March 4, 1862.* 
"Grant, with all available force, has gone up the Tennessee, to destroy 
(railroad) connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt." (All humbug, 
as the above dispatches prove. W. P. G. 3c? act of the jugglers, hy Halleck, 
Grant, and Sherman.) 

The originators and managers of this performance were 
in Washington, and may yet appear on this Woody stage, 
as it afterwards got to be. 

Ko expedition went np from Fort Henry till the 10th 
March, in temporary command of Smith, for a special pur- 
pose of the j uggler. On the 11th Grant is in command again, 
and writes to Smith, March 11, 18G2, (from Fort Henry:) 

"General Halleck telegraphs that when reinforcements arrive I may take 
the general direction. I think it doubtful if I shall accept." (Certainly not ; 
but he did accept, as usual, having only been out of the comedy behind the 
scenes. The jugglers will next appear between Shiloh, Pittsburgh, and Sa- 
vannah. W. P. G., West Point Graduate.) 

A very distinguished Senator, who runs the financial 
machinery of the nation with more or less ability and sta- 

* Observe tlie dates. 



20 PREFATORIAL. 

according to Ins estimate and belief. That he had, never- 
theless, earl}' on the morning of the 5th of April, withdrawn 
his cavahy pickets and artillerj' from the front or Sherman's 
line, and had no detachments of any kind out that day to 
the distance of over two and a half miles, where the enemy 
had been found on the 4th in such force as to make General 
Sherman apprehensive of an immediate attack. ^ That, in 
fact, he and that commander had had reason to expect an 
attack from and after the afternoon of the 3d of April, 1862. 
2d. To make known and not to conceal facts, he should 
have stated that General Buell, of the Army of the Ohio, 
from N"ashville, had arrived at 5 p. m. of the 5th, and the 1st 
division of his army about noon the same day. That, as had 
been intended, these troops might have been thrown up to 
Hamburgh, on the river, four miles above, whci'e they 
would have been little over a mile to the right and rear of 
the rebel army. That this Vv^as not done, for the reason 
that General Halleck was daily expected, and it had been 
his anxious desire to gratify that innocent commander's 
disposition to lead personally in the expected attack. That, 
knowing of General Buell's vicinity, it was preposterous to 
suppose there would have been any real attack by the en- 
emy, in which he was supported by the experienced and 
able conviction of General Sherman, as expressed to Major 
Ricker, which conviction was, that '•'■Beauregard ivas not 
such a fool as to march all the way from Corinth to make 
such an attack," and still persisted in the conviction that 
Befiuregard made a fatal mistake wiien he made an attack 
which drove us back no farther than the landing, with the 
loss of but 10,000 men, or only half the number of those 
that '•'■ did not run aicay," inclusive, Sec, in the first day's 
fight. Had he stated this, and several other items to be 
snp]»lied by this commentary, his report might have been 
of at least as much value to general historj^ as Sherman's 
letter of January, 1865, to the U. S. S. Magazine is to 
Sherman and Grant's history, if at all credible. 

To do the commander of the Army of the Tennessee en- 
tire credit, it must be admitted that we may gather by deep 



PREFATORIAL, 21 

enough resoaroh that General Bnell's arrival (5 p. m.) 
saved the landing and transports from capture and the 
army from an equivalent conclusion of the campaign, but 
most readers might, with justice, suppose that General 
Buell was a delinquent subordinate like General Wallace, 
who had tardily got up from his usual position on the iield, 
as G. charged and charges on Buell to this day. ISTow, these 
suppressions dam up, to say the least, the true source of 
history, while his statement of facts does as much to per- 
vert the same fountains to wrong conclusions. He knew 
the gunboats were useless without the presence of Bucll's 
troops, and were and could only be eifective 1)}^ the excite- 
ment of a cannonade. The statement that his force was 
too much fatigued to perfect a victory which was lost by 
neglect of pursuit, is alike fallacious, as there were over 
30,000 men, not in action that day, ready, and anxious, and 
able to pursue all night. If he had sent 3,000 idle cavalry 
and 10,000 of the stragglers and idlers, without ammuni- 
tion, as most of them were, up to Hamburgh at any time 
after the arrival of Buell, all the trains and most of the 
rebel troops would have been captured. But this was not 
then the object. They were saved for future use, as the wise 
old hunter spares the she wolf as productive of wolf scalps 
when at a premium. The enemy, he says, retreated in good 
order, for wliich he had, or should have had, an expression 
of their obligations, properly engrossed, in the neatest 
style, &c. 

The worst perversion, however, is the statement — 
. 1st. That General Sherman was with his command the 
entire two days of the battle, (which Sherman's report de- 
nies.) 2d. That he displayed great judgment and skill in 
the management of his troops, (which the report further 
denies.) 3d. The repetition that his place was nerer vacant. 
4th. That he was twice wounded and had three horses 
killed under him, (all I)y agreement. W. P. G.) 

These statements are all disposed of by General Sher- 
man's report and his (Grant's) autobiography by Badeau. 
And til us: 



22 PREFATORIAL. 

1. General Sherman states in liis report that at 10 a.m. 
his 3d brigade (Hildebrand's) had substantially disappeared 
from the field, and that the other two, Buckland's and Mo- 
Dowell's, 4th and 1st, were conducted by his aids ^^ to join 
on llcClernand's right.''' This point was over a mile off at 
the time. It gradually grew to near three miles, but the 
brigades never joined McClernand's right, and Sherman 
never joined the brigades: so that, if that part of Sher- 
man's report be true, and Buckland's report be true that 
his brigade was dispersed at 9 a.m., and Sherman's report 
be true that the attack in force did not commence till 8 
a. m. of the Gth, Sherman was with his command, by his 
own report, but one hour of the two days; and there were 
and are thousands of witnesses, besides Sherman's report? 
to prove this, Buckland's report aside. 

2. If Sherman displayed such great skill and judgment^ 
whence arise so many statements, by most historians who 
heroize him, that his troops were all dispersed by 8 or 9 
a.m.; and what was that skill and judgment worth in his 
own opinion, which deferred to that of subordinate oificers, 
(his aids,) to whom he consigned, he says, his only two or- 
ganized brigades at 10 a.m. 

By this he plainly intimated, 1st. That these troops were 
saler in the hands of his aids than under his own com- 
mand; or, 2d. That he was safer in avoiding the command 
of these troops on a march during which a contest Jie knew 
teas inevitable., as the result proved. 

Take cither horn, and what is proven as to '"'■this ejaUant 
(fvd. able officer," more meritorious than that he exhibited 
the modesty of Bob or Tom Acres in the one case, in want 
of self-confidence, or the wisdom of the great Falstafi' in 
the other in the husbandry of discretion. 

The truth of this statement, as to the present com- 
nnindor-in-chief, is easier sustained in this case than usual, 
as the wi'iter can bear witness that McDowell's brigade was 
til us detached out of Sherman's immediate command by 
himself, in the hottest of the fight, and it was most for- 
tunate in his discretion of giving up the command, as 



PREFATORIAL. 23 

stated by him, and perhaps equally so iu its desertion by his 
aids a*- d his friend and favorite, the brigade commander, 
v' X left it, as admiring historians say, '■'far to the right, 
a front of the Union army,'^ to join, as ordered, on to Mc- 
Cieruand's perpetually vanishing right, if allowed by the 
enemy, who vetoed the procedure before it came in sight 
of the objective vanished point; and about the time that 
Sherman, like Horatius Codes (or perhaps Cokely) at the 
Sublician bridge, was so highly commended by Grant, (so 
S. says,) for so obstinately keeping back tlie enemy with- 
out troops, except his sword, as Mrs. P's broom kept out 
tlie ocean, or the l^orth sea, all the same. 

3. The repetition that his place, or the position of his 
feet, or his horse's feet, was never vacant, is perhaps true, un- 
der the construction of the way in which a leopard may 
change his spots; of which construction, if his report is 
credible, he took advantage, by his change, in retreat, of 
the numerous spots between Shiloh church in the morn- 
ing and Snake creek bridge at night. 

4. As the latest reports are considered most reliable. 
Grant's statement, on Badeau's authority, may be found on 
page 84 of that veracious chronicle, that at the close of the 
battle Grant was s/r?<c/i-, but not hurt; Sherman was slightly 
wounded, very slightly, in the epidermis, left hand, on its 
back, by a twig, and at least 10,000 men on each side were 
either killed or wounded, (true;) in which there is some 
slight show of truth as to the mortal hurts of these greatest 
of rebellion-risen commanders, while not much is abated of 
the slaughter they achieved. And to sum up all the true 
material for history above stated, as derived from Grant 
and Sherman's reports, we have, 1st. That Buell's army 
saved the Army of the Tennessee from ruin on the 6th 
April; 2d. Sherman gave up all command at 9 or 10 a. m. 
of the first day's fight, and was slightly wounded, he says. 
As to the three horses, their bones, if ever discovered, will 
be just as recognizable as those of the thousands of Union 
soldiers dumped down and but slightly covered, under or 
over where they fell, ^' unknelled, unnoticed, and wiknoion,' 



24 PREFATORIAL. 

bj' the benevolence of this "prototype of Washington," 
who has the promulgation of the veracious Sherman for 
being as "unselfish, kind hearted, and honest as a man 
should he." And now, having presented for true history all 
found worthy of transcription as truth from Grant's report, 
return we, as the French say, to our "mouton," or to Gen- 
eral Sherman's historian, Colonel S. M. Bowman, say '■Hong- 
boiv-7)ian" for shortness. 

This historian, in the ^'single interest of truth," concludes 
his preface by the hope, that his efforts in so deep an interest 
may elicit new testimony from the same depths. l!^ow, if it 
be in the interest of truth to detect fallac^^and expose fiction, 
something of the sort, it is hoped, will be perfected by the 
digressions and commentaries required in the search of that 
oldest inhabitant of the bottom of a well. And, to begin at 
the beginning, let all historians of the Shiloh campaign, past 
and future, be warned against the report of Grant, repeat- 
edly contradicted by himself, and as is seen, by Sherman's 
report at the time. Be warned against Sherman's report, 
contradictory in itself, and afterwards contradicted b}- him- 
self; and especial care must be taken to exclude as truth 
everything Hal leek has so far advanced, or which yet, undis- 
covered, may be advanced on his authority, granting that 
the evidence of these men may be used against themselves. 
No living man, as he perhaps may repeat, regrets General 
Halleck's death more deeply than this narrator. He might, 
if alive, be made to answer for some part of the mischief 
he has done, by being compelled to make known his au- 
thority for the many terrible and most diabolical incidents 
of the war, before and after he became commander-in-chief 
of the army at Washington. Whitelaw Reid's paper is 
the most readable account of the battle, and he seems to 
have had an inkling of design in the arrangements for defeat 
he has remarked were seemingly made. He was doubtless 
deceived by some one in Sherman's interest as to the posi- 
tion of McClernand's left brigade, as to the attack upon 
the 1st brigade before the first retreat, aud its disappear- 
ance amonij:: the ravines of Snake creek, &c., &c. 



PREFATORIAL. 25 

He miglit have seen that it was detached in that direc- 
tion by Sherman's report, but he never had any means of 
further tracing its operations. As to his statement that 
Grant allowed no sign of distrust to escape him, he had 
not seen Grant's letter to Buell about noon of the 6th, of 
which the following extract is sufiicient at present: 

" Commanding Officer, &c., Buell's army, near Pittsburgh : 

"If you will get upon the fidd. leaving all your baggage over the river, it 
will be a move lo our advantage, and po!<sibly save the day to us. 

"U. S. Grant." 

If this was no sign of distrust, what could be more so 
than his proving his faith by his works, and abandoning the 
field as lost till Buell in person came up at 1 p. m. ? Sher- 
man's chivalric conduct is all the merest fiction. His own 
report, as above stated, and his retiring on Snake-creek 
bridge, by which he could have escaped to the river be- 
low, proves his cautious, and perhaps correct, intent to save 
liimself and Avhat troops he could on the expected capture 
of the landing he made no effort to prevent. lie made 
no more use of the brigade sent him by McCIei-nand to 
support his left than Grant did of Buell's division reach- 
ing Savaimah at noon on the 5th, by means of which the 
Confederates could have been driven back without the 
necessary loss of a single Union soldier. This warning 
against Halleck is proven clearly right b}' the intrigue de- 
veloped at the head of this prefatorial chapter; and his 
statement, on which rests everything that could ever be 
claimed for Sherman, is as purely a fiction as that of " Jack 
the Giant Killer," or the Greek legend of "Ixion and the 
Cloud," and his report proves it such. ISTever was the truth 
more clearly established than by him (Halleck) that the 
"evil that men do lives after them; the good dies mostly 
with themselves." If he ever did the country a real ser- 
vice during the war, it stands upon the Popish dogma that 
" lohatecer is, is right ; " and the Latin aphorism of " de mor- 
tuis nil nisi bonum'' was never more entirely than in his 
case proven '■'•more worfJiy in the breach than the observance.'^ 
That the dead should, of course, or in any case, stand in 



26 PREFATORIAL. 

the way of the life, of trutli, or of justice, to living men 
or measures, is as great an absurdity as the mourning of the 
Spartans at each darkness of the moon, which religiously 
kept them away from Marathon when the lights and liber- 
ties of Greece itself were about to be extinguished by the 
still existing darkness and superstition of the Asiatic world. 
And here, lest it be forgotten, this compiler of fictions, 
exploded like percussion caps against the truth, to their 
own extinction, declares his intention, that in each and 
every cliapter of this commentary lie will endeavor to im- 
press upon the reader, wear}- or otherwise of repetition, 
that— 

1st. About the only truth worthy of record in the re- 
ports of these great commanders is that Buell saved the 
army at 5 p. m., which Grant and Sherman retired from, 
and gave up as lost at 10 to 12 a. m., April 6, 1862. 

2d. That if ever, as AVhitelaw Reid intimates, a defeat 
was organized, it was done at Shiloh. 

3d. That Buell's army was purposely kept back during 
three days of perpetually expected attack at Sbiloh. 

4th. That the troops of Buell at hand on the 5th of April 
miglit have defeated the enemy, if they had not been pur- 
posely rejected; and this would have been done without 
the loss of a single Union soldier. 

5th. That the otherwise inexplicable events of the Shiloh 
campaign can only be accounted for I'rom January to June, 
1862, by a systematic effort to protract the war, as had 
been agreed by the war cabal at Washington. 

6th. That (iirant, Sherman, and Ilallcck could have, on 
this theory alone, obtained not only impunity but reward 
for the slaughter and disgrace of Shiloh, and other other- 
wise unaccountable events of the war, the most direct evi- 
dence being the choice of Ilalleck instead of Buell, March 
11, 1862, to control the war in the West, when the cap- 
ture of Florence and the upper Tennessee was the great 
direct measure to be done or not on the 11th of March, 
1862. If there is any other explicable theor}^ of the pro- 
traction of the war than by the failure to take possession 



PREFATORIAL, 27 

of tlie upper Tennessee after tlie fall of Fort Henry, let the 
writer of this digressive treatise go into disgrace licre and 
hereafter. 

After looking over, for a while, in the national library, 
the numerous fallacies and fictions as to the Shiloh cam- 
paign, this compiler had at last concluded to disperse them 
by a commentary on the histories of Badeau and Bowman. 
lie had not half his work done when his proposed 150 
pages were exhausted, and he had scarcely a fact 2')cr se 
to show, except the fact of fallacies extinguished generally 
by each other. He, however, by looking over official docu- 
ments, and comparing them with his own, found that about 
all that had been said or done by the chief actors in the 
campaign must have been done by the authority of some 
power in Washington delegated bv the Government, Avhich 
the Government did not publicly acknowledge or avow. 

It was plain that blundering and incapacity, even on a 
battle-field, were not considered censurable, when the ob- 
ject of the junto in Washington was advanced without too 
much risk of exposure and ultimate defeat. Violations of 
the army regulations, of the articles of war, or of the estab- 
lished laws of military art and science, of the grossest char- 
acter, which subserved the purposes of the party in power, 
were considered meritorious rather than otherwise. 

This state of affairs had often been charged during the 
war and since, but no very specific evidence was adduced 
to establish the charge. 

Immediately on the capture of Fort Henry, when the 
way was opened up to Florence, Alabama, the question at 
once arose, whether the war should be virtually ended by 
the occupation of the upper Tennessee and the capture of 
Chattanooga, or should be continued a year or more by 
delaying such occupation, which could have been eflected 
with little time, risk, or expense iJicn. As will be seen, 
Buell had been urging this as far as military propriety 
would allow. He was sustained by McClellan, who, about 
March 1, 1862, wrote Ilalleck that it was important to 
seize Decatur, Alabama; and he should have ordered it. 



28 PREFATORIAL. 

The question first to be settled was the seizure of Flor- 
ence, near the Charleston and Memphis Raih'oad, so as to 
prevent A. Sidney Johnson joining Bragg and Beauregard 
at Corintli. 

The matter was, of course, discussed in the Cabinet, but 
was doubtless settled by the congressional cabal or com- 
mittee on the war, or over and under the war, more prop- 
erly called. It was nothing but a mask to cover the cabal. 
The decision not to take and fortify Florence was the de- 
cision to give Halleck the control of the w^ar on the Ten- 
nessee instead of Buell: to leave the road past Florence 
open, and to protract the war, ivhich was done, against 
Buell's urgency. It then became a work of supererogation 
for the writer to enter upon any specific examination into 
the character or conduct of the commanders intrusted with 
the prolongation of the war. Their true character as mil- 
itary jobbers in bloodshed, and not leaders, was settled at 
once. They were under a contract or obligation to extend 
the war, instead of ending it—for a consideration, of course. 
And while no honorable soldier would go into such an 
undertaking for any earthl}" consideration, these ofiicers 
understood that they were to have all that was to be had in 
their line if the speculation succeeded. It did succeed, and 
they have had and nov^^ enjoy their purchased positions and 
perquisites. This bargain was doubtless consummated 
when Grant went up to St. Louis the last week in January, 
1862, to see Halleck, Sherman being there; and this was 
doubtless the initiation of the Tennessee and Cumberland 
expeditions, referred to in Sherman's speech at St. Louis 
in 1865. In this speech he gave Halleck the credit of these 
expeditions, and asserted the reverse of the tact, that Hal- 
leck, but for delays occasioned by Buell, would have gone 
on to Florence, instead of stopping at Savannah, or rather 
Pittsburgh. 

This bargain or arrangement once understood, everything 
about the battle and campaign of Shiloh is made plain. 
This sliows why the expedition was started from Paducah 
without proper forage, ammunition, proper stores, or in- 



PREFATORIAL, 29 

trenching toolp, sneli as it should have liad. This accounts 
for taking along the sick, pnrposely lo incumber the camps 
with hos[)itiils, for the feigning on East[)ort, for the condi- 
tion of the roads out from the landing to Shiloh, for the 
scattering of tke camps, for taking a position commanded 
by high ground in front, with a bushy screen for the 
enemy. It accounts for the ftiilure to order intrencli- 
ments, and the refusal of tools to strengthen the front. A 
battle was invited without regard to any other result. 
That a defeat was at iirst intended to be organized admits 
not of a doubt by those who understand the rules of war. 

The expectation of Sherman and Grant of an attack on 
on the 3d of April; the effort to keep Buell back till the 
7th and 8th, or till after the fight; the rejection of his 
troops when they came three days to five days before they 
were wanted, wdiile the enemy in front was estimated at 
one hundred thousand men; the indilicrencc of Grant on 
and off the field; his lingering at the landing and on his 
boat; Sherman's recklessness on the battle-field and the 
turning over of his last-organized troops to his aids at 9 
to 10 a. ra. — all point to an intended defeat, or a careless- 
ness for the result, without apprehension of rej^rimand 
from Washington. And they got no such reprimand; they 
got reward and promotion. 

Then the refusal of llallcck to make any investigation, 
though unanimously demanded after the battle, except by 
thecowards and skulkers; the silence of the junto in Wash- 
ington, so sharp after McClolIan ; Ilalleck's statement, with 
an audacity without parallel, tliat Sherman had saved the 
day he had done most to lose; the delay at Shiloh after 
the battle; the snail pace to Corinth, all to throw away 
time; the suspension of all operations in Western Ten- 
nessee, Avhich let Bragg loose after Buell; the purposely 
mismanaged campaign in Virginia; Bragg'sraid into Ken- 
tucky ; and the displacement of Buell — all point to a power 
at Washington that had determined to protract the war. 
Besides this, the promotion of Sherman on the capture of 
Corinth, for misconduct at Shiloh, and the translation of 



30 PREFATORIAL. 

Halleck to Washington as commander-in-chief — Halleck, 
who had Laid the foundation of all tliis dehiy, and disaster, 
and bloodshed, by the refusal to occupy Florence — all 
told the same story. And the story was, that the object 
was to make use of the war to carry the elections of 1864, 
lohich was done — done at an expense of blood and money 
past estimation ; at the risk of national calamity too terri- 
ble for contemplation; and was the commission of a crime 
by their own Government against the army and the country 
without a parallel in the annals of the world. And here 
all explanation or exposition of the Shiloh campaign might 
terminate with this preface, but the book is written and 
partly paid for. The character of the instrument employed 
by the Washington junto as the principal in this enormous 
intrigue may here appropriately be given by himself His 
untimely death is a calamity to this writer, and to the ends 
of justice, as he is beyond the reach of human law or even 
human execration. To deceive Buell, to humbug the 
people, and cover the intrigue was the question : and here 
is the way lie did it, or had it done : 

Halleck to the War Office at Wasldngton. 

" St. Louis, March 3, 1862. 
" Grant has left his command and gone to Nashville without my authority. 
I can get no returns or reports from liim; I am worn out and tired with this 
negligence and inefficiency." {Second act of the juggle.) 

Halleck to Grant. 

" March ith, 1862. 
" You will place Major General G. F. Smith in command of the expedition 
(up the Tennessee) and remain yourself at Fort Henry. AVhy don't you obey 
my orders," &c., &c. {Third act of the juggle.) 

Halleck at St. Louis to Buell at Nashville, Tennessee. 

"March -ith, 1862. 
" Grant, witli all available force, has gone up the Tennessee river to break 
the road at Humboldt," &c. {First act of the juggle.) 

The object of all this was understood by all the parties 
concerned, except Buell and Smith; Sherman being as it 
were the audience and claquer all to himself and for 
himself 

Buell may have been deceived, and thought the expedi- 
tion was bound for Florence. It did not, however, leave 



PREPATORIAL- 31 

Fort Henry till the lOtli; got to Savannah on the 11th; 
then, presto, as the jugglers say, and Grant was in command 
again on the 13th March, as he writes Smith on the 11th. 
(Last act of the juggle.) The expedition was long enough 
under command of Smith to give color to his location of 
the Shiloli battle-field. This had been doubtless arranged 
at St. Louis. Sherman's Bowman says that Halleck or- 
dered the position on the west side of the river, to pre- 
vent Beauregard joining Johnson at Decatur.* (To keep 
up the juggle this is written, but lets it out.) 

This character of llalleck is enough to settle the char- 
acters of his coadjutors, (Irant and Sherman; and it is 
easily shown, as are the eclipses of the almanac maker, or 
the programme of the traveling juggler, by the after-con- 
duct of these men, that they were chosen to carry out the 
plan of protracting the war, for the reason that Halleck was a 
man that never advised a battle, never went near a skirmish 
on the Corinth approach, and kept his quarters out of reach of 
the heaviest artillery. Grant could not or did not give an in- 
telligent order, or perform a tactical manoeuvre on the 
battle-field of Shiloh, or any other battle-Held, of himself, 
daring the war. Sherman, at Sliiloh, ruined everything he 
handled or meddled with in person on the field of Shiloh, 
and ever3^where else. These were the men, and exceedingly 
proper men, chosen by the Aulic council at Washington 
to protract the war in 1862, and let it run according to 
political circumstances thereafter, till 1861 and 1865. 

This commentator, then, with such characters to handle, 



*Tlus noeds no explanation to a close or military reader, but may to others. 
BuoU's effort was to prevent Johnson going from Decatur to Corinth by rail- 
road. Halleck's etlbrt had been to gwt Johnson to Corinth, past Florence, 
from Decatur; but here Sherman says, that the effort was to prevent Beau- 
regard joining Johnson at Decatur, (an absurdity,) and, therefore, it was nec- 
essary to locate the army on the west side of the river, which is a double 
fiction, or worse. To take and hold Florence was to prevent the junction 
of the rebel armies, and for this purpose Florence itself, on the north or east 
bank, was the point to reach. Sherman avoids this truth, for the purpose of 
deception, in one case, as to the true object in view by Buell, which is one 
fiction, and makes a statement against the fact to justify the location at 
Shiloh, where a battle could be invited, as it was to prolong the war, and 
this makes the double fiction. W. P. G. 



32 PREPATORIAL. 

claims and proclaims it his duty, as a truthful narrator, a 
soldier, and an honest man, to put the very worst possible 
construction upon the writings, words, and doings of these 
men. By their conduct since the war, they have rendered 
themselves subject to an indictment for false pretenses, if 
nothing worse, in appropriating laurels they never won, in 
assuming merit they never had, and in claiming the grati- 
tude of the people for having been the mere tools of polit- 
ical practitioners, to call them nothing worse. They have 
been hired and paid for unnecessary bloodshed, for accumulat- 
ing hundreds of millions of national debt, and for being the 
ministers of party frauds, and abases without historical paral- 
lel. Are such hirelings tit to be trusted ? If not hirelings, 
let their admirers tell us what they are, unless, like cun- 
ning stewards, they have become the owners of the estate, and 
will, if they can, by themselves or their successors, hold it 
in perpetuity, if not foiled in the impending attempt at 
the continuance of a corrupt administration of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic. Such, after as full an examina- 
tion as possible of what chance records of the war are left, 
is the entire conviction of a 

West Point Graduate. 
Washington, April 6, 1862. 



SHERMAN'S REPORT. 

Headquarters Fifth Division, 
Camp Suiloh, April 18, 1862. 
Captain J. A. Rawlins, 

A»^islant Adj utant General to General Grarit: 
Sir: I had tlie honor to report that on Friday, the 4th instant, tlie enemy's 
cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a half in advance of 
my center, on the main Corinth road, capturing one first lieutenant and seven 
men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them 
back about five miles, killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was 
again very bold, coming well down to our front ; yet I did not believe he de- 
signed anything but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning early, 
the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, 
when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to General Mc- 
Clernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him 
notice that the enemy ,was in our front in force; and to General Hurlbut, ask- 
ing him to support General Prentiss. At that time, 7 a. m., my division was 
arraneed as follows : 



PREFATORIAL. 3S 

1st Brigade. Composed of 6tla Iowa, Col. J. A. A'IcDowell ; 40th Illinois, 
Col. Hicks; 46th Ohio, Col. Wortliington ; and the Morton Battery on the- 
extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road, over Owl creek. 

2d Brigade. Composed of 5th Illinois, Col. D. Stuart; 54th Ohio, Col. T. 
Kilby Smith; 71st Ohio, Col. Mason; on tlie extreme left, guarding the ford 
over Lick creek. 

3d Brigade. Composed of 77tli Oliio, Col. Ilildebrand ; 5.3d Ohio, Col. 
Appier; 57th Ohio, Col. Mungcr ; on tlie left of the Corinth road, its riglit 
resting on Shiloh meeting-house. 

4th Brigade. Composed of 72d Ohio, Col. Buckland ; 48th Ohio, Col. Sulli- 
van ; 7lh Oliio, Col. Cockerill; on the right of the Corinth road, its left rest- 
ing on Shiloli meeting-house. 

Two batteries of artillery — Taylor's and Waterhouse's — were posted, the 
former at Sliiloh and latter on a bridge to the left, with a front fire over open 
ground, between Munger's and Appier's regiments. The cavalry and com- 
panies of tlie Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large 
open field to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, whicli I regard as the 
centre of my position. 

Shortly after 7 a. m., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our 
front, and when in the open field before Appier's regiment, the enemy's pick- 
ets opened a brisk fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, 
of Comfiany H, Second Illinois cavahy. The fire came from the bushes, 
whicli line a small stream that rises in the field in front of xippler's camp, 
and flows to the nortli along my wliole front. 

This valley afforded the enemy a partial cover, but our men were so post- 
ed as to have a good fire at him as he crossed the valley and ascended the 
rising ground on our side. 

About 8 a. m. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry 
to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became 
satisfied, for the first time, that the enemy designed a determined attack on 
our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of bat- 
tle, at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appier and ordered him to hold 
his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, 
and I informed him tliat lie had a good battery on bis right, and strong sup- 
porters to his rear. General McClernand bad promptly and energetically re- 
sponded to my request, and had sent me three regiments, which were posted 
to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line. 

THE FIEST DAY. 

The battle began by the enemy opening a hatter}' in tlie woods to our front, 
and tlirowing shell into our camp. Taylor's and Waterliouse's batteries 
promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry pass- 
ing obliquely to the left across tlie open field in Appier's front ; also other 
columns advancing directly upon my division. 

Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle be- 
came general. Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across 
the field to our left, and directing their course on General Prentiss's. I saw 
at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals 
McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel witli the 
Tennessee river, and about two miles back from it. Very soon the sound of 
musketry and artillery announced tliat Prentiss was engaged, and about 
9 a. m. 1 judged that lie was falling back. About this tune Appier's regi- 
ment broke in disorder, followed by Mungen's regiment, and the enemy 
pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery, thereby exposed. 

Tiie three Illinois regiments in immediate support of the battery stood for 
some time, but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, and the fire so severe, 
that when Colonel Raitli, of the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound 
and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and 

3 



34 PREFATORIAL. 

the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) batterjr. Al- 
though our lelt was tlms turned, and the enernj'- was pressing our whole line, 
I deemed Sliiloh so im[»ortant that I remained by it, and renewed my orders 
to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground, and we did hold 
these positions rntil ahout 10 o'clock a. m., when the enemy had got his 
artillery to the rear of the left fiank, and some change became absolutely nec- 
essary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade — Appier's and Mungen's — 
had already disa}ipeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in 
disorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery, still at Shiloh, to 
fall back as farjis the Purdy and Hamburgh road, and for McDonald and 
Buckland to adopt that road as their new line. I rode across the angle and 
met r.ehr's battery at the cross roads, and ordered it immediately to come 
into battery action right. Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost 
immediately shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, 
carrjnng off the caissons, and abandoning five out of the six guns without 
firing a shot. The enemy pressed on after gaining this batterj'', and we were 
again forced to choose a line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had sub- 
stantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. 
McDowell's and Buckland's brigades still maintained their organizations, 
and were conducted by my aids so as to join on McClernand's right, thua 
abandoning my original camps and line. 

This was abont 10]- a. m., at which time the enemy had made a furious at- 
tack on General McClernand's whole front. He struggled most determinedly, 
but finding him pressed, I moved I^IcDowell's brigade directly against the left 
flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the 
men to avail themselves of every cover — trees, fallen timber, and a wooded 
valley to our right ; we held this position for four long hours, sometimes 
gaining and at others losing ground, General McClernand and myself act- 
ing in perfect concert and struggling to maintain this line. While we were 
so hardly pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could 
not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front; and Gene- 
ral Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 
3 p. m. But about 4 p. m. it was evident that llurlbut's line had been 
driven back to the river; and knowing that General Wallace was coming with 
reinforcements from Crump's Landing, General McClernand and I, on con- 
sultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge by 
which General Wallace had to approach. 

We fell back as well as we could, gathering, in addition to our own, such 
scattered forces as we could find, and formed the line. During this change 
the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by an Illinois 
regiment, whose number 1 did not learn at that time or since. The Fifth Ohio 
cavahy, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in 
check for some time, and Major Taylor also came up with a new battery, and 
got into position to get a good flank fire upon the enemy's column as he pressed 
on General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when General McCler- 
nand's division made a fine charge on tlie enemy, and drove him back into 
the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field about two hundred 
yard.s wide in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the 
enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day. 

Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his ground 
all Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle, and, 
when ordered, he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In 
falling back to the next position he was thrown from his liorse and injured, 
and Ins brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates, 
Colonels Hiiks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel 
Hicks led his regiment in the attack on iSunday, and received a wound which 
it is fcareii may [irove mortal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and de- 
serves well of his country. Lieutenant Colonel Walcott, of the Forty-sixth 
Ohio, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. 



PKEFATORIAL. 



35 



My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having 
received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had heen 
under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them, as 
they did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of 
older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and 
organization; when individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get 
away. 

My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am notyet advised where 
they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. 

LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED. 







First brigade. 












Killed. 


WOUN 


DED, 


Miss. 


ING. 




Officers. Men. 


Officers. 


Men. 


Officers. 


Men. 


6th Iowa Vols. 


2 


49 


3 


217 





39 


40th m. 


1 


42 


7 


148 





2 


46th Ohio " 


2 


32 

Second h 


3 

rigade. 


147 





52 


55th 111. 


1 


45 


8 


183 





41 


54th Ohio. " 


2 


22 


5 


128 





32 


71st " 


1 


12 

Third h 




•igade. 


52 


1 


45 


77th Ohio. " 


1 


48 


7 


107 


3 


53 


57th " 


2 


7 





82 





33 


53d " 





7 
Fourth h 



•igadc. 


39 





5 


72d Ohio. " 


2 


13 


5 


85 





49 


48th " 


1 


13 


3 


70 


1 


45 


70th " 





9 


1 


53 


1 


39 


Taylor's battery, no report. 












Behr's " 


1 

















Barrett's " 





1 





5 








Waterhouse's do. 





1 


3 


14 








Orderly Ilolliday. 


1 













Killed, wounded, &c. 16 302 45 1230 6 435. 

Officers killed 16 Soldiers killed, 302x261-563 killed. 

" wounded 45 " wounded 1,230 

" missing 6 " died since the battle... 261 

" missing 435. 

Aggregate loss, 2,034 in the division. 

The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we re- 
covered seven, not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in number to 
balance the account. At the time of recovering our camps our men were so 
fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy, but on 
the following day 1 followed up with Buckland's and Ilildebrand's brigades 
for six miles, the results of which I have already reported. 

The cavalry of my command kept to the rear, and took little part in the 
action; but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the mus- 
ketry fire under which we were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a. m. 
till Monday at 4 p. m." W. T. Sheeman, 

Brevet Oen. Com. 5th Div. 



36 PREFATOKIAL. 

Extract from. Bowman s Sherman and His Campaign. 

The enemj''s forces under General A. S. Johnston, consisting of the corps 
of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, of two divisions each, and the reserve division 
of Brigadier General Breckinridge, having successively evactuated Columbus 
and Nashville, and abandoned Tennessee and Kentucky, with the exception 
of Memphis and Cumberland Gap, had concentrated at Corinth, in Missis- 
sippi, and were there awaiting the development of our plans, ready to act, 
according to circumstances, on the offensive or defensive, and to take advan- 
tage of any error we might make. The position was well chosen for observ- 
ing our movements, for covering the line of the Mississippi, or for menacing 
the flank ami rear of an army invading Mississippi and Alabama, 

General Halleck decided to advance up the Tennessee river as far as prac- 
ticable by water, tlien to debark on the west bank, attack the enemy at Cor- 
inth, and endeavor to cut him off from the east, and compel his surrrender, 
either at Corinth' or on the banks of the Mississippi. Grant was ordered to 
move up the Tennessee, and Buell to march from Nashville and join liim near 
Savannah, Tennessee. 

On the 14tli of March Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's 
army, passed up tlie Tennessee on transports, and after making a feint of 
landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh 
Landing. It was Sherman's intention to march from this j^oint seven miles, 
in the direction of luka, and then, halting his infantry, to dispatch the cav- 
alry to the nearest point on the Memphis and Charleston railway. The at- 
tempt was made, but the enemy was encountered in greater force than had 
been exjiected, and it did not succeed. In the meanwhile, Mnjor General 
Charles F. Smith, who had command of the advance, having landed his own 
second division at Savannali, had selected Pittsburgh Landing as the most 
favorable position for the encampment of the main body of the army, and 
under his instructions Sherman and Hurlbut, who, with the fourth division, 
had closel}!- followed him, went into camp there. In the course of a few days 
the}' were joined b}^ the first and sixth divisions of McClernand and Prentiss, 
■and by Smitli's own division from Savannah; and Major General Grant him- 
eclf arrived and took command in person. During the last week of March 
the Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio. General 
Buell had informed General Grant that he would join him before that time; 
but he had encountered great delays, and on the morning of the Gth of April 
the Army of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected. Instruc- 
tions iiad been sent by General Grant to expedite its advance, and to push 
on to Pittsburgh. The importance of the crisis was apparent, for Johnston 
would naturally seek to strike Grant before Buell's arrival ; but Buell marched 
his iroops with the same deliberation as if no other army depended upon his 
promptness. By exjiress orders, he even caused intervals of six miles to be 
observed between his divisions on the march, tluis lenathening out his column 
to a distance of over thirty miles. 

.Extracts from General Grant's report of Sluluh. 

" Headquarters District West Tennessee, 

"Pittsburgh, April 9, 1SG2. 
"To Captain N. H. McLean, &c.: 

" It becomes my duty again to report another battle, fought between two 
great armies, one contending for the best Government to be desired, and the 
other for its destruction. It is pleasant to record the success of the army 
contending for the former principle. 

"(.)n Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by tlie enemy. 
The ba,ttle waxed warm on the left and center, ranging at times to all ))art3 
of tiie line. There was the most continuous firing of musketry and artillery 
ever hoard on this continent kept up till nightfall. 



PREFATORIAL. 37 

" The enemy having forced the center line to fall back nearly half way from 
their camps to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort 
was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of tlie landing, 
transports, &c. This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexing- 
ton, Captains Gwin and Shirk commanding, with four 24-pound Parrot guns 
and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for 
artillery and cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops 
were stationed there, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry 
force for their support. 

"Just at this moment the advance of Major General Buell's column, part 
of the division of General Nelson, arrived. The two generals named both 
being present, an advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, 
and the enemy was soon driven back. 

"In this repulse much is due to the presence of the gunboats Tj^ler and 
Lexington and their able commanders, Captains Gwin and Shirk. During 
the niglit the divisions under Generals Crittenden and McCook arrived. Gen- 
eral Lew. Wallace, at Crump's landing, six miles below, was ordered, at an 
early hour in the morning, to hold his division in readiness to move in any 
direction he might be ordered. At 11 o'clock a. m. the order was delivered 
to move it up to Pittsburgh, but, owing to its being led by a circuitous route, 
did not arrive in time to take part in Sunday's action. 

"My force was too much fatigued, from two days' hard fighting and expo- 
sure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to 
pursue immediately. Night closed in with a heavy rain, making the woods 
impassable for artillery next morning. General Thomas, however, followed 
the enemj', finding that the main part of their army had retreated in good 
order," &c. 

"I feel it a duty, however, to a gallant and able officer — -Brigadier General 
W. T. Sherman — to make special mention. He not only was with his com- 
mand the entire two daj'S of the action, but displayed great judgment and 
skill in the management of his men. Although severely wounded in the 
hand on the first day, his place was never vacant. He was again wounded, 
and had three horses shot under him," &c. 

" Lieutenant Colonel McPherson, attached to mj'' stafl' as chief of engineers, 
deserves more than a passing notice for his activity and courage. AH the 
ground around our camps has been reconnoitered by him, and the plans, care- 
fulh' prepared under his supervision, give the most accurate iuformation of 
the nature of the approaches to our lines. During the two days' battle he 
was constanth^ in the saddle, leading the troops as they arrived to points 
where their services were required. During the engagement he had a horse 
shot under him. At present I can only give our loss approximately at 1,500 
killed and 3,500 wounded; 200 horses were, killed. U. S. Grant." 



38 SHILOH. 



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 

"The south to-day is more formidable and arrogant than she was two 
years ago, and we lof e far more by having an insufficient number of men than 
from any other cause. We are forced to invade ; we must keep tiie war South. 
They are not only ruined and exhausted, but humbled in pride and spirit." 
(Sherman's letter after Vickshurg.) 

"The enomy having forced the center line to fall back nearly half way 
from the camp to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a desperate 
effort was made by the enemy to turn our left, and get possession of the land- 
ing, transports, &c. 

" This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Captains 
Gwin and Shirk, commanding, with four twenty-four pound guns and a 
battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery 
and cavalry and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were sta- 
tioned there, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for 
their support. 

"Just at this moment the advance Major General Buell's column, a part 
of the division of General Nelson arrived ; the two generals named, both being 
present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack, and 
the enemy was soon driven hack. U. S. Grant." 

Extract from General Grant's Letter to the Society of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee. 

"Washington, April 7, 1871. 
"General W. W. Belknap. 

"Give my congratulations to the gallant Society of the Army of the Tennes- 
see, &c. The battle of Shiloh, though much criticized at the time, will ever be 
remembered by those engaged in it as a 'brilliant success,' won with raw 
troops over a superior force, and under circumstances the most unfiivorable 
to the Union troops. U. S. Grant." 

The writer of this treatise on the Shiloh campaign of 
1862 claims nothing more than to be an imperfect compiler 
of facts, fallacies, and fictions, in regard to this extraordi- 
narily understood and entirely misunderstood campaign. 
It stands forth now as a campaign more unexampled in its 
results, so far as they are known, than any this age or 
country has ever witnessed, in regard to its influence on 
the politics and policy of this so-called republic of the 
world. 



INTRODUCTORY. 39 

This compiler will sometimes endeavorto rise to tliegrude 
of a narrator or relator of events and their bearing upon 
each other and npon parties or individuals well known to 
the people of the Union. 

lie cannot aspire to the dignity of a historian such as 
Ileadly or Hume, or Greeley or Gibbon, or Badeau or Ban- 
croft, to close up the comparative alliteration. Abjuring 
everything in the shape of the philosophy of history, or 
historial philosophy, as to the meaning of which he pro- 
fesses his entire ignorance, he suggests the students of that 
science to Swintou or Schlagel, or Sherman's Bowman, or 
McCauley's JSTiehbur, or even to jSTed Buntline himself, as 
having far more philosopliieal capacity, or at least audacity, 
or even veracity, than several of the above-suggested his- 
torians of the rebellion, and especially the historiographers 
of the Shiloh campaign now in question : Instance Badeau 
and Bowman. All he does claim in the line of Lindlay 
Murray is, that his syntax shall be as near the standard of 
the illustrious characters at the head of this chapter and of 
the army, and of the army and navy of the republic, as cir- 
cii.iistances, and room, and time will permit. 

And that his conclusions from the same premises shall be 
no wider apart than those of the chivalric Sherman, in the 
first quotation, and that tliere shall l)e few, if any, wider in- 
terjections between his premises and conclusions moi-e dif- 
iicult to span or fathom than the ravine for artillery and 
cavalry tlirown in between the arrival of Buell and his 
rescue of Pittsburgh landing, &c., so luminously related 
by the illustrious President of the republic. 

And, having thus introduced these august personages, 
which, for the present occupy and require, of choice or of 
necessity, so much of the attention of this treatise and this 
Union, an analysis, however imperfect, ma}' next be under- 
taken to develop the profundity of Sherman, and extract 
from the martial and naval erudition of Grant the true 
meaning and intent of their respective paragraphs illustrat- 
ing this chapter. 

The condition of the South being in question, take from 



40 SHILOH. 

Sherman's paragraph all extraneous matter, and the solu- 
tion will be perfect, as thus: 

"The Soutli this moment is more formidable and arro- 
gant than slie was two years ago. She is not only ruined 
and exhausted, but broken in pride and spirit." There it 
is; how luminous, how like — well ; like Sherman, of course. 

This is a favorite practice of antithesis habitual to this 
'■'■r/rcat commander " who thus, in an unconsciously playful 
manner, seems only to express that he may expunge him- 
self, as at the West Point black-board after a demonstra- 
tion. This practice may be more readily observed in the 
chapters on "Sherman's Evidence and Cross-examination." 
These specimens of logic, or elements of evidence, may 
not be as profound or clear as 'SSVar/t^'e on Ecidence,'' hut 
will be found far more original, and infinitely more incon- 
clusive, to which condition it seems his eftbrt to reduce 
his own evidence in usual cases, even without a rebutter, 
of which there is seldom a necessity. 

Next, to proceed with the illustrative paragraph of the 
illustrious President, with which it has been presumed to 
illuminate this straggling production, it should first be 
premised, in historical justice, that it contains, if less syn- 
tax, much more of conclusion, however extremel}' ultimate, 
than does the conclusive production of his admiring friend 
the General, &c. The solution, however, is a trifle more 
tedi(Mis, not to say al)struse, by reason of the depth and 
width and ponderosity, not to say prolixity, of the syntax 
to be develoj^ed, with more or less grammatical ability and 
meciiaiiical skill. First steam out, with all possible regard 
and respect for Captains Gwin and Shirk, the gunboats 
"Tyler" and "Lexington," these captains commanding, 
with four twenty-four Parrot guns and a battery of rifled 
guns, then tilling up the ravine for artillery and cavalry, 
wdiich last are thus made to play the patriotic part of the 
noble Curtius (or, perhaps, properly Curtis — G. H. or 
Grant — Harper's Curtis) in the pit of the Roman forum, 
some time since, letting, meantime, the hostile infantry, 
if any, stand fi'om under, while packing or parking the 



INTRODUCTORY. 41 

artillerists nearer the landino:: then marcliini^ off" "/Ae 
small hifantry force" to swell Sherman's corporal's guard 
at the close of the battle, which, having no troops, as 
Greeley says, after 8 a. m., he must have need for; as 
Grant says, by his ^^ personal efforts," like a steel-clad yaladin 
of old, he saved the army. 

Having, with so much time and strain, cleared off these 
traverses or interjections between the President's premises 
or conclusion, we do roach the fiict, by no means seem- 
ingly intended to be expressed, if possibly to be avoided by 
this able rhetorician and commander, that " at a late hour 
in the afternoon a desperate effort was made to turn our 
left and get possession of the landing, transports," &c. 
(That is, trains, artillery, generals, and army.) "Just at 
this moment General N^elson, with the advance of Major 
General Buell's column, arrived, both Generals being pros- 
ent, when an advance was by these generals made, and the 
enemy driven back." Here is a necessarily handsome, but 
a hardly and niggardly wrung-out admission of almost 
providential aid in a desperate extremity, with not a word 
of acknowledgment, much less of gratitude, for deliver- 
ance from the very closing javi's of destruction. And then 
the matter is as indifferently dropped as the stump of a 
cigar. It is no wonder, then, that a mind so indifferent to 
beneiits, and a memory so callous to their recollection, 
selfish, ungenerous, and unjust, should, with the weight of 
honors and emoluments thrust upon their possessor, utterly 
ignore such a service, after nine long years of enjoyment 
and prosperity, due alone to such a providential rescue 
April 6, 1862. 

No wonder that their preservation from this very mael- 
strom of desti'uction should cultivate entire mental obliter- 
ation of the i)ast, and the man, made what he is by the 
criminality of that day, should write such a letter as the 
above, claiming this deliverance from disgrace and destruc- 
tion as a '■'■ brilliant success." 

Yes, n ^^ brilliant success," won by him over a superior 



42 SIIILOH. 

force, while in command of the Army of the Tennessee at 
Pittsburgh handing, April Gth, 1862. 

Should an^Mntelligent and impartial man, without know- 
ing anything personally or historically of Grant or Sher- • 
man, have the above-quoted paragraphs referred to him, by 
which to judge of the characters and qualifications of their 
writers, he might justly conclude, th it the writer of the 
first paragraph had not a very perfectly-balanced intellect, 
and the writer of the last might have serious imperfections 
of both bead and heart. Such is the fact, sucb will be 
found the fact, from everything these distinguished person- 
ages have said or done or written, hereinafter stated or hav- 
ing reference, as a part of this compendium of the Shiloh 
campaign of 1862. 

Taking a fair average of everything these men have ever 
said or done of themselves substantially, the above quota- 
tions are a fair criterion by which their degree of useful- 
ness and capacity may be properly determined. They are 
the inevitable results of the system under which the war 
was carried on and carried through, and it is about time 
that the people, having some little interest in the welfare of 
the Union, should endeavor to establish their real value, 
before intrusting them any further with the administra- 
tion of the military and civil Government of the Union. 

The writer first proposed to develop the true history and 
character of these otficers l)y a comm.entary upon their 
biographies, more especially that of Sherman, as the more 
obtrusive of the two, but he soon found himself in a maze 
of perpetual digression, as incomprehensible as the crudi- 
ties and fidlacies and fictions of Badeau and Bowman he 
undertook to explain and explode. " The diary extracts 
hereinafter quoted constitute the earliest germ of this 
treatise. When written, the writer saw much that was 
out of rule not therein recorded. He first attempted, with 
thousands of others, to have an investigation, immediately 
after the battle, by order of General Halleck; but all were 
referred by him to Grant and Sherman, the officers whose 



INTRODUCTORY. 43 

conduct was to be investigated. ISText he, with thousands 
of others, in and out of the army, applied to the Ohio Sena- 
tors, Messrs. Sherman and "Wade, the latter of whom was 
the head of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. No 
answer could be had from them, and this relator, having 
written to the lion. V. B. Horton, of Ohio, received an 
answer as follows : 

" Washington, June 6, 18G2. 
"Dear Sir: Your letter of May 23 came to hand. I saw Mr. Wade, as 
you requested. It is a delicate matter for any one connected with the legis- 
lative department of Government, to interfere with the military details, and 
I doubt whether Mr. Wade will think it judicious to do anything.' What- 
ever is done in regard to inquiries, will have to be accomplished, I think, 
through the regular military channels. 

"Yours, truly, 

" V. B. IIOETON." 

It was then plain to him that there was a power of some 
description at Washington, by which the architects of de- 
feat and slaughter at Shiloh enjoyed perhaps something 
even more than impunity. It seemed a nonplus. 

The French astronomer, Le Verrier, having noted the 
perturbation of Ilerschel, the planet, for which Saturn, his 
hither neighbor, could not be made accountable, betook 
himself to the laws of N'ewton, and perhaps Kepler, in ref- 
erence to planetary or material gravitation, in the inverse 
ratio of the squares of the distances, and perhaps the dis- 
cription of heavenly bodies of equal areas in equal lines, on 
the plane of their orbit, and with little more science than 
is exercised by the butcher or the grocer Avith his steelyards 
and counter-scales in the weight of a pound of beef or 
butter, he discovered his new planet. Moral influences 
have more intricate laws, and are far more complex in the 
manner of their solution; but, by observing the seemingly 
reckless, but clearly designing, and calculating, and invit- 
ing manner in which Grant and Sherman had allowed their 
army to be attacked; the deliberate movements of Grant 
after the attack; the destructive performances of Sherman 
on the field ; and winding up by the audacious fiction of 
Ilalleck, that Sherman had saved the ^'fortunes of a day " 
it was the unanimous conviction he had done most to lose. 



44 SHILOH. 

This relator wus impressed Avitli the conviction that Hal- 
leck had, in some way, an individual interest in the result 
of what had occurred at Shiloh. 

The indisposition to make any investigation, and after- 
ward the snail pace to Corinth, gave a solution to a con- 
versation that had taken place in Halleck's tent a day or 
two after he reached Pittsburg. Sherman's conduct on 
the march to Corinth, in magnifying the difficulties and 
dangers encountered, and his congratulatory order after the 
capture of Corinth, in which Ilalleck and the tedious and 
more than tard\^ achievment of capturing Corinth were 
so extravagantly exalted, as about the most brilliant and 
important victory of history, next to Shiloh by Grant, of 
course; faintly suggested an idea of collusion somewhere. 
Some words used in Sherman's address, or report, as to the 
arhUtij of the region, &c., called to mind a reported talk, such 
as is before mentioned. And when Halleck went to Wash- 
ington as commander-in-chief, in July, 1862, the inference 
was plain, that these commanders Avere in accord with each 
other and with some influences at Washington, overriding 
the articles of war. This then seemed a possible solution 
of disturbing influences behind and above military laws. 
The perturbation of Herschel, calculated by Le Verrier, 
outside of any attractions for which, as has been said, the 
chronic old Saturn could be brought to look — also hinted 
a clue. Hence the impunity to Grant for keeping Buell 
back to risk the loss of a battle, of which the writer was 
then ignorant. The promotion of Sherman, dating from 
the evacuation of Corinth, 26th May, and not from Shiloh, 
(too flagrant that,) was suggestive, in connection with his 
outside influences at Washington. 

Extract from Sherman's official report of the siege of Corinth, dated at Corinth, 
Mississipjn, June, 1862. 

It is a victory as important as any recorded in history. But a few days 
ago (two months) a large and powerful rebel army lay at Corinth, with out- 
post? extending to our very camp at Shiloh. (By special invitation, W. P .G.) 
If with two such railroads as they possessed they could not supply their 
army with troops and store,?, how can they attempt it in this poor, arid, and 
exhausted part of the country 1" 



INTRODUCTORY. 45 

The point liere is, tliat Sherman writes as tlioiigh the re- 
bels had moved from a distance to where lie was then and 
there at Corinth. Tiiese words are those which had been 
used by Ilalleck in saying that there should be no hnflle, as 
the ^^poor, arid, and exhausted state of the cowUry " would com- 
pel an evacuation, &c., early in June, 1862. Sherman con- 
cludes by saying that success can only be accomplished by 
a ready and cheerful obedience to our leaders, (Ilalleck and 
Grant and he,) in Avliom we mrin (after the siege) have just 
reason for the most implicit confidence. 

The letter of the Hon. V. B. Norton plainly proved that 
the Committee on the Conduct of the War was a cover, not 
an exposition, and might have been instituted to relieve the 
War Office of responsibilit\', which was the fact. Seeing 
no chance with the legislative or military autliorlties, 
plainly in colhision as to Shiloh,the writer became still more 
determined to hunt the matter down, as subversive of all 
justice or safety in the military, and all stability in tlie civil 
existence of the Government. lie became determined, as 
desirous, to get at a solution, if possible, of this collusive con- 
duct of the commanders in the field, and to find out iiow 
they were in accord with the intlnciices at AVashington. 

Disgusted with a service in which inca}tacity, neglect, 
and cowardice, and worse were at a premium, even on a 
battle-field, he pursued a course not necessarily here ex- 
posed, by which lie gained the court martial evidence de- 
tailed in a following chapter and never before made public. 
That he strove for the court martial is plain, from tiie fol- 
lowing indorsement of General Sherman, on the letter of 
objections, for which see the end of this chapter: 

Respectfully forwarded. 

Colonel Wortliington know that tho siibjccfc-matler of the charges were 
made by General iSiierman, and placed in the hands of the judge advocate. 

He niight have excepted to them before pleading, but ho did not, hid actu- 
ally courted the trial and waived ail objections on that point. The orvfinal 
proceedinr/s* WQVO sent to the Adjutant General's ofiice, Washington, 1). C., 
before any order was made by mo, and sent back with ihe indorsement of the. 
Jud(jc Advocate Gcneralj thai they did not require the order.s or approval of 
the President. 



*Not the fact. f Not the fact. 



46 SHILOII. 

Had Colonel Worthington excepted to his trial at the right time, viz, be- 
fore pleading, his exception would have been good. But it is now too late, 
as he boastingly waived all ohjections and courted investigation. The original 
proceedings will sent to the War Department/or record. 

W. T. SHERifAN, 

[No date, T. W.] Maj. Oen. Comd'g. 

Headquarters Dist. West Tennessee, 
Jackson, Tenn., October 19^, 1862. 
Respectfully forwarded to the Headquarters of the Armj^, Washington, 
D. C. 

U. S. Grant, ' 
Maj. Gen. 

The prisoner did not make objections before pleading, 
for fear they might be sustained, in whieli case he would 
not get the evidence he was after, outside of Sherman's 
evidence. Sherman, he felt sure, would betray his violent 
enmity, as he did. To insure his careless, reckless manner 
of expression and exposition, the prisoner employed no 
counsel, and for fear the court might demur to the extreme 
sentence insisted on by Sherman, he made no defense, ex- 
cept of his diary extracts, or rather a statement to show 
that all and far more than therein charged was true. He 
had not foreseen that all evidence as to everything happen- 
ing during the battle would be ruled out. That audacity 
was not provided for. But he perfectly understands it now. 
It arose from Sherman's impunity for any act of his or his 
court, however criminal or unlawful, which would carry 
out the policy of those by whom the officers in question 
were employed to prolong the war. Knowing this then, 
August, 1862, he might not have called the court. Snch 
evidence was excluded, because of its damning character, 
bearing on Grant, and especially on Sherman. It would, 
of course, have upset Halleck's glaring and most infxmous 
fiction as to the conduct of Sherman at Shiloh. But in 
the light of subsequent events even that evidence would 
have had no effect upon the court, as it will not now likely 
have upon the general public; and this is another fearful 
result of promoting men for acts which, by the articles of 
war, or by common law, would disgrace or execute them 
by a sergeant's platoon. 

The prisoner was indeed willing to waive a record so 



INTRODUCTORY. 47 

disgraceful to a West Point Graduate, and did not insist on 
the evidence, as Slicrman's own report offered sufficient 
evidence to show how worse than worthless on the battle- 
tield this witness, prosecutor, and court, all in one, had been. 
The prisoner did notthen knov/ thatthisincapacity,©/' worse, 
had gained him not only his promotion at Washington, 
but a lease of his position for the war. The record states, 
that the prisoner asked and was allowed counsel, but the 
fact was, that he asked only that one of his captains (Alex- 
ander) might assist in keeping the record, which was not al- 
lowed long, as soon after he was ordered on duty with the 
regiment in Memphis. And here may as well be made a 
digression as to another charge which came before the 
court, arising as follows : 

About the 25th June, 1862, the colonel of the 40th Ohio, 
with 302 men for duty, no cavalry, and two light guns, had 
been \eft for capture at Lafayette, Tennessee, there being a 
force of 1,000 to l,G00of the enemy, with headquarters not 
far southwest. He, however, soon finding out the danger 
through his pickets, at once fortified himself by the only 
closed field-work constructed during the campaign. Grant, 
then at Memphis, had refused to allow the troops of this 
regiment their daily rations of whiskey, when on this fa- 
tigue duty, as had been allowed by Ilalleck, to break the 
monotony of the Corinthian advance of half a mile a day. 
He, Colonel W., was notified by Sherman, at Moscow, Ten- 
nessee, July 16, to join his brigade next day, (17th,) as he 
did when the brigade came up. At the request of all hands 
who had built the fori, he allowed his sutler to bring up a 
few thousand rations of cherry-bounce, &c., from Memphis, 
thirtj' miles off". The division coming up on the 18th of 
July, the troops having been separated on detached service 
for some weeks, there were congratulations to the 46tli 
Ohio for its escape from capture by means of its defenses, 
and also convivialities, in which the colonel of the 46th 
Ohio was joined, of course, but attended to his usual duty 
in remaining behind to see that everything was got ofi" in 
proper order, and nothing left behind. 



48 SHILOH. 

The fort was evacuated at 8 a. m., and General Sherman, 
coming in to see the work at 10 a. m., noticed the colonel 
in a hetter humor, perhaps, than usual, as he wished and in- 
tended to be, and thus avoid giving his general of division his 
opinion as to his desertion of his first brigade at Shiloh, 
and exposure of the regiment without a horseman at La 
Fayette. It will be understood that the colonel of the 46th 
had been relieved from his command the day before, and 
the fort had been evacuated two hours before Sherman 
came in. On the strength of this aflair, however, and the 
diary extracts, Sherman preferred a ckarge of '•'■ dnuikenness 
on dn/^," as, commander of the fort, from which the colonel 
had been relieved by special order the day before.* He not 
only made this charge, but swore to the truth of this fiction, 
which he required his staff and several suborned witnesses 
to do also, and of course the prisoner was found guilty of 
being in command of a deserted post! Another necessary 
result of prbtractive policy. 

The above properly belongs to the development of Sher- 
man's cliaracter as a man of justice and veracity. It also 
illustrates the objects and requirements of the Washington 
cabal, who employed such instruments to carry on or carry 
back the war, as the policy of the party in power seemed 
to require. 

The colonel of 46th Ohio has long and vainlj- endeavored 
to have the incidents of the Shiloh campaign investigated 
])y the Senate, or his court martial reported on ])y a com- 
mittee of the House in Congress. It is now plain how 
useless was the endeavor. Such an investigation would 



* " Headquarters, Moscow, Tenn., 

"Julij 16, 1862. 

"Colonel WoRTniNGTON, 

" Commanding La Fayette. 

" Sir : We are oriJered to move. i\Iy division will come to-morrov? or the 
day al'ter to La Fayette, Avhere you will be prepared to Join your brigade 
with all your men and means of transjiortation. 

" Be prepared to destroy your works then, and everything that would be 
of service to the enemy who may come in. We are to operate farther South. 
If Colonel McDowell be at La Fayette, or near there, please communicate to 
him tliis fact, and that he need not return to his camp here, but await our 
arrival at La Fayette. ._" W. T. Suerman, Maj. G3n." 



INTRODUCTORY. 49 

develop much about the doings and misdohigs of this in- 
side ring and hidden cabinet council of the ruling party at 
Washington. It would disclose the price paid for pro- 
crastinating the war in the early winter of 1862, and the 
price promised for the slaughter and disgrace of Shiloh, 
notwithstanding the extent and nature of the official doc- 
uments suppressed and destroyed, and would prove the 
fact of this suppression and destruction. By this court 
martial is proven the suppression of whatoccured at Shiloh, 
the day and night before the battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862. 

Through this necessarily digressive, and, in some sort, 
aggressive, treatise, this relator makes his appeal to the great 
court of last resort, the people of the Union, and more es- 
pecially the volunteers of the rebellion, whose lives and 
hopes, and limbs, and health, and fortunes, were made sub- 
servient to the purposes of cowardly and scheming politi- 
cians, on and oft' the battle-fields of the war. 

Is there a man of character, who was in that service, 
who would liave budged an inch towards a field of slaugh- 
ter, where his general was employed to lose a battle, as a 
jockey is hired to lose a race? 

To you who so cheerfull}' strained yourselves to furnish 
the sinews of the war against the rebellion — 3'ou, the peo- 
ple, who, in the path of duty to the republic, strove so 
faithfully and trustingly — to you, the people, is made this 
appeal — to you who risked your lives in camps and hos- 
pitals ISTorth and South, exposed your lives and limbs and 
blood upon the battle-fields of the Union for the Union, 
this appeal is made. 

And while this appeal for justice is put forth, a solution 
is oftered of the tangled mystery which for ten years has 
clouded the battle-field of Shiloh, and the incidents of that 
campaign. These incidents were clearly and directly con- 
nected with the great crisis of the war. That crisis clearly 
came with the determination of the Government at Wash- 
ington to take no decisive advantage of the Tennessee river, 
in the winter of 1862-'63, to open a highway to the heart 
of the Confederacy. From December to March, the ques- 
4 



50 SHILOH, 

tion of moving troops up the Tennessee to the Muscle 
shoals had been skillfull}^ avoided by Halleck, and he had 
repeatedly declined a ]>ersonal interview with Buell, to ar- 
range as to this ino,-;t inqiortant measure. A great parade 
liad been made as to breaking up the railroads at Corinth, 
Jackson, and Humboldt, requiring land marches of from 
twenty to sixty miles, while the main connecting point at 
Florence, Alabama, was avoided, as will be seen, by Hal- 
leck. Let it then be established, that the occupation of 
Florence, and consequently of the Upper Tennessee valley, 
was purposely avoided, when so easily accomplished, with 
other studied neglect, tending to a prolongation of the 
war, and the intention of that prolongation is i)lain, and it 
is equally plain that it could only be for the political pur- 
pose of gaining the Presidential election. 

"What, had such a policy been known, or even suspected, 
would have been the results? 

1. Volunteering would have been checked, and perhaps 
entirely suspended, and with such a policy to carry on the 
war by drafts would have been impossible. 

2. The public credit would have been utterly prostrated. 

3. The policy of anything like delay was a premium on 
incompetence and neglect, if not cowardice itself. 

4. It was a policy of bloodshed, to maintain a party more 
terrible and revolting, because more irresponsible, than the 
newer policy to maintain a throne. 

5. It required the payment or pensioning of those whose 
knowledge demanded pay for silence, 

6. It gave impunity to otRcial oppression and the ac- 
ceptance of lictitious testimony, and the maintenance of 
trumped-up charges and consequent disgrace, or even death, 
to officers, for personal purposes, or w^ho denounced the 
policy and its ministers. (See Colonel Ws court-martial, 
the charges and the evidence.) 

7. It led to the destruction or suppression of all true 
records of the war, and led to tlie retention of false reports 
for special purposes, of which there is ample evidence in 
this commentary. 



INTROUUCTOllY. 51 

8. Sueli a policy necessarily sanctioned and encouraged 
the violation of all established rules of war, as was the case 
at Sliiloh, where every law of war possible was violated 
with impunity, and rewarded by promotion. 

9. It abrogated all true criterion of military eihciency, 
and made that a merit which before had becu a crime, 
punished by disgrace or death. 

10. It was equivalent to the legalized extension of dis- 
ease, and vice, and crime, the concomitants of war, indefi- 
nitely and without control. 

11. Such a policy was actually the extension of aid an<l 
comfort to the enemy, as occurred in the failure to take 
Florence, or pursue, with ample means, the enemy after 
Shiloh. 

12. Any established evidence of this policy must re- 
lease the opposition to the war from any cause, from all 
odium arising from such opposition in 1862. AVhile the 
war lasted, the sympathy of the people and the vote of the 
troops would most likely be as it was, on the side of the 
administration of the Government by the party responsible 
for the results of the war. 

One result necessarily would be, that all possible means 
must betaken to conceal a policy so inhuman in its prac- 
tice and terrible in its results. It led directly to a neglect 
of all reports from the iield, and indeed of their suppression 
when made, as has to a great extent occurred. The writer 
is aware of one record of a court-martial entirely sup- 
pressed by General Sherman, as no doubt many such 
records have been by him, and especially by General Ilal- 
leck, with the approval of General Grant. 

The record of General Buell's court of inquiry, with the 
exception of the findings, cannot be had. The inijuiiy in 
BuelTs case w-as not allowed to include the incidents pre- 
ceding and during and immediately succeeding the battle 
of Shiloh, proving, as did the suppression of these inci- 
dents on Colonel Worthington's trial, that they will not 
bear the light. It can be proven that the articles of the 
army regulations requiring division commanders to make 



52 SIIILOH, 

immediate reports of all orders issued, was dispensed with, 
at least in the case of General Sherman. The orders issued 
hy this general in his campaigns were, as a general rule, 
unknown at the War OfHce till the end of the wai-, when 
his order-books came in. These books are inaccessible, 
except by act of Congress, which cannot be had, and, if had, 
no order, the suppression of which was necessary to conceal 
the extension of tlie war policy could be found. 

The institution of the Committee on the Conduct of the 
"War for the ostensible purpose of instigating and keeping 
a record of its events, was a mere cover, against any inves- 
tigation or history whatever, so that this terrible policy 
inangurated the system of keeping no official records of 
the war, and suppressing those which were necessarily made. 
To conclude on this point, the writer feels assured that the 
members of this committee, with one or more iT^embers of 
the Cabinet, and two or more of the heads of the military 
bureaus, constituted, with thegeneral-iu-chief, Ilalleck, the 
Aulic council, which regulated the whole course of the 
war after 18G1. These gentlemen in Congress were the 
Hons. B. F. Wade and Z. Chandler, with perliaps Yates 
and Sherman, of the Senate, and of course Cameron, where- 
ever he was, and the Hons. Covode, Julian, and Gooch, of 
the House. 

The Hon. Henry Wilson, chairman of the Committee 
on Military Aftairs, must have been in some sort aware of 
the policy pursued. 

Tliis course must certainly have been repugnant to the 
principles and feelings of a man so honorable and benevo- 
lent; such a man as was Senator Henry Wilson, of Mas- 
sachusetts, 

"As mild a mannered man 
As ever cut a bore, or scuttled" — 

an amendment to an army bill. 

Early in 18G2 this relator made known to him that there 
was terril)lc neglect, oy(ksi[/n, or 'icorsc, in the inanguration 
and consummation and consequences of the l^attle of Shi- 
loh, and he thought he understood from liim and others 



INTRODUCTORY. 53 

in the public councils tliat when the war was over its inci- 
dents of wrong and injustice woukl be riglited, and all 
proper investigation liad for its true history; but, as above 
suggested, this has been made impossible by its extension 
policy, and all or most official records of any consequence 
relative to the great rebellion will constitute no material 
part of future history. 

If the statements hereinafter made, derived, as tliey are, 
from the official documents of the Shiloh campaign of 18G2, 
and from the letters and biographies of Generals Grant, 
Sherman, Buell, and Ammen, including, of course. Colo- 
nel Worthington's court-martial record — if these statements 
are established, and if the most prominent actors in this 
campaign (ITalleck, Grant, and Sherman) acted on their 
own responsibility, that responsibility is shown. to be such 
that, for its terrible and far-reaching results, they should 
be held responsible, whatever length of time has passed 
away. Otherwise they will continue to be, as they have 
been, the beneficiaries of their own wrong. 

If they acted in obedience to the policy of the Govern- 
ment at Washington, in obedience to the will or advice of 
any man, or set of men, authorized to carry out that polic}-, 
they did so, as is plain upon the record, to the violation of 
all military law — all human justice. 

It is a recognized principle, even by Xapoleon, despot 
as he was, that no general is bound to expose his honor, or 
the honor or safety of his troops, to any policy or order of 
his Government at home. 

If he cannot obey without the violation of established 
military law, without risk to his soldiers' honor, and the 
welfare of his troops, he may resign, and avoid exposing 
both, as his duty it is to do. 

If, then, these generals, in obedience to any power, legit- 
imate or otherwise, at Washington, are guilty, as charged, 
with failing to take those measures urged by Buell to defeat 
the enemy, and close the war; — if at Shiloh the army was 
willfully exposed, without guards or defenses, to an invited 
attack; if an endeavor was made to keep reinforcements 



54 sniLOH. 

back wliich were needed for the safety of the Army of the 
Tennessee; if they refused to use sufheient of their forces 
at hand to defeat the enemy, with little or no loss to the 
Union army; if all this, and more, was done for the pur- 
pose of [troti-acting the war, and if, in consequence of de- 
feat, they were screened from punishment and rewarded 
with promotion, the case is clear, that they were bought up 
to serve a political purpose, for which they have been 
amply paid. But as buyers and sellers of misery and blood, 
and human life, and severed social and parental ties, and 
broken hearts, and blasted hopes, and ruined fortunes, all, 
and more than these, tlie dread concomitants of war, they 
have proved themselves unworthy of all human sympathy 
and public confidence in future, and subject to disgrace 
and punislimcnt for the past. 

Brennus, the barbarian Gaul, but threw his sword into 
the scale to swell the golden ransom for desolated Rome, 
in an age of barbarity and blood. But these statesmen, 
and these commanders, in this age of culture and refine- 
ment, have nc^t hesitated to trade and truck and traffic for 
myriads upon myriads of lives and limbs, and rivers of 
blood and rivulets of tears, to satisf)^ a mad ambition for 
power and a groveling greed of gain. If the charge is false, 
then let them answer, why was Buell, who would have 
pushed on the war, }»ushed omt? Why was Ilalleck, who 
kept back the war, kej^t in ? Why were these commanders, 
who organized defeat at Shiloh, and rejected the surest 
means of victory, promoted? Why were those who did the 
most to save the Army of the Tennessee from ruin and dis- 
grace kept down and forced out of the military service? 
Tliese questions are sufficient now. Wlien satisfactorily 
answered, we may go into details as to how it is made a 
merit for commanders of the highest grade to give up their 
commands to subordinates, or give up the field as lost at 
noon of the day, and desert the ruin they had wrought. 



INTRODUCTORY, ' 55 

Note. — Letter of Objections. 

" Fort Picicering, Septemher 17, 18G2. 
"Adjutant General U. S. A. 

" Sir; I would most respectfully call j-our attention to the record on case 
of the trial of Colonel Thomas Worthington, IGth regiment 0. V. I., l)y gen- 
eral court-martial, at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, on the 14th Au- 
gust, 1S62, and suhmit whether, from the evidence, it is not apparent that 
Major General Sherman is the accuser or prosecutor. It also ajipears mani- 
fest of record tha,t the court was ordered by General Sherman. Is this not 
an irregularity, (see sec. G5, Article of War, act 29th May, 1830,) for which 
the record and proceedings should be set aside? 

" A^ery respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" T. Worthington, 
" Col. 4:6th Heg't. 0. V. /." 

Indorsonents on the above. 

" liEADCiUAETERS 46tH 0. V. I., 

"September 17,1862. 
" Colonel Worthington asks tliat the proceedings of his court-martial tiiay 
he examined a:id set aside. CiiAS. C. Walcutt, 

"Lt. Col. Cum'g AGth O. V. I." 

" Headquarters 2d Biug., oth Div., Fort Pickering, 

"September 18, 18G2. 
" Ros[iectfully forwarded. " .Tno. Adair McDowell, 

"CeA. ijth If)iva Vols., 2d Brig. Comd'g." 
" Respectfully forwarded. 

"Colonel Worthington knew that the subject-matter of the charges were 
made by General Sherman and placed in the hands of tlie judge advocate. 

" He might have excepted to them before pleading, but he did not, but 
actually courted the trial, and waived all objections on this point. The orig- 
inal proceedings* wcyq sent to the AdjutantGeneral's office, Washington, D.C., 
before any order was made by me, and sent back witli the indorsement of the 
Judge Advocate General,-\ that they did not re(juire the orders or approval of 
the President. 

"Had Colonel Wortliingtou cxceptdl to liis trial at the right time, viz, be- 
fore pleading, his exception would have been good. But it is now too lati^ as 
he boastingly waived all ol)jections, and courted investigation. Tlie original 
proceedings will be sent to the War Department/or record. 

" W. T. Sherman, 
[No date. T. W.] "^foj. Gen. Commanding.'' 

" Headquarters Hist. West Tennessee, 

".Jackson, Tenn., October 18, 18G2. 
" Respectfully forvvai'deij to the head((uarters of the aimiv, Washington, 
D. C. " U. S'! Grant, 

"Maj. Gen." 

"Ad.jutant General's Office, 

"November 4, 18G2. 
" Respectfully referred to tlie .Judge Advocate General for report. 
" l)y onler of the Secretary of AVar. 

" Thomas M. Vincent, 

"Asst. Adft. Gen." 
"Fleturned to the Adjutant General November 9. (See mem. wit/iin.) 
" The mem. within is asfedlows: [In i)encil. T. W.J 

"Returned to the Adjutant General. The Secretary of War will direct 
what order shall be issued in this case. " C. P. Buckingham, 

''Brig Gen., A. A. G." 



* Not the fact. t Not the fact. 



56 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER 11. 

ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION OF 1862. 

"Our Army of the Tennessee Lave indulgedin severe criticism at the slow 
approach of that army, which knew the danger that threatened us from the 
concentrated armies of Johnson, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay at Corinth," 
(sixteen miles off.— W. P. G.) {Sherman (o U. 8. S. Magazine, 1865.) 

"I hardly tliink we will want your troops. I do not think we will have 
an engagement short of Corinth." (sixteen miles away. — W. P. G.) {Ocneral 
Gvant to General Amnicn, April 5, 1862, at noon on his arrival at the 
river, lialf an hour by steamer from Shiloli.) 

In the last week of ISTovembei-, 18G1, General Buell, who 
bad been two weeks at Louisville, wrote to General-in-Gbief 
McClellan, proposing an expedition up the Tennessee as high 
as Florence and Decatur, Alabama, which McClellan ap- 
proved. On the 3d January following he proposed to Gen- 
eral Halleck the same expedition, to destroy the bridges 
over the Tennessee, as high up as Florence and Decatur, 
so as to sever the communication of the enemy between 
the north and south sides. This also would, by the oc- 
cupation of Florence in force, have prevented all communi- 
cation between Decatur and Memphis past Corinth, and 
past Humboldt, to New Madrid and Columbus, Kentucky, 
where the enemy were in force. 

The occupation of both Florence and Decatur in force 
would have compelled the evacuation of FortDonelson and 
Nashville without a fight, as afterwards Sherman's march 
from Savannah, Georgia, to the North, compelled the evacu- 
ation of Charleston, South Carolina. General Buell had 
proposed that the gunboats should run past Fort Henr}-, 
as afterwards, on Halleck's urgency, was done by Grant at 
Vicksburg; after starting down, as an exj)eritiicni, in Feb- 
ruary 18Go, two gunl)oats separately, which safely ran the 
batteries, but were of course captured below. 

BuelFs i»lan could have been accomplished, and would 
so have been by any commander less over-cautious than 



ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 57 

Ilalleck, who could never be driven into an initiative 
movement likely to provoke a battle.* Halleck at tliat time 
expected and intended nothing, other than to capture Forts 
Henry and Donelson, and took care that Buell should 
have no immediate share in the honor of these captures, or 
any operations up the Tennessee ; which will be plain before 
this narrative is concluded, (by necessary limitation,) and 
was upheld by the Washington ring. Before going into the 
subsequent correspondence, it may liere be premised that 
Ilalleck, having seen the growing discontent with McClellan, 
during the winter of 1861-'62, had, as subsequent events 
prove, determined, ifpossible, to obtain McClellan's position 
as commander-in-chief. The first commander, East or West, 
who should achieve any important success would of course 
be most likely to obtain the position ; and when Mr. Lin- 
coln, in January, 1862, exercised, ex officio, the duties of 
commander-in-chief, it was plain, as it was from the first of 
the war, that the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers offered 
the direct path to the most active and important operations 
of the war in the AVest. There was no one so likely to 
obstruct by his success the calculations of Halleck as Gen- 
eral Bnell. If he could be made use of in achieving any 
important object, without himself being an immediate actor, 
Hallcck's point would be gained, as it eventually was by a 
course of intrigue, of which Buell, to his honor be it said, 
was morally and intellectually indisposed, if not incapable, 
for any intrigue, for any purpose; while intrigue for every 
purpose was Halleck's characteristic practice and delight; 
and in this he, as will be seen, had resemblers, or perhaps 
followers or imitators, of various gradations. In all the cor- 
respondence so far published, the name of General C. F. 
Smith, as a principal, does not appear; though we are told 
he was in command of the troops up the Tennessee from 
early in March to the 17tli, and even a later date of that 
month. This means distinctly that he was either considered 
unfit for duty, or his name was used as a cover for ulterior 

*And had not the policy of the junto at Washington been in the way. 



58 SHiLon. 

purposes: tlie nuiin pui'pose being to make him account- 
able for the location of the Union army at Shiloh. The 
only mention of any correspondence with C. F. Smith is a 
letter of Grant's, March 0th, to Smith, stating this: '■'•Gene- 
ral Halleck telegraphs mc thai when reinforcements arrive I way 
take the general direction/'' On the 11th, Smith reached 
Savannah, Tennessee, whence he replied: "I wrote yon 
yesterday to say how glad I was to find from your letter of 
the 11th of March you were to resume your old command, 
&c. C. F. Smith."' 

Reference, for the better understanding of the above state- 
ments, may now be liad to the correspondence as to the 
Tennessee expedition, in which it will be seen that Halleck 
evades his concurrence in, and seeming origination of, the 
occupation of Florence, Alabama, in letters of March 4th, 
6th, and 10th, 1862, which was the most obvious and 
immediate object, after the capture of Fort Henry, (in a 
military point of view,) as a means of closing the war. 
This was the last thine/ wanted then, at "Washington, with 
whose ring Generals Halleck and Sherman were in close 
communion. And, as will be scon, to avoid Buell's urgency 
for the capture of Florence, he was placed under Hallcck's 
command by the order of March 11, 1862. This was done, 
as must be repeated, that, by permitting A. S. Johnson's 
junction at Corinth, the expected battle would be out of 
Buell's district. After the capture of Corinth all operations 
were suspended on the Mississippi, to prolong the war and 
ruin Buell, who was too upright a man for the purposes of 
the ring. 

"Johnson will not stand at Murfreesboro' ; in fact, is prefiaring to get out 
of the way. Their plan seemp to be to get in rear of the Tennessee, and in 
position to concentrate on Halleck or me." (Buell to McClcllan, March 1, 
1SG2.) 

" I havf! telegraphed Halleck that it is important to seize Decatur, and 
thus cut General A. S. Johnson from Memphis and Columbus," &c., (which 
Halleck would not do. W. P. G.) {McClcllan to Buell, MarcJi, 18G2 ) 

As Halleck had in January been perfectly silent to Buell 
as to a visit of General Grant to St. Louis, to propose tlie 
Fort Henry aifair, so he is, as will be seen, entirely silent 



ORIGIN or THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 59 

as to any dispatch from McClollan urging^ the obvious cap- 
ture of Decatur, which wouhl first liave required the occu- 
pation of Florence. This wonki liave driven A. S, Johnson 
down into Ahibama or towards Chattanooga, which was the 
last thing to be done for the accomplisliment of ITalleck and 
Sherman's objects — which was to allow the junction of 
Johnson to the rebel force at Corinth. This junction would 
carry the war out of Buell's district and into that of Grant, 
held by him under Ilalleck's command, which was done. 
Halleck had undoubtedly grown jealous even of Grant at 
one time, or he pretended to be, in consequence of Donel- 
son. He wrote him no word of congratulation; imputed the 
capture mainly to C. F. Smith, (it was right;) and got up a 
row with Grant about going without leave to iS"ashville 
in February, 1862. (This was, of course, all understood,) 
or it was doul)tless quieted by Sherman's agency when 
he reached Fort ITonry on the 7th of March, 1862. He and 
Halleck had soon become aware that Grant was not a sub- 
stantive man, and had sense enough to know it; w^hich is 
a very great and his only merit, and eifective as great it 
has been. It is the merit of the obstinate, but really docile 
mule, which, feeling its generic inferiority, will follow any 
thing of an}'- sex in the shape of a horse — however halt or 
blind, lame or spavined, the horse maybe. 

"Nashville, March 1, 1SG2. 

* * "Johnson is evidently preparing to go towards the Tennessee. De- 
catur and Chattanooga seem to be the points of rendezvous at present. As 
soon as I can see my way a little. I will propose that we meet somewhere to 
consult, if agreeable to you." (Which it was not, to Halleck.) {General Buell 
to General Halleck) 

" St. Louis, March 3, 1862. 

* * "I will make an appointment to meet you as soon as the Columbus 
movement is ended." (Which he did not intend to do. W. P. G.) {General 
Halleck to General Buell.) 

On the same day General Buell informs General Halleck 
that "Johnson is moving towards Decatur, Alabama, and 
burning all the bridges as he goes," and asks, "What can 
I do to aid your operations against Columbus?" 

On the 4th General Halleck writes Buell: 

"Why not come to the Tennessee, and operate with me to cut Johnson's 



60 SHILOH. 

line with Memphis and New Madrid?* Grant, with all available force,f has 
gone up the Tennessee to destroy connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Hum- 
boldt, (not the fact.) Estimated strength of the enemy at New Madrid, Ran- 
dolph, and Memphis is 50,000. It is a vital importance to separate them 
from Johnson's army : come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can do 
it. We then can operate either on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may 
seem best," (of which he had no intention — not wishing to make Buell promi- 
nent, under the then circumstances.) 

On the 5th of March Buell answers: 

" Your views accord with my own generally, but some slight modification 
seems necessary. Can we not meet at Ijouisville in a day or so? I think it 
very important. The thing which I think of vital importavce is, that you 
seize and hold the bridge at Florence in force. Johnson is now at Shelby- 
ville, some fifty miles south of this. I hope you will arrange for our meeting 
at Louisville. D. C. Buell." [General Buell to General Hcdlcck) 

Halleck answers Marcli 6 : 

"I cannot possibly leave here at the present time, (of course not, W. P. G.) 
Events are passing on so rapidly, tliat I must all the time be in telegraphic 
communication with Curtis, Grant, &c. We must consult by telegraph. News 
down the Tennessee that Beauregard has 20,000 men at Corinth, &c. Smith 
will probably be not strong enough to attack it. It is a great misfortune to 
lose tliat point, (why lose it then?) I shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as 
possible. If you could send a division round into the Tennessee, it would 
require only a small amount of transjtortation to do it. [Signed.] 

" H. W. Halleck." 

Here now is as plain an intention of avoiding Buell as 
Grant put in practice a month later at Savannah. He says 
we must bear the great misfortune of losing Corinth, be- 
cause there are 20,000 of the enemy there, we having 60,000 
men or more; while all idea of Florence, from which, he 
says in his letter of the 4th, two days before, we could 
operate on Decatur and Memphis, is forgotten : and be it 
understood that Florence was the only attainable point 
from which we could so operate with any chance of suc- 
cess. That's why Halleck avoided Florence. 

If there were 20,000 of the enemy at Corinth, these were 
20,000 reasons why Johnson should not be allowed to join 
them with 20,000 more of the enemy. Even the unsus- 
picious Buell seems to have felt tliat here was the cold 
shoulder to his great yet obvious project, indorsed by 
McClellan — the project of preventing the junction of the 
defeated Kentucky troops, under General Johnson, with 
troops from the Chesapeake and the Gulf, at Corinth, 

* Not the intention. f Not the fact. 



ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 61 

which project Ilalleck thus defeated. It seems that after 
the 6th of March there was a dispatch from Halleckof the 
same tenor on the 8th, to which Buell replies on tiie 9th, 
from Nashville, as follows: 

" I did not get your dispatch of the 6th until yesterday, (suspicious;) that 
of tlie 8th to-day. I suggest as loUows: The enemy can move from one side 
of the river to the other at pleasure, (by the Florence bridge,) and if we 
attempt to operate on both sides, without equal means of transit, ive are 
beaten in detail. Florence is the only point from which we can act centrally. 
If you occupy that point, I will reinforce you by water or join you by land. 
If we could meet, I think we could better understand eacli otlier." (This 
Ealleck persistently avoided purposely.) "D. C. Buell." 

Halleck answers, at St. Louis, March 10, 1862: 

" My forces are moving up the Tennessee river, &c. Florence ivas the point 
originally designated, but, on account of the enemy's forces at Corinth and 
Humboldt, it is deemed best to land at Savannah and establish a depot, (which 
was never done — the depot.) The selection is left to C. F Sviilli, vilio com- 
mands the advance. H. W. Hallkck." 

It is likely the dispatch of the 8th, which seems omitted 
above, had proposed a location on the west side of the 
river, as Buell intimates that till Florence is occupied, the 
enemy may move freely from side to side of the Tennessee 
by the bridge, and therefore insists on the occupation be- 
fore joining Halleck by land or water, (and was right.) 

Here he (Halleck) states that Florence was the point 
originally designated, but on account of the enemy's forces 
at Corinth and Humboklt, he abandons a position, in the 
loss of which liundreds of millions and myriads of lives 
were involved and lost, which became the more essential 
from this occupation of Corinth, to say nothing of Hum- 
boldt, one hundred and twenty miles or more off from 
Florence, and from which no attack need to have been 
apprehended. ISTo depot, properly speaking, was ever es- 
tablished at Savannah, except upon boats. 

Halleck says, however, the selection between Florence 
and Savannah, on the east side of the river, was left to C. 
F. Smith. So now, if Sherman and Badeau and Grant and 
Bowman are eredil^le witnesses, C. F. Smith tlisobeyed 
orders or directions here stated by Halleck, in choosing 
Pittsburgh on the west, instead ot'Florence or Savannah on 
the east, bank of the river. But this brave but infirm old 



62 SHILOH. 

soldier was indisposed or unlitted for any arduous intel- 
lectual duty after the capture of Fort Donelson, as was 
generally understood, and was hurt by an accident at Fort 
Henry, which, with other apparent causes, ended in his 
death the — day of April, 1862. This fixes with certainty 
upon Sherman, Hal leek, and Grant equal responsibility 
for their battle-field. But to return to the last letter of 
Buell, which could not have been of any avail, dated iSTash- 
ville, March 10, 1862. 

"The possession and absolute security of the country 
north of the Tennessee river," says Buell, "is of vital im- 
portance, both in a political and militar}^ point of view, 
and under no circumstances should it be jeopardized. It ' 
enables us, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate east, 
west, and south." (This, of course, looked to the occupa- 
tion of Florence, at the head of river navigation.) Had 
the enemy occupied and fortified Florence, the conditions 
stated by Buell could not have existed before its capture. 
( W. P. G.) " With this view," he continues, " the establish- 
ment of your force on the east side of the river as high 
up as possible (Florence) is evidently judicious, and with 
the same view it would be anadoisablc to change the line on 
which I propose to advance." (The line to Florence.) "I 
believe you cannot be too promptly or too strongly estab- 
lished on tlie Tennessee," (at Florence.) (Signed) "D. C. 
Buell." 

Meantime, after Mr. Lincoln had issued his military 
orders, no doubt on the advice of Halleck and others most 
concerned against McClellan, such a change was made in 
Ilalleck's command, March lltli, as made further remon- 
strance on Buell's part unmilitary and unavailable, and 
thus, it is repeated, was organized on a wrong base, with 
a selfish and political purpose, the "Shiloh campaign," of 
which tills is intended to be a treatise — a campaign by 
which was clearly planned and inaugurated the battle re- 
sulting in the slaughter and defeat of Shiloh, which sent 
Halleck to Washington as commander-in-chief; and with- 
out any merit but a criminal defeat, willfully induced, 



ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE. 63 

placed Grant and Sherman where they are; lengthened 
the war by at least a year, as was the object; cost $800,- 
000,000 and the lives and blood of many myriads of Union 
soldiers, with a pension list of at least $10,000,000 a year. 
Two days before this last letter or message of Ilalleck's, 
March 8th, General Curtis gained the battle of Pea Ridge, 
and Hallcck, if he had chosen, had then 80,000 men for 
the capture and occupation of Florence, for which not 
30,000 were requisite; but this capture, it is repeated, 
would have given T3uell and Mitchell the honor of Johnson's 
defeat or retreat at, or from .Decatur, and might have made 
Buell commander-in-cliief at Washington, instead of Hal- 
leek, unless, as is probable, tlud had been arranged in 
Washington in jSTovember, 1861. It must here be under- 
stood, that the line of marcli for Buell from Kashville to 
Florence or Decatur, Alabama, was shorter and better 
than that to Savannah, had it been commenced the 5th or 
10th of March, as it was not till the 20th that Johnson 
passed the danger, as he supposed it, of joining the Con- 
federates at Corinth. 

In a letter of March 18th, 1862, he (Johnson) says to 
Jeft'. Davis: 

" After Buell's capture of Nashville I marched soiuhward and crossed the 
Tennessee at this point, (Decatur,) so as to co-operate or unite wiih General 
Beauregard at Corinth for the defense of the valley of the Mississippi. The 
passage is almo-st completed, and the head of my column is already with 
General Bragg at Corinth. The mevement was deemed too hazardous by the 
most experienced members of my stalT, but the object warranted the risk. 
The difficulty of efl'ecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it ap- 
proaches completion. Day after to-morrov/, the 20th, unless the eneruy 
intercepts me, my force will be with Bragg." 

As to the tall of Fort Donelson, General Johnson says: 

"I observed silence, as it seemed the best way to serve the cause ami the 
country," (the Soutli.) 

Exactly the reasons which prevented an investigation 
into the criminality of Shiloh. It would have checked or 
stopped volunteering, and might have changed the politi- 
cal complexion of Congress. 

"The test of merit with the people is success," says Johnson. " It is a 
bard rule, but I think it right. If I join this corps to the forces of General 
Beauregard, (I confess a hazardous experiment,) then those who are now 
declaiming against me will be ivithout a?i argument." 



64 SHILOH. 

And thus, throogli Halleck's ambition to be com- 
mander-in-chief, and perhaps stronger desire to avoid a 
battle-field, was the way paved to the battle of Shiloh, 
which cost Johnson his life, tlie Union 13,000 soldiers, and 
made that field of disgrace and slaughter the path to 
power and promotion, by those who were their ministers, 
(through the ring at Washington.) 

Halleck had thus manoeuvred away forty days after the 
battle of Fort Henry before Buell's order, of March 18th, 
to McCook, to move from Columbia to Savannah. On the 
20th of March, eight days after Badeau says Grant was 
restored to command, Halleck dispatches to Buell, as 
though General Smith were still in command at Savannah, 
though General Grant got there on the 17th. On the 22d 
March, Buell states that he has a communication from Gen- 
eral Grant at Savannah, of the 19th, which contains no intel- 
ligence of importance. He closes by asking if the bridge at 
Florence is destroyed, but is never answered. Its de- 
struction was harmless to the enemy, as we were on the west 
bank of the river, preparing for the defeat at Shiloh. On 
the same day, March 22d, he writes to General Grant, in 
answer to Grant's letter of the 19th ; states that he has 
directed his advance at Columbia to open communications 
M'ith General Grant at Savannah, and also asks if the 
bridge at Florence is destroyed, to which, no ansioer. 

The above abstract of correspondence, to be returned to 
perhaps hereafter, will show: that Halleck, against the 
urgent advice of Buell, is responsible for the junction of 
Johnson and Beauregard at Corinth, and he and Grant 
are responsible for Buell's detention at Columbia. A single 
word that he was wanted, and, in less than two days, or 
one day, Buell could have crossed Duck river by flying 
bridges, and, if wanted, could have been at Savannah when 
Grant reached there, on the 17th of March, or sooner, but 
for Halleck; but there would have been no battle of Shiloh 
with its fatal results to all but these conspirators. 

And now, having got the Army of the Tennessee near its 
camp at Shiloh, and shown how a month had been wasted 



ORIGIN OF THE TENNESSEE EXPEDITION. 65 

for a scUisli purpose in not having it at Florence a montli 
before, let it be shown who was responsible for its location 
at Sliiloh. The means by which the floods were assisted 
in keeping lUiell back will be developed, and here, so far 
as private information is concerned, General Grant must 
bear the brunt of the delay and its consequences, meri- 
torious or otherwise. To do this satisfactorily, reference 
must be had to Badeau's History of General Grant, indorsed 
by General Grant himself, and one digression after 
another, and frerpient repetitions, must be the tedious 
consequence. The third, or Shiloh chapter, of this his- 
tory of Badeau,is made part of this commentary,* so that 
the reader, if not satisfied with the construction put upon 
the history by the commentator, can put upon the history 
a construction of his own, and no charge of garbling 
can be made, when so easily detected, by referring to Ba- 
deau. Reference must, in considering this history, be 
made to the letters and reports of Generals Grant and 
Sherman, the life of Sherman by Bowman, with Sherman's 
indorsement, and such other official and unofficial evidence 
as will explain a narrative by no means connected, but as 
regular a commentary as such a history as Badeau's will 
permit. No account of the battle of Shiloh can have much 
consistency as to the connection or succession of events. 
But there need be no such contradictions as to time, events, 
or distances, as occur in Badeau, and all other accounts. The 
intention to confuse and deceive the casual reader is evi- 
dent, and the labored endeavor to show that Grant did not 
try to evade Buell on the 5th of April, gives plain proof of 
this evasion. This evasion or avoidance of General Buell 
by Grant, on the 5th, is entire proof of the charge that he 
sedulously invited an attack, while as sedulously endeavor- 
ing to prevent Buell's knowing the danger, or having any 
share in repelling the expected attack; all of which, how- 
ever tedious the process, the true and impartial historian 
is in duty bound to expose, as intimately connected with 

*The writer is compelled to omit this chapter on Badeau. 
5 



66 SHILOH. 

the most important, and extraordinary, and sanguinary 
battle of the rebellion. 



Note. — la this order of March 11, 1862, is found the first direct evidence 
of the intention and endeavor of the party at Washington to prolong the 
war. The matter had doubtless been understood and arranged before Hal- 
leck left Washington. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson doubt- 
less created alarm among these political schemers, who were bartering the 
lives and blood of Union soldiers for another quadrennium of power. 

The capture of Florence was to be avoided, and it was for fear that Buell 
might follow up Mitchell's movement, and himself march on Florence, un- 
der authority of Halleck's letter of March 4, that this order was issued, which 
put the matter beyond the reach of Buell or McClellan; clipping McClellan's 
authority, and bringing Buell at once to a sense of subordination which he 
could not but approve. After the capture of Florence, that of Chattanooga, 
and the whole of the valley up to Harper's Ferry, so carefully avoided, 
might not have been easily prevented before the election of 1864. 

And thus this order sealed and signed the death warrant of 100,000 or 
more Union soldiers, and created Government bonds of a thousand millions 
or over. Who was, and who still is, and should be held responsible, and 
who were the willing instruments of such a willful waste of patriot blood 
and national treasure, whose punishment should no longer be delayed? 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 6t 



CHAPTER in. 

TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN OF 1862, UP TO SAVAimAH. 

" I wish no prominent place in this war, I have no heart for it. I am per- 
petually embarrassed by my former associations with the South." {Sherman 
at Paducah and Columbus, Ohio.) 

" I suppose we had a full supply of hay coming from Paducah, but think 
we were rather short." {Colonel Stuart's evidence for Shermayi.) 

" Some of Grant's regiments arrived at Shiloh without cartridges, and had 
withstood and repelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy at 
4 p. ra." {Sherman's letter, January, 1865.) 

" Headquarters District op Cairo, March 5, 1862. 
" Captain Hammond, Adjutant General: 

" Hold all steamboats till morning ; notify all armed brigades and regi- 
ments to embark for Tennessee to-morrow. Sherman." 

This dispatch was the initiation of that Army of the Ten- 
nessee which marched by Shiloh and Memphis to Vicks- 
burg; thence by Memphis and Chattanooga to Atlanta; 
thence by Savannah, Georgia, and Richmond, to Washing- 
ton, where, after a grand triumph, it was disbandoned in the 
summer of 1865. 

The above dispatch reached Colonel Hicks, 40th Illinois 
volunteers, about 9 p. m. of the 5th, and he, as brigade 
commander, made it known through his assistant adjutant 
general, to his subordinates during the course of the follow- 
ing forenoon. One of those subordinates (the writer) re- 
ceived the order to march while distributing arms to his 
regiment, about 9 a. m. of the 5th, or perhaps later in the 
day. It was, of course, greeted by his troops, with exceed- 
ing joy and great applause. 

Proceeding immediately to headquarters at Paducah, all 
commanders of regiments considered within the scope of 
the order received the following in addition : 

[" Special Order No. 74.] 

" Headquarters District of Cairo, 
" Paducah, March 6, 1862. 
"The following regiments will embark to-day for Savannah, Tennessee 
river, and there report to Major General Smith. 



68 SHILOH. 

" The commanding officers will see that their regiments have eighty rounds 
of ammunition and all the means of transportation ©n hand. Baggage must 
be reduced to tlie minimum, and the quartermaster, Captain Pearse, will ob- 
tain a house in which to deposit all baggage left behind. (No house for the 
sick. W. a. P.) 

" Ohio 46th, Colonel Worthington ; Ohio 48th, Colonel Sullivan ; Illinois 
40th, Colonel Hicks; Ohio 53d; Colonel Appier ; Ohio 72d, Colonel Buck- 
land. 

" The quartermaster will at once provide the transportation necessary. 

" By order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman. 

" F. H. Hammonh, a. a. O." 

With this order the different chiefs of regiments repaired 
to the transportation office for boats, and generally left dur- 
ing the 6th of March, 1862. 

It will be observed, that in this order to raw troops, ig- 
norant of, and unaccustomed to, service in the field, noth- 
ing is said in regard to array or hospital stores of any kind, 
or to any disposition of the sick, of which there was neces- 
sarily a large number, who could and should have been 
provided for in the many empty dwellings then in Pad- 
ucah, left by rebels. 

"Fort Henry had been captured," says Colonel Bowman, 
General Sherman's autobiographer, by "General Grant, on 
the 6th February, 1862," without explaining that the capture 
had been made through the intervention of Commodore 
Foote's gunboat fleet, sometime before that General's ar- 
rival, which, in justice to the gunboat fleet, should have 
been explained as it is here. 

About the time of this capture it seems that General W. 
T. Sherman was ordered to Paducah, to take charge of for- 
warding supplies and reinforcements from that point. What- 
ever the characteristic energy imputed by his biographer 
may have effected in regard to the troops at Fort Douelson, 
it is certain that near a mouth later there was neither proper 
forage, ammunition, nor hospital stores for the five regi- 
ments ordered up the Tennessee on the 6th of March, 1862. 
That there were no proper hospital stores, and neither hay, 
oats, nor straw even, for the draft animals, might be accounted 
for by the exhaustion of this material of war for the con- 
sumption of the three divisions of McClernand, C. F. Smith, 
and L. Wallace, then at or near Fort Henry, which divis- 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 69 

ions, however, reached Savannah in about the same state 
of destitution; and General Sherman, a month later, admits 
that some of the regiments reached camp Shiloh even with- 
out ammunition. But hospitals and quarters for the sick 
were plenty at Paducah. There was no possible excuse 
for the extravagance, impolicy, and inhumanity of hauling 
sick men to crowded boats, where to properly care for 
them was impossible; and to carry them with the army, 
as was done, to die, was simply barbarous. 

The surgeons, of their own motion, found empty houses, 
and did the best they could for the dangerously sick, though 
all weak and ailing men should, as a matter of expediency 
if not humanity, have been left behind. 

The 6th was a raw, windy, snowy March day, worthy 
more of Labrador than Tennessee, near the line of which 
last we were. The mud was just sufficiently frozen for the 
horses to break through at every other step. This narra- 
tor, with his command, was near two miles from his boat, 
and, with unbroken mule teams, to reach the river during 
daylight, with his camp equipage and stores, was a very 
uneasy job. 

Of the above-named regimental commanders ordered up 
the Tennessee, Colonel Worthington, 46th Ohio, was the 
only educated military officer. He was sufficiently provi- 
dent to take on board ten days' additional stores of army 
rations for his men and provender (nothing but shelled 
corn) for his mules and horses. Of the eighty rounds of 
ammunition ordered, but thirty could be had, and that at 
11 p. ra., or after. 

His stores were all on board, and he embarked (just one 
month before the battles of the 6th and 7th of April fol- 
lowing,) at 3 a. m. of the 7th of March, 1862. The boat 
(Adams) neared Fort Henry, about noon next day, and about 
all the boats which had left Paducah the day before were 
still there, besides many others intended for the transpor- 
tation of the three divisions from Fort Donelson to the fu- 
ture ticld of Shiloh. 

Drawing up on the west side to make inquiries, the 40th 



70 PHILOH. 

Ohio found itself next the boat of the 5th Ohio cavalry, 
Colonel Taylor. On inquiry it was found that this regi- 
ment had been there near a week, waiting orders, and that 
there was one gunboat and perhaps a single transport 
gone up the river. During our two weeks' delay at Padu- 
cah, there had been rumors of ill treatment of Union men 
at Savannah, who had expected we would have immediately 
taken possession of Florence, Alabama, as urged by Gen- 
eral Buell, immediately after the capture of Fort Henry. 
On this reliance many had expressed their sentiments too 
freely, and thereby suffered in various ways. A general draft 
of all men fit to bear arms had been contemplated, and as 
it is one of the first rules of an intended invasion to move to 
the objective point as rapidly as possible, it was concluded, 
nem. con., to proceed, as there was no signal for the boat 
from Fort Henry. Beyond this there was some chance of 
forage for the teams before the advance of the army, mo- 
mentarily expected, and the regiment accordingly steamed 
on up. The colonel of the 46th would have continued all 
night, and urged the master of the boat to do so, but he 
was apprehensive, he said, of masked batteries upon either , 
shore, and nothing was left but reluctant acquiescence. 
The colonel's diary of the 8th is as follows : 

" Saturday, March Sth, 1862. — A fair frosty morning. Started about sunrise, 
and about 8.30 a.m. stopped at Britt's landing, and tool;; aboard 98 bushels and 
426 sheaves of oats. Stopped at Clifton and other landings, but heard nothing 
satisfactory. Got to Savannah about sunset. Found there one half of the 
40th Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Booth. Took command, and threw out 120 
men as pickets — also a patrol, which took up 40 or 50 stragglers of the 40th, 
who were invading the houses, and, as the people thought, threatening mis- 
cliief, there being a bar on board the boat. Saw a Union man, Mr. W. H. 
Cherry, and got him to send a servant to Waynesboro, 30 miles northwest, 
for information. Heard that the rebel authorities, in anticipation of our 
arrival, were hauling stores from the river below, around by Florence, to luka, 
all of which would have been stopped but for the delay in sending troops to 
Florence a month before. This half of the 40th Illinois had passed Fort 
Henry in the night of the 6th, and, taking little note of circumstance or time, 
had reached Savannah about an hour by sun. It might have been in danger 
but for the arrival of the 46th, which last it was afterward rumored, at home, 
had been captured by ignorantly going ahead of the fleet, &c. But the arri- 
val was most timely. From Mr. Cherry was derived information that the 
rebel authorities were active in the vicinity — that tliere had been a draft en 
masse of the able-bodied male population the previous Thursday, and the 
drafted men were ordered to muster at Savaunali on Monday, the 10th of 
March following." 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 71 

Deeming it his duty to get as full a report as possible of 
the state of affairs in the vicinity for the information of 
General C. F. Smith on his arrival, he, as stated in the above 
diary extract, employed and dispatched a scout in the direc- 
tion of Waynesboro. During the night many refugees came 
to the boat from the west side of the river. Many came 
into the town from the eastward on hearing of the arrival 
of Union troops, and perhaps more than a thousand drafted 
men from all quarters crowded the little village next day. 

On Sunday, the 9th, the 46th had a dress parade, and, 
in connection with the in-coming refugees from the rebel 
draft, this Sunday was pronounced the liveliest day the little 
town of less than one thousand inhabitants had ever wit- 
nessed. At about 2 p. m. several ofRcers of the 46th went 
up in the gunboat Lexington, by invitation of Captain Quin, 
to Pittsburgh landing, eight miles above, and threw, per- 
haps, a dozen shell into the interior, to which there was 
no reply. 

Savannah is the county seat of Hardin county, and is 
joined on the west by McNairy county. From the drafted 
refugees mainly of these two counties the 46th received 
during the day forty or fifty recruits. Mght came on with 
no news of the fleet below, much to the surprise of the 46th 
Ohio, which, being the last regiment to embark at Paducah 
had had little thought of being the first full regiment to 
to reach its destination in advance of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, so famous afterwards in the war. 

On Monday, the 10th, daylight came on with rain. 
Lieutenant Colonel Booth, of the 40th Illinois, found him- 
self out of stores, and the colonel of the 46th, declining 
his request to forage upon the people of the town, gave him 
two days' rations, and an order to proceed down the river 
and look up the army fleet. This was deemed an affront 
which Colonel Hicks, of the 40th Illinois, and commander 
of the brigade, was disposed to resent, and did afterwards 
resent, as an insult to himself and his regiment. 

A river boat, crowded with troops, being the last place 
suitable for sick men, they were got out to-day, and put into- 



72 SHILOH. 

a vacant house near the river, which had been emptied bv 
its owner, who was an officer in the Confederate army. 
He had, however, with usual southern hospitality, author- 
ized Mr. Cherry to allow its occupation by our sick or 
wounded, should our troops appear in his absence : doubt- 
less, also, aware of the good policy of making a virtue of 
necessity. 

Arrangements were also made for the fitting up of a new 
frame church, with the consent of the village authorities^ 
for a government hospital; it having been understood that 
here was to be a large army depot for weeks or months, 
whence the troops would march to break up railroads, or 
rebel camps at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, (humbug.) 
During Sunday and Monday the pickets of the 46th had 
captured half a dozen or more of rebel scouts and horse- 
men, with their horses and mules, and learned that there 
was a large force of Confederate troops gathering or ex- 
pected about Florence, Tuscumbia, Eastport, and luka, 
then expectiiig our attack on the first-named place, as it 
had been expected a full month before. 

Tuesday, the 11th, was a fair, cool morning. The troops 
were brought ashore to clean up the boat, and most of the 
sick were made more comfortable in the improvised hopi- 
tals, the villagers doing all service in their power; for which 
they had and still have the grateful recollections of the 
troops and their commander — Mr. William H. Cherry be- 
ing among the foremost in this friendly, and, indeed, charit- 
able ministration, for which no provision had been made 
by our commander. 

Several Confederates were captured to-day, and among 
them one of the regular rebel cavalry, who had been sent 
in to see what was going on among the Yankee invaders 
of the "sacred soil." 

The steamer Golden Gate came up about noon, and an- 
nounced the Union fleet of boats at hand. The 46th Ohio 
was paraded on the hill above the landing on open ground, 
where a fair view could be had of the approaching Army 
of the Tennessee. 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 73 

The first boats came in sight about 2 p. m., some two 
miles down the river, and it was a sight fraught with 
splendor for the 46th Ohio — a spectacle beheld by no other 
regiment in the army. The weather was soft and fine, 
and one or more flags floated over every boat. ISTearly 
every regiment had a band of music, and in this, till then, 
sequestered region, occurred a scene of martial activitj^and 
festivity, never before witnessed in the Union. Unexpected, 
grand, and indeed terrible, it was, to the inhabitants along 
the forest-girded banks of the Tennessee. 

It was soon, however, discovered, that however beneficial 
to the people of the vicinity and to the interests of the 
Union had been the arrival of the 46th Ohio in adv^ance of 
the array, it was anything but agreeable to General C. F. 
Smith and the general ofiicersof the Army of the Tennessee. 
General Smith, irritable from ill-health and ill-habits, was 
furious at what he denominated the presumption and in- 
subordination of a colonel of volunteers in preceding such an 
expedition in command of a regular officer of the army of 
the United States and major general of Union volunteers. 
He refused to receive the colonel's report, and rebuked him 
for disregard of military etiquette in not passing his report 
through his commander of brigade and division, with 
whom his orders had nothing to do ; and to do this would 
have been impossible, without disobeying the order of the 
6th, (j^o. 74,) which was peremptory to proceed to Savan- 
nah and there report to Major General C. F. Smith, who 
was on the leading boat of the fleet, where the colonel of 
the 46tli found and oftered him his report. 

It also soon appeared that the division commander was 
equally irate at the too prompt arrival of the 4Gth, whose 
colonel he liad snubbed at midnight for being slack in his 
departure, while he was getting on stores and hunting up 
ammunition, which the general of division not only failed 
to supply, but he refused to give an order for ammunition 
at Paducah, intended for a regiment without arms. But 
Colonel W. got it. 

By his prompt arrival the "colonel of the 46th had pre- 



74 SHILOH. 

vented the pressure into the rebel service of perhaps a 
thousand Union men, and had added hundreds to fill 
up the deficient Union regiments. Instead of approbation 
for the result of his prompt obedience to a peremptory 
order, his reward was the enmity of those above him, who 
had failed in their dut3\ and an attempt at his degradation 
for performing his own. (See notes at the end of the chap- 
ter.) 

Colonel Hicks, the brigade commander, was an old Illi- 
nois militia oflicer, a benevolent and brave man, but proud 
and obstinate, as he was ignorant of, and opposed to strict 
militar}^ discipline. Without much education of any kind, 
he was boastful that in the Mexican war he had acquired, 
and professed, great contempt for regular ofiicers and army 
regulations. This contempt for all military law he had car- 
ried out to the fullest extent at Paducah, refusing to sub- 
ject his troops (good men as they were and of excellent 
material for soldiers) to any discipline whatever. 

lie had in consequence been held in arrest by General 
Smith for weeks or even months at Paducah, and his men, 
instead of being sent to the field, had been retained in 
quarters, as utterly unskilled, in consequence of their col- 
onel's practices and principles, and therefore unfitted for 
campaign duty. 

Under this ofiicer, at war as he professed to be with all 
regular ofiicers and with strict discipline, was the colonel 
of the 46th Ohio brigaded by the general of division, with a 
purpose of his 0(on, and anything but friendl}^ to the older 
graduate. When visiting his pickets at Padueah, near those 
of Colonel Hicks, he had found it the practice of these vigi- 
lant watchers of the Illinois, to gather in squads, of two or 
three or more, around a fire, on or off" the picket line, then 
and there to stack arms, by driving their ])ayonets into the 
" bloodless sheaih" of the muddy soil, and pass the time at 
seven-up, poker, or some such absorbing game of cards, 
and all with their colonel's entire approbation — sometimes 
perhaps a looker on himself. 

On reporting this in a qwiiet way to tlic brigade com- 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 75 

mander, lie told his subordinate a long story of his expe. 
rience with the stiff' and stately regulars, tyrannizing over 
the innocent recreations of their men, of whom they should 
have been like him, even as it were a father to Ids troops, as he 
was. As to amending the habits of the sentinels, " it was hard 
to teach an old dog new tricks." On representing the case to 
General Sherman he agreed with Colonel Hicks, and con- 
cluded to let matters proceed in the regularly irregular 
militia routine, or no routine at all. 

So the West Point man had to give it up, &c., &c., 
forbidding his own men on pain of imminent death or dis- 
grace, if ever in danger, from indulging on picket duty in 
such agreeable but dangerous and most unmilitary prac- 
tices; and it was by such practices that many regiments were 
surprised, posts lost, and thousands of men killed and cap- 
tured, in the earlj^ period of the war. But to return to the 
brigade commander at Savannah. He had on arrival landed 
on the west side of the river, thus dividing his brigade. On 
the morning of the 12th, the adjutant of the 46th reported 
this fact, and stated that, the yawl of the Adams being 
gone, he could not get his morning report over the river. 
He was told to send a copy of the report to the A. A. G. of 
the division, and get the report over as soon as he could 
get a boat. There was no forage to be had in the country 
for the teams, and the colonel of the 46th, having purchased 
a lot of corn in the husk, was busily getting it on board, 
supposing, of course, the expedition would not stop short 
of Florence, where feed for teams would be still more dif- 
ficult of supply, and tlierefore he left the care of his report 
to the adjutant. 

At 1 p. m. Colonel Hicks had the colonel of the 46th 
arrested for fiiiling to send over his report. Stating the 
case to Sherman, he got a release at 5 p. m., with a letter 
from Hicks, in which he was assured the arrest had been 
fully approved by Sherman, who knew that no one but 
General C. F. Smith could legally make an arrest. This, 
however, exposed his animus toward Colonel Worthing- 
ton of the 46th, who was reported at home as degraded for 



76 SHILOH. 

misconduct and neglect of duty, in preceding the army with- 
out orders. The object of brigading him under such an 
enemy of regular oiScers as Colonel Hicks had been at- 
tained, and soon after Hicks was displaced for the appoint- 
ment of another brigade commander, also with a personal 
object on the part of Sherman, as will appear in the course 
of this treatise; which, let it here be remembered, will 
not be cumbered with any more such personalities, if pos- 
sible to be avoided. 

We have now the Army of the Tennessee at Savannah, 
instead of Florence; the reason of stopping short of which 
place will be developed hereafter, so far as present infor- 
mation can lead to such development. 

The division commander tlius vented his rage at the 
early arrival of the 46th Ohio at Savannah, on those of its 
sick men his negligence or inhumanity had failed to pro- 
vide for at Paducah, and this after having snubbed its 
commander for being late at that place, to repair his ne- 
glect in not giving orders to his colonels to take on addi- 
tional stores for such an expedition and leave their sick 
behind. 

Note. — 

[Extract from the Diary of an Officer of the Army of the Te7incssee.] 

Savannah, Tennessee, Tuesday, March 12, 1872. 
" A lot of t^ick men wore lodged for the day lu a house near the river bank, 
owned by a Confederate oiiicer named Martin, with leave of his brother to 
use it and his own leave, through Mr. Cherry. Martin's wife I had seen in the 
morning, who made no objection to the use of the house, which was destitute 
of any furniture, and did not tell me there was anything to be injured, as I 
understood there was not. Being in a room above stairs about sunset, I heard 
that she was complaining that mischief had been done. I went down and 
told the sick men to go to the boat. Going out, I found Mrs. Martin com- 
plaining to General Sherman, who asked me angrily what the men were doing 
in the house. I said they were sick men, put in the house by permission of 
its owner, while the boat was being cleaned out. He answered that it was 
an outrage to put men in a house where there were a parcel of women, and 
ordered some soldiers of a Missouri regiment to turn the men out. The sick 
were going as fast as their strength would permit. I clutched his arm and 
rer[uested him to be quiet, as I had ordered the men out, and he saw that 
they were going out. lie repeated his order to clear them out very violently, 
and in the most silly and brutal manner ; but no one seemed disposed to obey 
an order to commit violence upon sick men, thus barbarously brought up 
from Paducah, instead of being sent home, both as a matter of humanity and 
economy." 



TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 77 

"Savannah, Tennessee, March 12, 1862. 
"The ondersighed, citizens of Savannah, Tennessee, and vicinity, hereby 
declare, that the presence of the 46th Ohio volunteer regiment,on the 3d in- 
stant, proved most opportune in preventing the arresting and pressing into 
service of persons subject to the draft or detail ordered by the State authori- 
ties. Refuge was thereby afforded to those who had to leave home on ac- 
count of the draft, and in preventing many of them from being pressed into 
the rebel army, and adding a considerable number of recruits to the Union 
army. The troops under Colonel Woi'thington have been quiet and orderly, 
committing no trespa,ss or intrusion on our citizens or their property. That 
they were actively engaged as scouts and pickets is proven by their capture 
of a number of the rebel cavalry. Information of hostile operations was 
sedulouslv sought for, and active measures taken for their suppression by the 
officers in command. And wo furtlier declare, that the opportune arrival of 
said regiment here gave great satisfaction to our community, and by their 
efficiency and good conduct they merit our thanks and approval, as they will 
doubtless receive that of the national Government and all true friends of the 
Union. W. H. Cherry, H. Stephens, J.S. Berry, B. Hinkle, George L. Morrow, 
Donald Campbell, H. H. Brogles, I. N. Kindel, I. N. Herring, C. W. Morris, 
Bert S. Rusgell, B. B. Alexander, J. I. Trist, D. T. Street, T. N. Caldwell, T. 
G. Lee, R. T. Picket, John H. Maxwell, John Willliams, E. Walker, W. N. 
Maxwell, Wm. Russell, John W. Eccles, J. D. Donahue, C. C. Franks, Thos. 
Maxwell, J. S. Winton, W. W. Thurston, Robt. Meadar, W. D. Booth, T. L. 
Puckett, D. D. Crook, T. F. Frazier, R. H. Russell." 



78 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER IV. 

EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 

"Sherman, on the 14th March, went to Tyler's landing, whence the 6th 
Ohio marched to Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, some 
miles east of Corinth, which was destroyed, and returned unmolested to 
Savannah." (Hon. H. Greeley.) 

"On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's 
army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and, after making a feint of 
landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pitts- 
burgh landing," (all on the 14th.) {Bowman & Irving's Sherman and his 
Campaigns.) 

" General C. F. Smith pushed forward troops to Eastport, on the Ten- 
nessee, but ultimately took Pittsburgh landing as the initial point." {E. D- 
Mansfield's Lives oj Grant and Colfax.) 

" C. F. Smith took command of the expedition, and while the captain of 
Donelson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops were pushed 
forward as far as Eastport, on the Tennessee. The operations, however, 
were without results, and Smith returned to Pittsburgh landing, on the 
western bank of the Tennessee." {Badeau's History of Grant.) 

By the above the honor of this Eastport affair seems to 
remain easy as between the claims of Smith and Sherman 
to the same, while Grant is entire!}^ accessory, and was, 
perhaps, more than so in reality, though Smith bears the 
blame. Now, there may be many inferences deduced from 
the above-cited quotations by the admirers of these two 
rebellion-risen commanders. Inseparable in the origin 
and cause of their success as the twin brothers of the old 
Dorian mythology, though which is the pugilist and which 
the cavalier their admirers may take their own time and 
way to determine. (Both are of the ring.) 

From this category of admirers may, perhaps, be ex- 
cluded that most benevolent and impracticable politi- 
cal philosopher and too practical utilitarian sage, Gree- 
ley, never satisfied without the evolution of results from 
causes. In such earnest and laudable research he has 
found it essential to tell, in order that actions may have 



EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 79 

results, that Sherman went to Tyler's landing, whence the 
6th Ohio (under the general's command, of course,) 
marched to Bnrnsville, some miles out of Corinth, which 
(Bnrnsville or Corinth?) was destroyed, and returned un- 
molested to Savannah. It is difficult to distinguish as to 
the merit of these wonderful performances, if accomplished; 
hut it seems plain that the 6th Ohio should have the palm, 
not as to the imaginary destruction of Burnsvilleor Corinth, 
&c., but, being at the time (March 14th) at ISTashville, 
Tennessee, its march must, if made, have far exceeded in 
celerity that of Nero, the consul, (not the fiddling fire- 
brand,) from Venusia to the Metaurus. 

There seems, at the same time, little or no disposition 
on the part of Sherman's admirer. Bowman, to impute 
that merit to his patron, which, according to Badeau and 
Sherman, properly belongs to C. F. Smith, the real hero 
of Fort Donelsou, if there was one. The last friend (fidus 
Achates) and uncertain eulogist of the President is clearly 
entitled to the merits, and still more clearly to the de- 
merits, of this wonderful, dangerous, and mysterious ex- 
pedition, comparable only to that of Jason, (or possibly 
Mason,) to Colcliis after the Golden Fleece — time out 
mind. 

This expedition is, or was, as brilliant, according to 
Greeley, as it is terrible, according to Draper. If we are 
to believe this most erudite, critical, and most veracious 
historian, Sherman lost many men and horses in the 
swollen streams, striving to reach the Memphis and Charles- 
ton railroad. If any men and horses were really lost, 
their record has been kept more quiet than that of the 
three horses which were not killed under Sherman at 
Shiloh, unless, like the knight of old, he killed them to 
prevent their captivity by the enemy. 

The venerable Mansfield makes the Eastport honor un- 
certain, but drops the matter as provocative of inquiry by 
curious readers. 

The true history of this affair, so studiously covered up 
by Badeau and Bowman, is taken from the diary of an 



80 . SHILOH. 

officer who was an actor in this worse than useless expedi- 
tion, which was most fortunately arrested, as it might plainly 
have produced the most ruinous results to the troops en- 
engaged in it — though with that cost — if Sherman, its in- 
stigator, could thereby have been set aside for a more 
worthy commander at Shiloh. 

"Savannah, Tennessee, March 14, 1862. 

"About 1 p. m. Sherman's troops left on an expedition to Mississippi, and 
tied up a few miles below Eastport. Kain last night and rain all day after 
12 m. We were to have left for the interior at midnight, but about 11 p. m. 
had orders that the start was postponed till 2 a. m. (15th,) the river rising six 
or eight inches an hour, and filling a bayou or thoroughfare next the hill, 
which will be impassable long before noon to-morrow. 

"Saturday, March 15,1862. — Up at half past 12; raining, as it had 
been all night. The expedition had been ordered, with two days' cooked pro- 
visions, to march out and break up the Memphis and Charleston railroad and 
return. A useless job, unless we can effect a lodgement, which does not .seem 
intended. Started in the rain about 3 a. m., though from the rising water 
it was plain we would soon have to return. Went out about three or four 
miles, over a road impracticable for artillery without repair, and were there 
stopped by a creek backed up from the river and several feet deep upon the 
road. My regiment, having charge of the artillery, I went back and re- 
ported to Sherman, who ordered a return about 7 or 8 a. m. At the bayou 
found the 54th Ohio zouaves. Colonel Smith, wading back breast deep. 

" A very silly expedition under the circumstances, and adding hundreds 
of weakly men to the sick list." 

The high water was fortunate, as had we got a few 
miles farther toward the railroad, the division would 
have been captured, as the rebels were in force about luka, 
and A. S. Johnson was just passing his troops over the 
route from Decatur to Corinth, expecting the occupation 
of Florence every hour of every day after the capture of 
Fort Henry, up to the time he concentrated with Bragg 
and Beauregard, about the 20th of March, 1862. (W. P. G.) 

This Eastport atfair demands attention, on account of 
the endeavor, by imputing it to Smith or dropping it en- 
tirely, to conceal a characteristic blunder of Sherman's in 
the opening of the campaign, which was repeated by him 
whenever an opportunity oftered throughout the war. It 
was the blunders, and nothing else but blunders and far 
worse, at Shiloh, which have given him his present posi- 
tion, and blunders alone characterized him in the advance 
on Savannah, Tennessee, as improvident, reckless, violent, 
and unjust, while his advance on Savannah, Georgia, earns 




liri 

"ij:ini '■ 8UCJ.L 



K,.y,'„„,f/.,„ n i 



EASTPORT EXPEDITION. 81 

for him the reputation of the " Attila of the age." It took 
all clay of the 15th to get the troops and artillery on hoard 
the fleet. Left soon after midnight, and on the morning 
of Sunday, the 16th, the hoats tied up at rittsburgb, which 
also deserves attention, as this first landing of troops at 
Pittsburgh is imputed by Grant to C. F. Smith. 

Note. — This most extraordinary and indeed insane movement could not be 
accounted for by the writer till he found ample evidence that it was intended 
to cover Halleck's avoidance of the occupation of Florence for personal pur- 
poses. It would not have been undertaken had there been any probability 
of its success. Time will doubtless develop that these operations of Hal- 
leck's had their origin in Washington, having several purposes — one to sup- 
plant McClellan, one to prolong the war. and beyond this to put Halleck, 
Grant, and Sherman into the positions they attained, at the sacrifice of hun- 
dreds of millions and myriads of lives. 

6 



82 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER IV. 

INTO CAMP SHILOH. 

" A small stream that rises in the field in front flows to the north along my 
whole front. (This faces the division to the west, W.P.G.) I saw that the 
enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernand 
and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee 
river, and about two miles back from it." (Sherman's Report of Shiloh.) (The 
Tennessee running due north at Shiloh.) 

These divisions are also face east or west, and are in a line parallel with 
Sherman's division, exposing their flanks to the attack from the South, (see 
plate 2,) which was about an equivalent arrangement to that which ex- 
isted. (W. P. G.) 

Sherman's 5tli division went into camp three miles out 
from Pittsburgh binding, on the 18th and 19th of March, 
and Ilnrlbut's division, (the 4th,) from half a mile to a 
mile out about the same time, and to the right and left of 
the Corinth road, with little or no order whatever. C. F. 
Smith's and McClernand's divisions came out from the 
20th to the 22d of March. Smith's, the 2d division, was 
scattered along the upper Purdy road from half a mile to 
a mile or over, out west from Pittsburgh landing. 

McClernand's (1st) division was encamped in better 
order and on better ground than any other. His left was 
a little east of the main Corinth road, about four hundred 
yards nearly due north from Sherman's center at Shiloh 
ch urch, and bending a little back or eastward from the center 
to tlie right or north ; the ground was, in general, wooded 
on the east of this camp, with open ground on the west, 
which was a good arrangement for defense, so far as it 
went. 

Its general direction made an angle of about seventy 
degrees toward the northwest, with the direction of Sher- 
man's line at its center. Sherman's statement of his center 
as l»eing at Shiloh church is about the only correct state- 
ment in that report, except, perhaps, his account of his. 



INTO CAMP SHILOH. 83 

wanton destruction of a battery of his own artiller^^ and 
his desertion of what organized troops he had left at the 
most dangerous hour of the day, 10 o'clock m., as he spe- 
cifies, but only one brigade, not two, as he says. 

Badeau's map of Shiloh, corrected both by Grant and 
Sherman, has his (Sherman's) center far east of the Corinth 
road; while the ofiicial map, corrected by the same authori- 
ties, puts the same centcrfive hundredyards or more west of 
the Corinth road, so that both maps contradict the division 
report and each other. Badeau's map refuses, or throws 
back the right or 1st brigade of Sherman's, which was the 
reverse of the fact. This map also throws the 1st brigade 
across the Purdy road, where it was not, but where one of 
its regiments should have been. 

The two extreme right regiments of the army lay directly 
along the lower Purdy road, which passed between the 
field and staft" quarters on one side and the company cpiar- 
ters on the other. Sherman's division was on a line con- 
cave, instead of convex to the front. 

It is most probably arranged convex on the map to pro- 
duce the impression that Sherman's center, behind which 
he had his headquarters, was the most advanced part of 
the line, as it was, southwest towards Corinth, but not south- 
ward. 

The camp of General B. M. Prentiss, established ten or 
twelve days before the battle under General Grant's im- 
mediate direction, was located with its right over a mile 
from the loft of Sherman. Its center was ih latitude near 
a quarter of a mile south of Shiloh church, or a little south 
of east from Sherman's center. It had seven regiments 
scattered without order along a distance of half its proper 
front,which would have been over three-quarters of a mile. 

On Badeau's map a third brigade, which is a fiction, is 
thrown in to fill up the vacancy. The left of Prentiss 
was in nearly a north and south line with the right of Stu- 
art's (2d) brigade of Sherman's (5th) division, and was about 
eighty rods south of Stuart, whose three regiments were 
dumped down anywhere, near a mile from the Ham- 



84 SHILOII. 

hurgh ford of Lick creek, half a mile from its mouth at 
the river. It has been asserted, according to Whitelaw, 
Reed, and otiiers, as an excuse for so exposing and de- 
taching this brigade, that as Buell's troops were to be 
posted at Hamburgh, two miles above on the ]-iver, the ex- 
posure would cease when this posting should occur. IN^ow, 
BueU's advance division reached Savannah, eiglit miles be- 
low Pittsburgh, before noon of the 5th. The same after- 
noon the rebel army was concentrated westwardlj, at and 
from the southeast bend of Lick creek. Tliis bend is 
about a mile northwest of Hamburgh, on tlie river, and 
the same distance nearly due south of Stuart and Pren- 
tiss, making the right of the enemy a little over a mile 
from the river at Hamburgh, accoi'ding to Badeau's map. 
So that, if the intention of posting Buell at Hamburgh 
had been carried out, the rebel army might have been 
attacked at 4 p. rn. (5th) or after, on its right and reai', by 
Buell, and on its front by our arm}^ of 40,000 men, at Shi- 
loh. Its capture and dispersion would have been inevita- 
ble. But, if done, this would have been done by BueU's 
troops, and was not in accordance with the views of Grant, 
Sherman, and Halleck, in the field, nor the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, &c., at Washington. This digres- 
sion will be repeated whenever opportunity oft'ers, to show 
bow and why the Union troops at Siiiloh were slaughtered 
for personal purposes, after their betrayal into security, 
for purely or impurely political objects, by direction of 
those in power.* 

After which digression return is made to the camp. 
Grant and Sherman, to make the front look respectable, 
have posted the right of Prentiss half a mile nearer Shiloh 
than it was, while the brigade of Stuart, the only body 
of troops placed anywhere near right on the front, is sep- 
arated from the left of Prentiss by a gap of half a mile, 
which did not exist, so as to close the gap towards Shiloh. 



* The war was cultivated as old hunters cultivate she- wolves, for wolf- 
scalps for the sum of so much a head or scalp. 



INTO CAMP SIIILOH. So 

To cover tliis fictitious o:ap there is ver}^ cunnino;l_y placed 
a body of troops wliicli was not there till after the battle. 

The very worst fictional feature of this map of Grant's 
and Sherman's is the poking in of McClernand's left flank 
between Sherman and Prentiss, over half a mile east from 
its true position. This is an attempt to close upon paper a 
gap of over a mile, which did really exist in fact, and which 
Sherman swears did not exist at all, and did exist; for Buell's 
troops, which were to be sent to Ilamburgli, as they would 
have been sent, were it not necessary, as he says, to have 
had a "Shiloh" trial of pluck. So they were left at 
Savannah, were Buell's troops. This gap was a bait; the 
bait took, and took with it 13,000 Union soldiers on the 
6th and 7th of April, 1862. 

This ga}) was not only tlie key-[)oint, but the wide, open 
highway to the flanks and rear of the Union line; and this 
is the key Grant says Sherman held into the inside of the 
line, if line that can be called, without military connection; 
without connecting road:^, front, flank, or rear; without prop- 
er guards; without defenses, for fear they would invite an 
attack; without anything especial but the gaps, like the in- 
tervals between herds of buffaloes scattered over tlie west- 
ern plains, if buflaloes do scatter at all, even when out of 
danii-er. The least broken i»:round on this battle-field 
of about ten S(|uare miles, except that of AfcClernand's 
1st division, was the line of this front, of about two and 
a half to three miles from Stuart's left to the extreme 
right of Sherman's 1st 1)rigade. This extreme right rested 
on a lieiglit one hundred and twenty rods north of Owl 
creek. There was a rivulet, with swampy borders, be- 
tween the left regiment, the 53d Ohio, which separated it 
about two hundred yards from the 57th, on its right. 
Over this swamp there was no causeway or connection with 
the center, but by the high land in the rear. The ground 
on this line being unbroken by ravines, was easily defen- 
sible from infantry, and no line ever more recpiired defenses 
than did this line of Sherman's three right brigades, and de- 
fenses sufficient could have been made by all the troops in 



86 SHILOH. 

an liour. Located on the upland, bordering a creek fifty 
to one hundred and fifty yards in front, with a wooded, 
bushy border, the line was approachable and was ap- 
proached witliin half-musket shot by an an enemy remain- 
ing almost entirely unseen. Beyond the creek four hun- 
dred to six hundred yards in front, was a range of low hills, 
commanding the camp, and forty to sixty feet or more 
above its level, which level was thirty to forty feet above 
the creek bottom immediately in front. The left might have 
been so located as to be completely protected by the Ten- 
nessee river, but it was so posted as to be turned easily, as it 
was turned soon after the attack on the 6th. On the ex- 
treme right, Ov;^l creek might have been used to strengthen 
that flank, but it was left as a mask for a hostile approach. 
II;;d this right flank been attacked, as was Sidney John- 
son's intent, by even a single brigade, at the same time 
with the left, and held its ground no better than the 53d 
Ohio, under Sherman's immediate direction, the destruc- 
tion of the Union army before noonwould have been inev- 
itable. 

The same result would have occurred at or about noon, 
had our right been turned bj' the rebel flanking force, 
which for several hours w^as repelled by the 1st brigade of 
the 5th division, which brigade was detached under the 
charge of Sherman's aides, and, deserted by them cmd him, 
was left unsupported and alone, lar on the extreme right 
and front of the Union line of battle. (See Sherman's re- 
port. 

Such as is above imperfectl\' described, was the battle- 
field of Shiloh, selected by Sherman with demoniac sagacity 
and ajiproved by Grant, bof >re the troops went into camp 
on the 18th and subsequent days of March, 1862 — chosen 
with as much anxious and personally interested sagacity as 
marked the patriotic purpose of the great German libera- 
tor Ai'minius (Hermann) in chosing among the forests of the 
Lip]»e (Del mold now) tliat battle-field for the destruction of 
Vorus and his legions, denominated, as one part of it is, the 
"mord kessel" [^'- death j)ot'') to the present day. 



INTO CAMP SIIILOH. 87 

To fix the day of our being ordered into camp tlie fol- 
lowing diary extracts may be of interest: 

"Pittsburg Landing, March 18, 1862. 

"Went to Sherman's boat, the Continental, for orders, and was told to get 
everytliing off the boat of the 46th Ohio at once, and to the camp about three 
miles out near Shiloh church. During the night the 3d Iowa and Slst Ohio 
had completely clogged the road, which they did not clear for the teams of 
the 46tli till near 2 p. m. By night the teams were worn out and had to 
stop. There .seems no order or regularity about anything. Every volunteer 
regiment is allowed to dump its camp down anywhere and in everybody's 
■way." 

"Wednesday, March 19tb, 1862. 

" A damp morning, after rain during the night. At 8.30 a. m. faw Sherman 

on the Hannibal, and reported that the road was clogged by the regiment 

and would soon be impassable. Without waiting for my suggestion that the 
road should be left open or I could not get out, he said very brusquely that 
he could not act on my mere ipse dixit; that his engineer had examined and 
reported on the road, (he had no engineer.) I then suggested that one thousand 
men on the roail towards the proyiosed camp could put it in passable order in 
a few hours, and requested that I might be myself permitted to repair the 
road. He said he would do nothing with it to-day, but might to-morrow, 
(nothing, however, was done.) Rode out to the camp about noon, stepped off 
the ground for the ten companies, and had my own tent pitched about sunset." 



88 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER V. 

HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 

"I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype, 
Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be." 
(iShervtan to Grant on his ap2')ointment as Lieutenant General.) 

But this much is certain: The rebels were repelled in their last attack on 
Sunday without any assistance from Buell — that turned the scale. {Grant in 
Badeaxi. See Grant's report. W. P. G.) 

The first tiling that will call the attention of the critical 
reader in the autobiographies of Grant and Sherman by 
Badeau and Bowman, is the fact that General Buell is 
charged with tardiness, while the Army of the Tennessee 
is in danger of attack and need of assistance. Grant says, 
in Badeau, page 67, that on the 17th March he removed 
his headquarters to Savannah. " The attention of the rebels 
in this part of the country had now become concentrated 
on Grant's forces. Troops in great numbers were accord- 
ingly hurried to Corinth, and the enemy was preparing to 
assume the oifensive. To counteract this. General Buell's 
command, numbering nearly 40,000 men, and Buell him- 
self, were ordered from Nashville to the support of General 
Grant. And there ivas imminent need of such support. The 
movements of General Buell, however, were seldom expe- 
ditious," &c. (Imminent need of support, 3Iarch 17, 1862?) 

General Sherman informs us, through Colonel Bowman, 
"that General Ilalleck had decided to advance up the Ten- 
nessee river as far as practicable by water — then to de- 
bark on the west bank, attack the enemy at Corinth, and 
endeavor to cut him ofii" from the east, &c. During the last 
week of March the Army of the Tennessee only waited for 
the Army of the Ohio.''* General Buell had informed Gen- 
eral Grant that he would join him before that time. On 

* To march on Corinth. 



HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 89 

the morning of the 6th of April the Army of the Ohio had 
not yet come. The importance of the crisis was apparent, 
but Bncll marched his troops with tlie same deUheration as 
" if 710 other army depended on his promptness." There was 
imminent need of support, sucli as Buell's, we are tohi. 
The importance of the crisis was apparent, says Sherman; 
but Buell's march was not altered by the consideration 
that another army depended upon his promptness. The 
apprehension of danger both by Grant and Sherman must 
be borne in mind as we proceed, as this dang-er of attack 
was denied on the 5th of April, 1862. The point here 
aimed at by this relator is, that if there was imminent 
need of Buell's support as early as the 17tli March, the 
need increased in proportion of the increase and proximity 
of the enemy, and, therefore, it was essential that BucU 
should have had daily or hourly information of the progress 
of the enemy, in the increase of his force, and his actual or 
probable approach to the point of danger. 

Now, if General Grant had been the man described by 
Sherman as the second Washington, he would have been 
the first to repel this charge of tardiness, if for no other 
reason than that Buell, as he admits, saved him and Ids 
army from ruin on the 6th day of April, 1862, at Pittsburgh 
landing. 

It was not the fact that Buell was ordered from I^ash- 
ville to support Grant. This expression, " to support Grant,'" 
is made the origin of all the obloquy thrown upon the 
former, (Buell,) in not supporting Grant in time to prevent 
the slaughter and disgrace of April 6, 1862. Buell's Army 
of the Ohio was ordered over to form a junction with the 
Army of the Tennessee at Savannah, on the east side of 
the Tennessee river, nine miles below Pittsburgh, which 
destination was afterwards altered to Hamburgh, on the 
west side, after, it is said. General C, F. Smith, on General 
W. T. Sherman's suggestion, had fixed upon Pittsburgh 
landing as the best point at which to organize the army to 
advance on Corinth. The two armies were to be united at 
Savannah, and when ready to advance with adequate men 



90 SHILOH. 

and means, were to be nnder the immediate command of 
Halleck, as happened after the battle. 

Halleck was most anxiously strivino^ for the general 
command of the Union army, vacated on the 11th or 12th 
of March by the relief of McCIellan. 

Sherman, stung by his having been deemed unequal to 
the situation in Kentucky, was madly, but not insanely 
striving for promotion. But, as will be apparent, with 
that craftiness which is generally imputed to unfortunates 
of an unsound mind. Grant was striving, as usual, for any 
thing chance or Providence might throw in his way, in- 
different alike to the intrigues of Sherman or Halleck, so 
that '■^profits might accrue'' to this ^^ Ancient Pistol" of modern 
war. All, more or less schemers, were alike striving for in- 
dividual interest entirely, and were, perhaps, the most suc- 
cessful triumvirate that ever engaged in a combination for 
the advancement of each other, with regard to nothing else. 

An actual design will be proven by comparing the state- 
ments above quoted from Bowman and Badeau, on Sherman 
and Grant, with the actual circumstances existing, and to 
exist, before, at, and after the battle of Shiloh. This com- 
mentary is not intended to be, it is repeated, so much a nar- 
rative of evejits, as the exposition of concealments and the 
correction of fallacies and fictions, indulged in for selfish 
purposes by the principal actors and their coadjutors in 
and out of the army, especially the last. 

It will liave been seen by the above or previous corres- 
pondence, that General Buell would long before have been 
up the Tennessee, as far as practicable, or to Florence, but 
for Ilalleck's ulterior designs as to his own promotion, and 
to keeping Buell inactive. The whole tending, and intend- 
ing, to lengthten the war. Grant'pretends that there was 
imminent need of Buell's support on the 17th of March: 
perhaps from his knowledge that Johnson was forming the 
junction at Corinth, wanted by Halleck. But he tells Hal- 
leck there is no immediate danger, whatever there might 
have been, here is an extract from his dispatch to Halleck 
of April 5, 18G2, from which it is seen that he says: 



IIOAV BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 91 

" I have pcarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made 
upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." 

Sherman writes to Grant the same clay — 

"All is quiet along my lines now ; we are in the act of exchanging cavalryi 
according to your orders." 

And he adds: 

" I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day but some picket firing." 

It will liave been seen by the assertion of Sherman, through 
Bowman,* that Ilalleck intended to advance up the Tennes- 
see as far as praclicablc by water. Halleck had said that he so 
intended, (as we have seen,) to advance as high as Florence, 
not to cut the army ott' from the East, as Sherman says, 
but to cut Johnson off from the West, which, against Buell's 
and McClellan's urgency, he concluded not to do, for reasons 
above intimated, so that the above statement is clearly fal- 
lacious. 

1st, In impressing the idea that Halleck did advance as 
far as practicable up the Tennessee; and, 2d, that the object 
was to prevent troops going East instead of West ; while 
not a word is said about the failure to occupy Florence, 
which silence is most significant of the intention and wish, 
botli of Halleck and Sherman, that the rebel junction 
should take place, so as to provoke a battle outside of 
Buell's comn^and. "During the last week of March, says 
Sherman, the Army of the Ohio only waited for the Army 
of the Tennessee" — to march and fight of course. Yet, as 
will be seen, Sherman reproved Bucklaud, on the 4th of 
April, for capturing prisoners, whereby an attack might 
have been brought on before the Army of the Tennessee 
was ready. (When was it ever ready?) 

Sherman also says in his report that many of the troops 
were unprovided with ammunition, (could they then ad- 
vance?) There is official evidence that no intrenching 
tools could be had up to the day of the battle. Could he ad- 
vance without axes? That Prentiss wanted five regiments 
to make up his division, and that regiments intended for 

* See extract from Bowman, Sherman, &c. 



92 SHILOH. 

the march on Coriuth arrived on the day of the battle, and 
many of them not for ten or more days afterwards. The 
army, Sherman knew, was not to march till General Ilal- 
leck came up, and further, that on the 2Sth General Hal- 
leck writes that large reinforcements are being sent to 
General Grant. 

Beyond all this, General Ilalleck, on the otli of April, 
dispatches to General Buell "that he is right about concen- 
trating at Waynesboro, thirty miles west of Savannah, thus 
causing delay of one or more days, and saj-s, as usual, that 
future movements must depend on those of the enemy, and 
also that he will not be able to leave St. Louis till the 7th or 
8th of April, all of which must of course have been known 
to General Sherman and Grant, as still more cause of 
delay before the army conld march. 

Buell, he says, had informed General Grant that he 
" would join him before the 1st of April." This statement 
is utterly gratuitous, and little suits the veracity and honor 
of a soldier. Grant does not claim that he himself fixed a 
time fov Buell to be up. On the 1st of April, Buell dis- 
patcjlies to Halleck that he expects to concentrate at Savan- 
nah on the 6th and 7th. This is the lirst evidence of any 
time fixed on by Buell, and Grant never named a day for 
Buell's arrival, as will be seen, before tiie 7th and 8th; 
while, as will be proven, he ex[)ected the l)attle of Shiloh 
would have been fought without Bnell, before that date, 
from the 8d to the 7th. Again, says Sherman, on the 6th of 
April, "the Army of the Ohio had vol yd come" Now, 
Sherman knew that Buell's advance division reached Sa- 
vannah before noon of the 5th, and thus charges General 
Grant himself with dereliction for not telling him of Buell's 
arrival, on the evening of that day, the 5th, when he was 
at Sherman's quarters at Shiloh, late in the afternoon, and 
remained there, or at his boat at the landing, till near mid- 
night, purposely to avoid meeting Buell, who had requested 
a meeting that day, April 5th, with Grant, at Savatniah, 
where he (Buell) arrived at 5 p. m., to find Grant not there. 
Instructions, says Sherman, had been sent by General 



HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 93 

Grant to expedite Buell's advance and push on to Piitsbinr/h. 
The reverse was the case, and Sherman mnst have known 
that, expecting an attack, ashe swears he did every hour after 
the afternoon of the 3d of April, Grant had not only not 
coniiterrnnndcd an order sent Xelson, of Bue!]'s army, 
March 30th, not to he at Savannah before the 7th, but that, 
on the 4th of April, knowing iSTelson to be twenty miles 
from Savannah, he sent him word that he need not be up 
till the 8th of April, as he could not ferry 1dm across 
the river till tied time. " The importance of the crisis 
was apparent," says Sherman, for Johnson would natur- 
ally seek to strike Grant before Buell's arrival, and yet he 
was a party to the attempt, at least twice, to keep Buell 
back till long after the blow should be struck. Buell, he 
says further, marched his troops as if no other army de- 
pended on his promptitude — that is, depended for safety 
from defeat, of course, on him, (Buell.) 

What, then, must be thought of these repeated efforts 
to keep Buell back till after the expected attack? How 
could Buell suppose danger possible, Mdien his advance 
division, under Xelson, was iirst informed, March 30th, 
that he was not wanted at Savannah till April 7th ; and 
again, on the 4th of April, when twenty miles ofi", that he 
need not be up till the 8th following, or three to live days 
alter? Sherman's own evidence, on oath, shows that he 
expected the attack on the 3d, and the worst deception 
of all for the public, is the statement that Buell caused in- 
tervals of six miles to be observed between (the heads of) 
his divisions: a soldierly arrangement wdiich Sherman 
habitually neglected, and consequently on a march habitu- 
ally had his troops in confusion. 

Let us examine the wisdom of this arrangement : Say 
there were 7,000 men in each division. These would re- 
quire one and a half miles in line of battle, and over three 
miles on a route march; and the artillery and trains of an 
army will, in general, require as much space as the troops, 
and far more, with such a commander as Sherman or Grant. 
There was not, however, an average of over 6,000 men, if 



94 SHTLOH. 

that, to a division, and the baggage was cut down below 
the average, so that the six niik'S so invidiously introduced, 
as an obvious means of delay, would be barely sufficient 
to avoid confusion. 

There are in a space of one page and two lines of this 
third chapter of Bowman, on iShiloh, at least tifteen state- 
ments such as the above, some of which are noted else- 
where in this treatise, especially that easily exploded fal- 
lacy that " Sherman merely made a feint of landingi at 
Eastport." This may liave also been done ; l)ut, as has 
been stated, he landed a few miles below, and, marching 
out in the rain near four miles, eifeited nothing more than 
to fjitigne and consign hundreds of men to the sick list — 
to endanger the whole division of 8,000 men, and, as his 
admirer. Draper, says, "to occasion the drowning of many 
mm and horses in (he swollen streams." This condition of 
the streams he also knew would exist when he started, at 
2 a. m., on a fifteen or twenty mile trip, the water then 
rising eight inches an hour. 

This characteristic piece of strategy has thus been hushed 
up, laid on C. F. Smith by Grant, or made a triumphant 
success by Greeley in the destruction of Burnsville or Cor- 
rinth, it is hard to say which, from the philosopher's syn- 
tax. There are, in this chapter of Sherman's on Shiloh, 
from pages 47 to 57 inclusive, which, in the above-stated 
proportion, say on 12 pnges, would contain 180 fallacies, 
suppressions, or fictions. So tluit, wliatever may be this 
commander's reputation as a tactition and strategist, it is a 
mere tifle to his archery practice with the long- bow. 

The following utterly fallacious, and indeed fictitious, 
statement of General Grant should not escape attention, 
though noted elsewhere : 

" At the battle of Shiloh General Sherman lield, on the first day, with raw 
troops, tlie key-point of the landing. It is no disparagement to any other 
officer to say, that I do not believe tliere was another division commander of 
the skill and experience to have done it." (No one did Ho it.) 

To his individual efforts I am indebted to the success of 
that battle. "Was the 6th a success? W. P. G." (U.S. 
Grant.) 



HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 95 

Now, not to be in the least critical or disparaging, where 
these " two mighty ivarriors,^' (see sensational history,) are 
concerned, it may as well be explained, that the key-point 
of any battle line or any position aimed at beyond it, is 
that point of approach wdiere the line is easiest pierced, or 
turned, or entered, for a special purpose. This key-point at 
Shiloh, should have been the Corinth road atShiloh church, 
on Sherman's center; but Sherman threw away this key- 
point, b}' leaving a gap of over a mile on the left of his left 
center brigade, near half a mile to the left of the Shiloh 
church. This became then not only a key to a closed gate, 
but an open highway, through which the enemy could 
march in column bij division of a mile front to the flanks and 
rear of three division of the Union arm3^ There is evidence 
in this treatise, and in Sherman's report, that near this gap 
in front of his left center brigade he was tired on from the 
thicket in front, his orderly killed, and he instantly and 
considerately rode rapidly to the rear. The rear, be it un- 
derstood, being the usual proper place for a commander in 
action ; but he did not stop in rear of this left regiment — now 
doul)1y left — which stood its ground against the example 
from 10 to 20 minutes, and then, making discretion the bet- 
ter part of valor, not only followed the example, but for the 
time far surpassed the examplar, by a rout in retreat to the 
landing very early in the tight. Such is the manner in 
which, as thousands can prove who were present, Sherman 
held the key-point to the landing, to which the key had 
been lost the flrst day and hour of the battle. As to the 
results of skill and experience exhibited, the results are the 
best evidence, as even the benevolent and phih)sophic 
Greeley had it impressed on his editorial conviction that 
Sherman's whole division was scattered at 8 a. m.,in wliich 
most other writers agree, while the}' make him the great 
Horatius at the bridge, of the battle, on the above statement 
of Grant, quoted from Hal hick, who was thereby made 
commander-in-chief for this single stretch oi Ids long-bow. 

As to Sherman's individual eftbrts in saving the day, 
reference need only be had to his report, from which it ap- 



96 SHILOH. 

pears he never left his position on the right and rear of Mc- 
Cleniand, (to which point he was driven pell-ynell at 9 or 10 
a. m.,) till after the second day's battle. That on the 6th 
he W'Us driven back to Snake-creek bridge, near three 
miles north of Sliik^h and near two miles west of the land- 
ing. So that, by his own report, he could have done noth- 
ing in snvmg the ihiy with the fragments of a few disorganized 
and disheartened regiments, which did little more than fall 
back, wdien threatened, till the end of the battle. But be- 
yond all this, here is General Grant's own report, which, 
in a little over a year, he seems to have utterly forgotten, 
or thouu'ht worthless : 

[Extract.] 

" Headquarters Division of West Tennessee, 

" Pittsburgh, April 9, 1862. 
* * * "The enemy having forced the center line to fall back nearly 
half way frntn their campa to the landing, at a late hour in the afternoon a 
desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession 
of the landing, transports, Ac. Just at this moment the advance of Major 
General Baell's column, a part of the division of General Nelson, arrived- 
The two generals named both being present, [when,] an advance was imme- 
diately made upon the point of attack, the enemy was soon driven back." 

ISTow where — "tell us where" — are the personal efforts 
of General Sherman, out of cannon-shot as he was, at the 
Snake-creek bridge, waiting for General L. Wallace to 
come up; and, if Sherman is to be credited, he was, at the 
time of Nelson's arrival, concluding, with the aid of General 
Grant, that there had not been '■'■much of a shower after all ;'^ 
and inasmuch as Lew. Wallace had saved Grant from defeat 
at Donclson, why should he not do the same next day at 
Shiloh? Happy and fortunate Lewds Wallace, of the civic 
crown, who, having had the presumption to attack, with- 
out orders, in Grant's absence, for seven or eight hours at 
Donelson, was fortunately preserved on the 6th for the 
battle of the 7th. That day, on Sherman's right, he, wdth 
McOlernand on Sherman's left, literally, as it were, carried 
along Sherman and his panicked troops -through the fight 
on our right flank. For this and other acts of good soldier- 
ship at Donelson and Shiloh, these generals were merci- 
fully allowed to command the reserve "in the siege;" 



HOW BUELL WAS HURRIED UP. 97 

pcrliaps to pick up the sliells and stragglers thrown or 
driven hack from that tremendous advance upon, and siege 
of Corinth, whei-e, as Sherman testifies, Ilalleck won a 
victory as hrilliant and important as any recorded in his- 
tory. And wlio shall douht such testimony, on authority 
as undouhtabki as this commentary has shown Sherman's 
evidence to be — or not to be — that is the question? 

P. S. Some one of the earliest earls of Pembroke, Henry 
II's tim-e, perliaps, (niost j^hMiksw' fail in seven hundred /y)-w/)lu./'^.^y>, 
years) was surnamed Strongbow, from his bold bearing in 
battle. 

If in the approaching imperium — simply a question of 
time — there shall be instituted a dukedom for a '•'■ Due de 
Lo]i(/cboN-c,'' which of these commanders, on their own evi- 
dence, should bear the palm, or wear the strawberry leaf 
on his shoulder-strap or collar? 
7 



98 SHILOH. 



VII. 

HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 

" General Sherman asked me what was up. I answered, that I had just 
met ami fought the advance of Beauregard's army ; that he was advancing 
on us. Next morning, the 5th, the 5th Ohio cavalry were removed to the 
4th division, General Hurlbut." {Major Bicker, 5th 0. V. C.) 

"General Sherman's manner indicated that he was not pleased, as he asked 
what I had been about. I replied, that I had accidentally got into a little 
fight, and there were some of the fruits of it, pointing to the prisoners. He 
answered, that I might have drawn the whole army into a tight before they 
v/ere ready." {Buckland's Skirmish, A-pril 4, 1SG2.) 

"While G:reat stress is, and perhaps ought to be, laid by 
General Sherman on the ftict, that the importance of the 
crisis was apparent from and after the junction of Johnson 
and Beaureg-ard at Corinth, about the 20th March, 1862, 
it is stated that, during the last week of March the Army 
of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio, 
and at the same time great pahis are taken to show 
that the movements of Buell were seldom expeditious. 
That, as early as the 16th of March, Halleck had in- 
formed Grant that Buell was in motion towards the army 
at Savannah, Tennessee, and that it took Buell from the 
19th of March to the 6th of April, or nineteen days, to 
inarch 90 miles; while the writer knew that the march of 
the 4th (Nelson's) division had been made over this siime 
ground in six days, and Buell himself had ridden it in two 
days — from the evening of tlie 3d to the evening of the 
5th of April, 1862. 

A great eftbrt is also made to prove that while the Army 
of the Ohio was anxiously expected, exceeding pains were 
taken to hurry it up; the whole showing, however, being 
that Grant sent word to McCook, on the Slst March, a3 
follows: "I have been looking for your column anxiously 
for several days." But no evidence is adduced to prove 



HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 99 

that any message to that effect ever reached the com- 
mander of that army or McCook, or that he was ever ad- 
vised of any possible immediate danger to the Army of 
tlie Tennessee, as he studiously w^as not so advised. 

The statements of Badeau to conceal facts, without seem- 
ing to do so, evince much ingenuity, calculated to puzzle 
and perplex even a professional reader, without due ex- 
amination. Take, for instance, the following: Grant, he 
says, had made his arrangements to move his head- 
quarters from Savannah, Tennessee, to Pittsburgh, eight 
or nine miles above, when a message was brought to him, 
dated the 4th of April, requesting Grant to remain at Sa- 
vannah on the 5th, as he (Biiell) would arrive there on 
that day. "I shall be in Savannah myself to-morrow, with 
perhaps two divisions," said Buell. "Can I meet you 
there?" Grant replied, on the 5tli : "Your dispatch just 
received. I will be here to meet you to-morron\ (the 6th.) 

The enemy at and near Corinth are probably from 60,000 
to 80,000." "Buell, however," says Badeau, "did not 
arrive till the 6th, or, if otherwise, did not make it known 
to his siq)erior, and Grant remained to meet him." • Now, on 
the 68th page, behind this statement, we are told that on 
the 3d of April Grant was tinally able to inform Halleck 
" that a dispatch from the telegraphic operator is just in. 
He states that General jSTelson, commanding Buell's fore- 
most division, is in sight. The advance will probably 
arrive on Saturday, the 5th;" but there is ample evidence 
to prove that Grant did not remain at Savannah all day on 
the 5th, but avoided meeting Buell that day. 

It is notorious that on the morning of the 4th, General 
Nelson, then twenty miles from Savannah, received a mes- 
sage, stating that he need not hurry his march, and that he 
could not be ferried over the river before Tuesday, the 8th. 

This message of Grant's may have occasioned some 
delay. But Nelson, an active and impatient commander, 
did not pay full attention to the dispatch, and his advance, 
under General Ammen, reached Savannah before noon of 
the 5th of April, 1862. 



100 SHILOII. 

Botli these divisions, stated by Buell, if Imrried, could 
have Ijeen up during the 4tli, and McCook's that or next 
niglit at furtliest. 

Crittenden did not get in till on the (jth, at 10 a. m., and 
tlien got no orders to go on, hut went up of his own accord. 

This is the anxious way in which Buell's troops were 
hurried up. Grant, meantime, liad information, that the 
main body of the enemy left Corinth the night of the 2d 
and 3d of April, and could, as expected, have been at 
Shiloh the afternoon of the od, had he marched as fast as 
Grant, the previous February, had done from Fort Henry 
to Fort Donelson — twelve miles in half a dnj. So says his 
autobiographer, Badeau. Though the rebel march was 
delayed till afternoon of the 3d, there had been since 
April 1st a large rebel force at Monterey, fi\'e miles on the 
wa}^ to Corinth. Sherman has testitied under oath that 
there was reason to expect an attack on the 3d, and there 
is ample evidence to prove that he thought there was 
sufficient force in his front to attack him on the 4th, as 
follows: 

General R. P. Buckland, an especial friend of Generals 
Sherman and Grant, in describing a picket skirmish on the 
4th of April, 1862, says: " Major Ricker, of the 5th Ohio 
cavalry, came up with his cavalry, and we joined in pursuit. 
"VYe |)ursued about a mile, when the enemy commenced 
firing artillery at us. We discovered that he had a large 
force of cavalry and artillery." 

" We therefore concluded to march back to camp with as 
little dela}^ as possible. When we reached the picket line 
General Sherman was there, with several regiments in line 
of battle. As I rode up to General Sherman, at the head 
of my column, with about fifteen prisoners close behind 
me, tilt General asked me what I had been doing. His nnm- 
ner indicated tliat he was not pleased. I replied that I had 
nnintentionally got into a little tight, and there were some 
of the fruits of it, poiuting to the prisoners. He answered 
"that I might have drawn the uiholc (/r)in/ into a fight bef )re 
they iDcre rcadi/, and ordered me to take my men to camp." 



, HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 101 

(Yet he (Sherman) swears there was no danger of attack 
the 4th or 5th.) 

Here, tlien, on the 4th of April, is a clear admission on 
the part of General Sherman that the enemy, mai-chi ng 
from Corinth early the morning of the 3d, which he.thonght 
was the fact, were in full force hefore him at about 3 or 4 
p. m. of the 4th. And an admission, too, of not being ready 
for an attack, upsetting his assertion in his autobiography 
by Bowman, that, during the last week of March, the army 
of the Tennessee only waited for the army of the (3hio to 
advance upon the rebel force at Corinth. ISTow, however, 
it ap})ears that, so far from being ready to advance on tlie 
4th of April, he was not ready to meet an attack in his own 
lines, if these words to Buckland are worthy of credit. 
Having given such evidence of what the commanders. Gen- 
erals Grant and Sherman, thought of a probable attack on 
the 5th of May, let it be shown what precautions were taken 
to meet it. 

Major Ivicker, mentioned above bj^ General Buckland, 
noticing Gen. Buekland's statement, writes as follows in 
the Cincinnati Gazette, April, 1871: 

"General Buckland refers to the 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry in his article 
in the Cincinnati Gazetfe of April 7, 1871. I propose to give a statement of the 
part taken by the '2d battalion Bih Ohio volunteer cavalry, for a few days 
beforo the battle of Shiloh. From the 24th of March till the 4th of April, 
the 2d battalion had almost daily skirmishes with the rebel scouts and pick- 
ets. About 3 o'clock p. m. A[iril 4th, I received an order from General Sher- 
man to go to the front, with one hundred and fifty men, to look for a major, 
lieutenant, and five or six men, who had wandered outside the lines and were 
lost or captured." 

After relating the occurrence of a sharp skirmish, he 
proceeds : 

"Colonel Buckland soon came up with his command on the double-quick. 
After consultation, we marched back for camp, the 5th Ohio volunteer cav- 
alry bringing ofl:' eleven prisoners. When we got back to the picket lines, we 
found General Sherman there, with infantry and artillery in line of baitle, 
caused by the heavy firing of the enemy on us. General Sherman asked me 
wJtat ^uas u]'). I told him I had met and fought the advance of Beauregard's 
army ; tliat he was advancing on us. General Slierman said it could not be 
possible. Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations 
at Corinth and attack us in ours. 

"On Saturday the 5th Ohio volunteer cavalry moved their camp to tlie 
4th division, General Hurlbut, and the 4lh Illinois cavalry took our places 
with General Sherman's division." 



102 SHILOH. 

Major Ricker does not state that the 4th Ohio volunteer 
cavahy were moved very early Saturday morning, and that 
the 4th Illinois cavalry did not come in till late in the eve- 
ening of Saturday, the 5th, so that the Union front had no 
cavalry seouts out that day or night, the 5th. 

The object of removing Tlicker's cavalry was of course 
to quiet the suspicions of the enemy as to our alertness on 
the one hand, and prevent the Union troops from getting 
information on the other. But not only the cavalry scouts, 
but three out of the four batteries of Sherman's artillery, 
were moved back on the morning of the 5th. Two of 
these batteries were returned at dark to a point eighty 
rods in rear of Sherman's center; but that of the second 
brigade, detached some two miles to the left, was not 
returned at all, though the position of the brigade was 
commanded by the heights above Lick creek, from which 
this brigade bore the brunt of an artillery attack the morn- 
ing of the battle. So tliat, so far as guards and defenses 
were concerned no army was ever more completely ex- 
posed to attack than this Army of the Tennessee, till at- 
tacked at 6 or 7 o'clock the next day, 6th of April, 1862, 
utterly unprepared. Add to this the indications of a bat- 
tle were never more absolute, whatever the rebel writers 
may have said about concealing the approach of the attack. 
At 7 a. m. of the 5th, the pickets opposite the right center 
were driven back in three brigades, and the picket stations 
occupied by the rebel advance less than a mile from the 
front of the camp. Early in the afternoon several pieces 
of rebel artillery were seen at a picket station of the 1st 
brigade, not three-quarters of a mile in front of the right 
center brigade; and all these facts, reported to General 
Sherman, must have been reported to Grant during the 
course of the afternoon. One of the rebel cavalry, wounded 
on the 4th, and dying during the night, made known that 
we were to be attacked on the 5th, while at the same 
time many of the regiments had little or no ammunition 
for small arms; and the artillery, as next day proved, was 
yet worse off. Add to this, the camp hospitals were full of 



HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 103 

men ill with diarrhea, and men unfit for duty were num- 
bered by the thousand in more than one division, while no 
regular hospitals had been established at the river. I^To 
intrenching tools, and especially no axes, were to be had, 
and the colonel of the 46th Ohio, when his regular requi- 
sition was reduced and the reduced number not forthcom- 
ing, ordered one hundred from Paducali, and the night 
before the battle got iwenhf-Jicc — ;ill, he was told, that could 
be found at Paducah. One hundred axes, properly used for 
one hour before the attack, would have prevented or de- 
feated it. On such cobweb strands did the lives, and limbs, 
and liberty of so many thousands hang. 

Yet with a knowledge of all these I'acts, and expecting 
an attack, known by General Grant to be imminent at any 
moment, from the myriads of foes gathered and gath- 
ering within drum-beat of his front, he dispatches repeat- 
edly to Ilalleck on the 5th, as follows : 

" Savannah, April 5, 18G2. 
" Major General II. W. IIalleck, 

St. Louis, Missouri: 
" The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at diflerent points 
east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and Hurnboldt. The 
number at these places seems continually to change. The number of the 
enemy at Corinth and within supporting distance of it cannot be far from 
60,000 men. Information obtained through deserters places tlieir force west 
at 200,000. One division of Buell's column arrived yesterday, (the 4th.) Gen- 
eral Buell will be here himself to-day. U. y. Grant, Major General." 

The above seems plainly intended to deceive General IIal- 
leck. The number of troops (200,000) is intended to keep 
Halleck away till there are more reinforcements, and the 
statement about the arrival of Buell's troops the day be- 
fore is to quiet his apprehensions of an attack without a 
sufficient Union force. The statement about the troops 
at and about Corinth is plainly fallacious, as can be proven 
from a score of sources: he (Grant) knowing these Corinth 
troops to be within striking distance of his own front. 
Claiming to know all about troops at Jackson and Hum- 
bold, Tennessee, forty to sixty miles off, he cannot deny 
intinuite knowledge of everything at Corinth, but one- 
third that distance from his front. 



104 SHILOH. 

Here is another dispatch to Halleck, based on one from 

Sherman, who says: 

" Pittsburgh Landing, Tennessee, 

"Ajnil 5, 1862. 
"General Grant. 

" Sir ; All is quiet along my lines now. We are in the act of exchanging 
cavalry, according to your orders, and I will send you ten prisoners of war, 
&c. W. T. Sherman, Brigadier General." 

" Your note yesterday received. I have no doubt that notliing will occur 
to-day but some j)icket firing, &c. I will not be drawn out far, unless with 
certain tv of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on 
our jiositi'on. Sherman." 

It is to be presumed that with this dispatch at hand 
Grant telegraphs to Halleck the third time : 

" Headquarters District of West Tennessee, 

" Savannah, April 5, 1SG2. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" St. Louis, Missouri .- 
" Just as my letter of yesterday was finished, notes from General McCler- 
nand and Sherman's assistant adjutant general were received, stating that 
our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable 
force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet, &c. They had with 
them three jiieces of artillery and infantry. How much, cannot of course bo 
estimated. I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being 
made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place. 

" General Nelson's division has arrived ; the other two of Buell's column 
will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them 
to Hamburgh, some four miles above Pittsburgh, when they all get here. 
Colonel McPlierson has gone with an escort to-day to examine the defensi- 
bility of the ground about Hamburgh, &c.* 

" U. S. Grant, Major Ocneral." 

Now, to prove what must be more than once repeated, 
that Grant was deceiving Halleck, by collusion or other- 
wise, as to occurrences at Pittsburgh, and actual)}" evading 
Buell,with the same purpose — an attack before Buell came 
up — and before repeating the occurrences of Saturday, the 
5th of April, recurrence must be had to Badeau's History 
of Grant, page 71, in which it is stated that Buell did not 
arrive till the 6th; or, if otherwise, did not make it known 
to his superior, and Grant remained to meet him. And in a 
note on the same page is found the statement, that " Buell's 
official report states that he arrived at Savannah on the 
6th, l)ut Grant was not notified of this, and, consequently, 
had no suspicion of (he fact," (because he was away.) 

* McPherson was driven back by the rebel cavalry, which was known to 
Grant at the time of this dispatch. 



HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 105 

The very repetition of this statement is plainly intended 
to hide the fact that Grant evaded Buell, and this evasion 
of him was necessary to the intention of provoking and 
meeting the expected attack hefore the knowledge of his 
(Bnell's) arrival should reach the enemy, and before Buell, 
aware of the danger, should demand that his troops should 
be sent forward to Hamburgh, or Pittsburgh, or take them 
forward himself. 

AVhy put oif meeting Buell till the 6tli, and perplex the 
reader by stating, as Badeau states on page 71, that, while 
writing to Buell on the 5th that he would meet him on 
the 6th, he nevertheless remains {see Badeau) to meet 
him on the 5th, and in the same sentence states that Buell 
did not arrive till the 6ih, knowing the reverse, as he 
did. 

The whole matter of Badeau 's History from page 68, 
where he indicates danger to Grant, March 17th, to page 
75, where he announces the attack by Johnson, April 6th, 
is confusedly mixed, witliout seeming connection or con- 
tinuation, and is most ingeniously arranged, so as to per- 
plex even aproi'Bssional reader of more than usual patience 
and research. One main object of this commentary is to 
unfold the design of this medley, intended to cover the effort 
to deceive Ilalleck by agreement perhaps, and keep him 
back at St. Louis; to keep Buell back at Columbia or 
Waynesboro', and, unaware of danger, to keep all knowl- 
edge of Buell's arrival out of reach of Grant's own troops 
and the enemy: all of which was most skillfully and for- 
tunately done till the object was accomplished, which was 
an attack by the enemy, which Buell's troops should not 
be present to repel, but in the repulse of which, if neces- 
sar}', they might be made available, as they were for the 
salvation of the Army of the Tennessee in its last extrem- 
ity. But even this last intention was only adopted, as will 
be seen, when it was found that, against repeated orders or 
advice, Buell's advance troops were at Savannah, as the 
whole might have been, in full time not only to have taken 
part in a battle on the 6th, but, if sent to Hamburgh on 



106 SHILOH. 

the 5tli or 6th, to have captured or dispersed the enemy. 
This iinist be repeatedly stated. 

Going back to page 70, it will be seen that Grant's head- 
quarters remained at tSavannah after sending np MeCler- 
nand and Smith's divisions, " because," says Badeau, "from 
there lie could more easily communicate with Bnell, whose 
deliberafe movevieiits had not yet brouglit him within sup- 
porting distance of the Army of the Tennessee." 

Grant was very anxious to hurry up Buell, and Buell 
was very shick in hurrying up, is the plain English of what 
is here intended by Badeau or by Grant, for they are one 
in this matter. 

On page 68 of Badeau, the dates are brought down to the 
8d of April. We are told that on the 19th of March 
Grant wrote to Buell: "There is every reason to suppose 
that the rebels have a large force at Corinth and many at 
other points on the road towards Decatur." But he does 
not tell Buell that these troops on the road towards Deca- 
tur are A. S. Johnson's troops from Decatur, gathering 
at Corinth. 

And this note of the 19th is the last communication 
spoken of by Badeau from Grant to Buell, till the answer 
to Buell's note of the 4th of April. 

Nor does he tell Buell that he is, as Badeau saj's he was, 
apprehensive of an attack on Pittsburgh, and is concentrat- 
ing his own troops at that threatened locality. 

On the 26th of Miirch he tells Halleck, "my scouts are 
just in with a letter from General Buell, who is yet on the 
east side of Duck river, detained bridge building; " and 
the next day, the 27th, he dispatches again to Ilalleck: "I 
have no news of any portion of Buell's command being 
this side of Columbia," but says nothing of danger to the 
army. On the 31st he writes to Halleck: "Two sokliers 
from the head of McCook's command came in this evening: 
some of this command crossed Duck river on the 24th and 
estabhshed guards eight miles out that night.* On the 

*An officer of Sherman's division kept -a diary, and on this 31st March, 
the entry is: "Further indications through the pickets that an attack is im- 



HOW BUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 107 

same clay, the 31st, he (Grant) sent word to McConk, (not 
Buell,) "I have been looking for your column anxiously for 
several days." But no dispatch is mentioned by Badeau 
to Buell or jSTelson two or three days before the Slst, and 
our biographer may not have found on Grant's order- 
book such a dispatch, where likely it was never entered or 
was verbal. Let there be a pause in this relation to say 
here, that before the 31st Grant must have heard of the 
concentration of A. S. Johnson's troops at Corinth, whence 
it liad been understood at Sliiloh they were to march on 
Pittsbugh the 1st of April, 1862, or account of Bueli's ap- 
proach. 'No such anxiety as that expressed to McCook, as 
above stated, is intimated to Pmell or Ilalleck. On the con- 
trary, immediately after the dispatch to Ilalleck, of the 
27th, stating no news of Buell this side of Columbia, he 
sendsamessage to Buell or Nelson, in suhstance as follows: 

"Savannah, March 28, 1862. 
"General Nelson, 

" of Bucirs udvaiicc Division. 
"You will so time your march to Savannah, Tennessee, as to reach there 
not before Monday, the 7th of April, as the crowd of troops arriving and to 
be cared for will wake it inconvenient to pay proper attention to so large a 
body of troops before that date. U. S. Gkant." 

It may liave also been arranged with Halleck, as a fur- 
tlier precaution, to keep Buell back at Waipiesboro. For, on 
the 20th, JIalleck writes thatBuell is " marching on AVaynes- 
boro," there to concentrate and march thence to Ilambugh, 
four miles above Pittsburg. "From that point to (yorinth 
the road is good, and a junction can be formed with the 
troops from Pittsburgh at almost any point." [Grant to 
Halleck, Savannah, April 5, 1862.) 

It was intended by Nelson not to reach Savannah before 
the 7th, and Buell expected a dispatch at Waynesboro to 
stop him there. But by some fatality Nelson had just 
passed Waynesboro when Buell got there, and, meeting no 



minent, and though I don't fear the result, a sudden attack, if violently 
made, asit will be, may throw us back for months. The men are discouraged 
at our delay here, and the close vicinity of the rebel scouts, which should be 
driven off. Sherman is inviting an. attack, for which we are unprepared, but 
which I hope may occur." 



108 SHILOH. 

dispateli from Ilalleck, Buell pushed on to Savannah, reach- 
ing there at 5 p. ra. on the 5tli. 

Grant's combinations to defeat 100,000 rebels with less 
than half their supposed number had miscarried. The 
affair, as sailors say, had nussed stays; and, says Colonel 
Adam Badeau, 

" On the 3(1 of April Grant was fiaally able to infortn Halleck that, accord- 
ing to the telegra[iliic opei-aior, General Nelson, commanding Buell's fore- 
most division, is in >ight. (From what station ?) The advaiK'.e will arrive, 
piobaldy, ou Saturday, April Stli," (when Grant kept purjio.-ely away. W. 
P. G.) 

jSTow, here is a blunder, real or intended, calculated to 
befog the casual and perplex or irritate the professional 
reader. Why say a body of troops in sight on the 3d, or 
even the 4th of April, will only '■^ ^^robablij arrive on the 
5th," when so anxiously expected? The country about 
Savannah, in the direction of Waynsboro, was level and 
wooded, and a mile was probabl}' the limit of vision in that 
direction. The inference may be, what was prol)ably the 
fact, that Nelson might act upon the message from Grant of 
the 4th, that he need not hasten his march; and there was, 
therefore, room for such a probability. Bat this dispatch, at 
least, proves, outside the message to xlelson, that no effort 
was made to have Nelson up in time to defend the attack 
Grant and Sherman knew was intended to be made on or 
about the 5th, and of which, with no other evidence than 
that of Buckland and Ricker, above stated, S/ieriium on the 
41 h felt certain of on the 5th. 

These messages or dispatches, endeavoring to delay 
Buell's arrival, if ever reduced to writing, or placed upon 
record, with numbers of others, criminating both Grant 
and Ilalleck in regard to their own and Buell's operations 
about this time, have doubtless been suppressed, and, as 
such messages may seem surprising to readers knowing 
little or nothing of the parties here concerned, the follow- 
ing evidence maybe of interest to a/^ concerned, especially 
old volunteers of these armies: 

"Cincinnati, Fchraanj 12, 1872. 

" 1 was in cornmand of the 10th brigade, 4th division, (General \V. Nelsoa 



HOW RUELL WAS KEPT BACK. 109 

comm.imling division,) army of the Ohio, on its inarch from Nashville to Sa- 
vannah, Tennessee, in the spring of 18(52. 

"On leaving Coliimhia, Tennessee, about the last of March, General Nelson 
directed me to conduct the march, so as to reach Savannah, Tennessee, the 
7ih of April, as «;e were not loanted there before. 

"Tiie roa<-is were good, the weather f>leasant, and camping grounds favor- 
able, wliicii will account for our reii.ching Savannah before noon April 5th, 
1SG2. If required, the march might have been hastened without fatigue to 
the troo[is or leaving an}' part of the train behind. J. Ammen." 

Snpposinc:; it plain now tliat, while anxiously seeming 
to expect Biioll, Grant was still more anxiously striving to 
keep him back, the text of Colonel Badeau is again taken 
up. 



110 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE. 

"General Grant, while at Springfield, Massachusetts, said that Buell might 
have reached Pittsburgh landing several days earlier than he did, in which 
case General Grant would have been the attacking party." {N. Y. Herald, 
August, I860.) 

It is exceedingly convenient, especially for a military man 
or historian, to forget, or omit, or misplace dates, which are 
generally of the utmost importance, even to a minute or a 
second of time, during or before a battle, and are important 
at all times. General Grant's report of Shiloh proves that 
five minutes' more delay might have lost his army. The 
enemy on our extreme right, on the 6th of April, 1862, 
about noon, failed to turn that flank by withholding his 
fire in a single instance not over a second of time. Our 
biographer, whether prompted or not, takes advantage of 
this circumstance to omit or confuse liis dates as emergen- 
cies seem to require. Thus we are told that a message from 
Buell, dated April 4th, was brought to Grant, not stating 
whether received the 4th or 5th. Grant replies on the 5th, 
at Savannah: "I)is})atch justreceivcd; I will be here to meet 
you to-morrow. The enemy at and near Corinth are prob- 
ably from 60,000 to 80,000." "And," says Badeau, " Buell, 
did not arrive till the 6th, and Gi'ant remained to meet 
him." 

Now,if thewriterof this mixed matterintendedtosay that 
Grant retained his headquarters at Savannah to meet Buell, 
he should so specify. But Grant's headquarters were, or 
were supposed to be, on the boat Tigress, while his adju- 
tants had offices on shore, both at Pittsburgh and Savannah. 
The fiite of two armies of 80,000 men depended in a great 
measure on the meeting of these two commanders. And 
here was one nwstavxioifsbj expected, as ic'e (ire toUi, while the 
other, in the utmost danger, as the event proved be was 



HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. Ill 

and ])i'ofe.ssed to be, not only endeavors to keep his troops 
Lack, but dekavs an answer to a dispatch received on the 
4t]i of April till tlie otii; and writing on the 5th, which, it 
is repeated, was the last limit of the expected attack, he 
postpones the requested interview to the 6th, and by this 
he plainl}" ])()st})ones this requested meeting until after 
tlie attack did come, as was expected; and, but for several 
accidents of the most improbable character, this postpone- 
ment must have been more fatal to both armies tlian the 
delay was to the one so miraculously saved, and then tlirown 
back, as it was, at any rate, one to two months in its ex- 
pected operations.* Consider again this confusion of dates, 
which is repeated two pages forward, (page 73.) Grant 
writes to Buell on the 5th: "I will be here to meet you 
to-morrow, the 6th." "Buell did not arrive till the 6th, 
and Grant remained to meet him," says Badeuu. Wlien ? 
On the 5th, when this answer was written, or the (h\v after? 
Now, it is certain that General Grant saw General Nelson 
soon afternoon on the 5th, and must have heard from him 
of the proximity of General Buell. He also sees Colonel Am- 
men; tells him he is not wanted, as he does not expect a 
iiglit much outside of Corinth. Knowing that General Buell 
will be at Savannah on the 5th; and, expecting every mo- 
ment to hear tlie roar of an attack above, he runs up in 
the Tigress, after seeing Nelson, to Pittsburgh, and does not 
return till near midnight, and thus avoids seeing Buell. 
Next morning, roused up by the roar of rebel cannon, he 
hastily and forgetfull}' writes to Buell as follows: "Savan- 
nah, April 6, 1862. Heavy tiring heard up the river, in- 
dicating an attack on my most advanced position. I ex- 
pected this, but did not think it would take place Till to- 
morrow or next day," (Monday or Tuesday, 7th or 8tli.) 

And this is written after he had dispatched to Nelson at 
Columbia that lie was not wanted till the 7tli, written after 
he had arranged with Ilalleck to stop Buell, to close up at 
Waynsboro, (30 miles off,) and march thence to Hamburgh ; 

*Thi3 was the object of the Washington cabal. — W. P. G. 



112 SlIILOII. 

after advising IlTelson on the 4tli that he would be in the 
way if up before the 8th; and after saying to General Am- 
men that his troops were tlius superfluous, as he did not 
expect a fight much short of Corinth, tclhng him to hold 
to the position he was in till boats came down for him; and 
then, as Colonel Bndeau relates, ordering ISTelson, with 
extreme providence, to move to a point five miles below 
Pittsburgh, forgetting, of course, the previous order to 
Ammen, to remain where he was — at Savannah. 

And this is the greatest soldier of the age, honest and 
just, as a man should be ! This, then, is the provident com- 
mander, who had been so anxious for Buell's arrival over a 
week befoi-e the 5th! Buell who, as Sherman says and 
swears, had been rightfullj^ expected for two weeks; and 
therefore he (Slierman) maintained the gaps in our front 
for an army which was to go elsewhere, but knew their 
real use was gates to the enemy in cannon-shot of our camps, 
and whose entry thereat was by him so successfully re- 
pelled, if any faitli is to be placed in his letter to Professor 
Coppes, contradicting his division report, written immedi- 
ately alter the battle. Buell, be it re[ieated, was not sent 
to Hamburgh, as he would have prevented the attack. But 
to return again to Colonel Badeau's dates, jumbled together 
like a crate of dates, and confused as the bloody battle about 
to break upon and break to pieces the Armj- of the Ten- 
nessee. 

After the statement that on the r)tli Grant remained to 
meet Buel at Savannah, a very free use is made of tliat day, 
the 5tli, which may here be taken for either the 5th or 6th. 
It will be seen, however, very phiinly, that he did not re- 
main on the 5th, the day fixed by Buell to see hira. lie 
remained there, however, long enough to meet JSTelson and 
Ammen, and give them conflicting orders, which came 
very near, say within five or ten minutes, of utterly scat- 
tering or cnpturing the Army of the Tennessee, late in the 
afternoon of the 6th, wlien, it is again repeated, as is stated 
in Grant's report, those rejected troops of Buell's, under 
Nelson and Ammen, prevented the turning of our extreme 



now GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 113 

loft and tlie capture of the landing, transports, &c., wlii^'A, \rC ffM^y 
f OOffX S Ky the army fSi^t^ deserted by Grant. But to the 
dates again : 

" There was skirmishing daily after the 2d of April, and on the 4th the 
enemy felt Sherman's front in force, but nothing serious came of it, and the 
opinion of that commander was, thac no probability of an immediate engage- 
ment existed. (Though there had been danger three weeks before.) Grant 
rode out on the day after, i. c, the 5th, and concurred with him in this judg- 
ment." 

Now, supposing, of course, that these commanders, in 
good faith, put these words out of or into the pen of their 
biographer, what is to be thought of them as men above 
idiocy, to say noticing of their being commanders, intrusted 
at the time with the destinies of two large armies, quad- 
ruple in number that with which the great Julius won 
the empire of the olden world at Pharsalia? 

Consider the circumstances ihen^ by them known to ex- 
ist, as has never been denied. Sherman and Grant both 
believed the enemy had marched from Corinth the night 
of the 2d and 3d; a ver}' large force having been in our 
front for some days before. Sherman has testified that there 
was reason to expect an attack on the 3d, and Grant has 
admitted that he thought an army equal to his own on the 
evening of that day (the 3d) was in his front. Johnson 
marched on the 3d, so as to attack before Buell came up, as 
arranged by Grant, on the 7th or 8th : he (Johnson) having 
fixed early on the 5th for the attack. 

How it was possible he failed to know that Buell's ad- 
vance was at Savannah the 5th, at noon, who can conjec- 
ture; but such ignorance, on some reliable assurance, must 
have existed. Our commanders now (the 5th) recognized 
how close the chances were of his retreat or his attack, 
and Beauregard advised a withdrawal of his troops. Grant 
had been assured on the 4th that Buell's advance was in 
sight of the station, and Buell himself, Grant knew, was 
to be on the ground with two divisions that day, (5th.) On 
the 4th of April, 1862, the day before these commanders 
concurred in their judgment, says Badeau, against the 
probability of an immediate attack, Sherman had been 
8 



114 SHiLon. 

assured by Major Ricker that he had just met the ad- 
vance of Beauregard's army, and Sherman had admitted 
it by telling Buckland that, by capturing prisoners, he 
might have drawn our whole army into a light before they 
wereready. But beyond this the meeting of Grant and Slier- 
man must have been late in the afternoon of the 5th. 
Badeau admits this imminent attack, l)y stating Grant's or- 
ders to Kelson as to placing his camp live miles from Pitts- 
burgh on the 5th. Grant then went up late on the 5th for 
two very special reasons. One was to avoid meeting Buell, 
and let Sherman know how close the chances were, and to 
prevent all possible information to the enemy, for which 
reason the cavalry pickets had been withdrawn the night 
before, (4th.) They had both known or believed that an ad- 
vance in force had been within the power of the enemy 
since 2 p. m. of the day before, (the 4th,) or even the od, 
and were no doubt in extreme apprehension that, knowing 
Buell's proximity, the rebels had retreated, or determined 
80 to do that night, as some advised. But, more than all 
this, there had occurred that day what Sherman and Grant 
concealed in their reports — what they seem, according to 
Badeau; to have concealed even from Halleck, (and what 
tliey have seemingly or actually concealed from Badeau 
and Bowman, which is left in doubt) — occurrences not men- 
tioned in the dozen histories and thonsands of accounts of 
the battle, and obtained by Colonel Worthington's court- 
martial in August, 1862. At 7 a. m. (5th) the pickets of the 
1st brigade were driven in from a station three quarters of a 
mile, as Sherman testifies, from his right center, and soon 
after the pickets of the two center brigades were also 
driven back. The 5th April, early in the afternoon, one or 
more rebel guns were in battery at this picket station of 
Sherman's 1st brigade, and rebel artillery was heard of 
farther to our left, opposite Shiloh church, and reported 
to Sherman, who had no guns at hand. 

The woods in front swarmed all day with rebel troops of 
all arms, as Colonel (now General) Buckland testified, and 
mentions in his letter to the Cincinnati Gazette, indicat- 



HOW GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 115 

ing tlic power to attack and warning the immediate ap- 
proacli of the enemy. 

These facts are here repeated as known to Grant on the 
5th, in the afternoon, when he avoided meeting Buell; and 
to prove that he did this purposely, (see Ammen's note, &c., 
above.) He tlius kept Buell back, knowing himself liable 
at any moment to attack, while he kept his front exposed 
and defenseless. Yet this charge has been and is sneered 
at as a queer idea, that any general of any army should 
commit such an act of folly, or madness, or criminality, 
whatever be its denomination in the calendar of crime, 
or of insanity, or selfish purpose, or interest. The very 
confusion and omission of dates now in hand prove the de- 
sign cliarged by the avoidance of Buell on the 5th. We 
have it stated, after mention of this interview between Grant 
and Sherman on the 5th, that on the 4th "Grant's horse 
slipped and fell on his rider. This lamed him for over a 
week," &c. This fall, and especially the lameness, was not 
apparent on the 6th to anybody, and was never known to this 
narrator till seen in Badeau's history. The report may have 
been spread as an additional inducement to the attack, and 
Grant's going every night to Pittsburgh was calculated to 
kill the suspicion of the enemy that their attack was ex- 
pected, and to quiet any apprehension in his own army. 

But this accident of the 4th should have been stated in 
its place — not so stated as to produce the impression that 
the concurrence of judgment was on the 4th. He keeps 
on mixing dates. Tiie same day, we are to infer, on which 
Grant got hurt, the 4th, Lew. Wallace reported eight regi- 
ments of rebel infantry and 1,200 cavalry at Purdy, &c.; 
and the same day, the 4th, he (Grant) writes to Sherman: 
''I will return to Pittsburgh landing to-morrow, (the 5th,) 
at an early hour," &c. An interview between Grant and 
Sherman on the 5th has been noticed at length by Badeau. 
If he did go up in the forenoon, he was back at Savannah 
at noon and some hours later; and, going up to Pittsburgh 
in the afternoon to avoid Buell, his impressions as to an 
immediate attack must have been the same; and it is a 



116 SHiLon. 

fair presumption that Badeaii was made aware of all that 
occurred at Shiloh as to pickets, and before Grant returned 
to Savannah at 11 p. m. that night, or so much pains 
would not bo taken to explain this avoidance of Buell on 
the 5th. 

We come now to Saturda}^, April 5th, and will be done 
with these tedious and tangled dates — tangled at a time 
when of all others they should be eminently straight and 
clear. On Saturday, April 5th, Sherman is quoted to 
show" that the enemy's cavalry came down well to his 
front, and what is stated before by Badeau is repeated. It 
is repeated that Grant, having m.ade all his preparations 
to remove his headquarters to Pittsburgh on the morrow, 
(the 6th,) remained to meet Buell, as that "officer had 
desired, on the 5th." 

The inference here is plain, that Grant remained in 
person to meet Buell on the 5th, as Buell had desired, (on 
page 70.) To which desire on the 5th (page 71) Grant 
writes: "I will be here to meet you to-morrow." 

Buell, however, says Badeau, did not arrive till the 6tli, 
and Grant remained to meet Jam. If there is any doubt 
about the date specified or meant by Badeau here, there 
can be none where this same matter is specified (page 73) 
as a meeting on the 5th, as Buell had desired. 

A battle may be lost by delay or precipitation; by 
blundering or neglect; by misinformation or b}^ accident, 
as thousands of battles have been lost or won, and yet the 
•delin(|uent general may preserve his honor, and even his 
reputation. Soult never w^ou a battle, and was beaten 
repeatedly, and especially and unexpectedly by what 
seemed, and may have been, a blunder, at Albuera, but 
lost no reputation; wdiile Beresford, who won the battle, 
gained none. Yet though Beresford w^as chargeable with 
neglect of the same sort as that at Shiloh, both he and 
Soult did all of which their minds and means were com- 
petent, neglected no reinforcements that could be got 
up before the battle, and made the best use they could of 
(their troops in hand: they themselves all the time remain- 



now GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 117 

ing on the battle-field. Soul t blundered in lii^ tactics ; and 
Beresford, it is said, lost his temper on the field of 
'■'■ Albuera, lavish of its dead;" almost as Shiloh. But 
neither of these generals was charged or chargeable with 
designed neglect, or a selfish purpose, and their honor was 
not tarnished. 

But here is a case where an endeavor was plainl}' made 
to delay the approach of much-needed reinforcements to 
the aid of a threatened army, and, what is worse, an abso- 
lute rejection occurs of the anxiously expected troops when 
arrived, and when an attack was momentarily expected, 
and when these troops, if used as had been intended, could 
Lave crushed their adversaries in an hour, or one-fourth 
the time, if properly handled. And though ten years 
have passed, there has been no suspicion expressed but by 
this relator, that any one but General Buell was in fault, 
and, by his deliberation, was the cause of the slaughter and 
disgrace at Shiloh, April 6, 1862. Hoping we have hunted 
down these dates with a legitimate purpose to expose their 
nefarious use, and hunted up and out their concealment 
and confusion to an understanding of the fact, that while, 
as is pretended. Grant remained to meet Buell on the 5th 
of April, 1862, he purposely avoided doing so : — the tedious 
detail ma^^ not be without interest and instruction to a 
professional reader. 

The following letter, to show whether intentionally or 
hot the meeting with Buell was avoided, is introduced. 

Grant and Sherman admit, by Grant's dispatch to Hal- 
leck, that they had not the faintest idea of an immediate 
attack on the oth. There was nothing, then, to keep 
Grant from Savannah on the 5tli, where he had remained, 
we are told, for the purpose of hurrying foru-ard Buell's 
troops. AVe are here shown how he did it, by remaining 
at Pittsburgh, knowing Buell to be at Savannah: 

"August 27, 1862. 

" My statement of where I was and what I was doing April 5th aud 6th, 
(1SG2,) is as follows : 

" I was sent in charge of ten prisoners and ten guards to Pittsburgh land- 
ing from Shiloh meeting-house by Colonel Ilildebrand, commanding 3d 



118 SIIILOH. 

brigade, on Saturday, April 5th. The prisoners had been taken the day 
before, and belonged to companies C, K, and D, of 1st Alabama cavalry. 
On Saturday evening I was ordered by General U. S. Grant to put my men 
all on board the steamer Tigress, with one day's rations, and take the prison- 
ers to Savannah that night. We landed at Savannah about 11 p. m,, and 
Genera] Grant said it was not advisable to take the men ashore that night. 
He, with other officers, remained up to a very late hour, and were very late 
in getting up on Sunday morning. 

" I finally got an order to take the prisoners to the guard-house, and was 
told my guards might remain in town till 4 p. m. At that time the boat was 
to start back to Pittsburgh landing. I bad just got to the guard-house when 
I beard cannonading in the direction of Shiloh. I looked down towards the 
steamboat landing, and saw that the "Tigress" was firing up- I took my 
men (the guards) back on double-quick, and scarcely got there in time to 
get on board the boat. General Grant stayed all night on the boat. We halted 

at Crump's landing, and Grant inquired of Commodore where the 

firing was at. Answer, 'in Sherman's division.' Grant remarked, 'I would 
rather it was there than any place else along the line, for he is better pre- 
pared for them.' He then ordered the boat on up to Pittsburgh, at which 
place we arrived near 10 o'clock, a. m. 

" E. K. MooRE, 
"Seco7id Lieutenant Company D, I'ith Regiment 0. V. /." 

If Badcau writes on Grant's authority', that commaiider 
indicated his expectation of an attack both h\ the order 
(which we are tokl was obeyed by N"elson) to encamp five 
miles below Pittsburgh, and by telling Am men to stay 
where he was, and that, if wanted, he would send boats 
down for him; and, therefore, he must have been in mo- 
mentary expectation of an attack, instead of the attack on 
the 7th or 8th he told Buell he had been expecting. AVith 
all this expectation of an attack on the 7th, there is no 
accounting for the fact, that he did not send BuelTs troops 
up on Saturday, except hy the conclusion that he purposely 
kept him back to prevent his having any share in the ex- 
pected repulsion of an attack. With Sherman the pur- 
pose might have been different, if, as he had said, his heart 
was not in the war. 

On page 72 we are told that the skirmish of the 4th put 
both officers and men on the alert. We have seen, that 
among these officers were not Sherman and Grant. Sher- 
nuin parked his two center batteries eighty rods in rear of 
his center on the evening of the 5th, and told a large num- 
ber of troops, who were on the look-out near Shiloh church 
after dark, to disperse to their quarters, where they would 
be in no more danger than if at home in Ohio. Suppose, 



now GRANT WAS PREPARED BEFORE THE BATTLE. 119 

now, these commanders bad been upon the alert, and, as 
was di.«patched to Ilalleck on the 5th, had been ready to 
meet an unexpected attack, woukl not the threatening oc- 
currences of Saturday, the 5th, have been dispatched hourly, 
or oftener, to Ilalleck and to Buell's troops in the rear? 
Would not notice have been sent to Buell so soon as the 
pickets were driven in at 7 a. m. ? Would not boats have 
been read}' to take up the division of ]!:^elson that arrived 
at noon on the 5th? Would not Grant's scattered divis- 
ions have been warned of the danger, and the widely sep- 
arated columns have been brought into regular line of 
battle that threatening afternoon and day? 

Sherman maj- perhaps l)e excused for inaction on the 
ground of his theory that fortifications would have been a 
sign of weakness, and invited an attack, for which he was 
not ready on the 4th, or 5th, or 6th, or ever in the war. 
Drawing his lines up so as to close the gaps, and properly 
arranging his artillery on the front or flanks, would, on the 
same principle, have incurred the temptation to attack; and 
to lead even an enemy into temptation of shedding blood, 
would have been morally and religiously wrong, and so he 
remained inactive, lest he might induce an attack for which 
we were not prepared. Such inactivity, in addition to the 
presentation of his flanks to an expected attack, is the new 
Shermanic strategj'. 



120 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER IX. 

• SHERMAN'S EVIDENCE 

Extract from record of court marlial at Mi-mphis, Tennessee, August, 1862. 

'■ No ptronger position was evor held by any army. Therefore on Thursday, 
(3d of April,) two days before the battle, I knew there was no hostile force 
within six (three) miles, though there was reason to expect an attack. The diary 
entry that an attack was imminent on Thursdaj^, April 3, 1862, is false and 
libelous." {Sherman' s evidence.) 

" Wo did not occupy too much ground. General Buell's forces had been ex- 
pected rigiitfullj' for two weeks, and a place was left for his forces, though 
Grant had afterwards determined to send Buell to Hamburgh as a separate 
command. The entry that we covered too much ground is false and libelous." 
{Sherman's evidence.) 

Extracts from the record of Colonel "Wortbingtou's trial 
at ^Memphis, Tennessee, August, 1862: 

Extracts from a Diary of the Tennessee E.vpedition, 1862, 5y T. Worthingion, 
Colonel 46iA Regiment, 0. V. I. 

" Wednesday, March2Q, 1862. — At Camp Shiloh, three miles from Pittsburgh 
landing. A company being called for picket duty to-day, detailed Captain 
Sliarp's company, B. Indications of an attack, if the country people are to 
be believed. Their pickets are around, and too near us, showing a strong 
effective force. 

" Thursday, March 27, 1S62. — This afternoon two of Sharp's pickets were 
fired on by the rebel horse, about Ah p.m., not a mile from camp. A disgrace 
to the army that such should be the case, and an indication that they are 
covering some forward movement, j'et Sherman is improvident as ever, and 
takes no defensive and scarce any precautionary measures. He snubs me, 
and lias no time to hear even a suggestion. 

"Friday, March 28, 18G2. — Having suggested to McDowell the sending out 
of a stronger picket, he ordered thirty more men, wliich were immediately 
volunteered. If Beauregard does not attack us, he and the chivalry are dis- 
graced forever, if for nothing else. 

"Saturday, March 29, 1862. — Sherman has refused to sign a requisition for 
seventy-two axes for my regiment, making it twenty- two; and while a slight 
abattis might prevent or avert an att;\ck, there are no axes to make it, nor 
is there a sledge or crowbar in his division, and scarce a set of tools out of 
my regiment. 

"Monday, March 31, 1862. — Farther indications through the pickets that 
an attack is imminent, and though I do not fear the result, a sudden attack, 
if violently made, as it icill be, may throw us back for months. The men are 
discouraged at our delay here and the close vicinity of the rebel pickets, 
which siiould be driven off. Shorniau is inviting an attack, which 1 hope 
may occur, but for which we are unprepared. 

"Tuesday, April 1, 1862. — Have now over one hundred rounds of ammu- 



Sherman's evidence. 121 

nition for all available men, an'3 feel easy on that point. Ordered the cap- 
tains to send in accounts of" clothing, &c., wanted, which the quartermaster 
is very careless about getting. Still no axes, which now he cannot get if be 
would, and which are worth more than guns at present. 

" Thursday, April 3, 1862. — Rode to Pittsburgh landing. The place is 
crowded and in disorder below, with noise and gambling on the bank above, 
across the way from the post office. Hunted up and down for clothing and 
axes, and found that Sherman had forbidden his quartermaster from receiv- 
ing anytliing; that General Smith's quartermaster will answer no requisi- 
tions outside of his immediate command ; and the post quartermaster, Baxter, 
(Grant's,) will only answer the requisitions of the division quartermasters. 
The reason that Sherman's quartermaster will not receive any stores is, that 
be has no jilace to put them. There are now at least six boats hired by the day 
at the landing, (as I hear,) at no less than two thousand ($2,000) a day, when 
two thousand dollars with that many men could, in ten days or less, put up 
store-houses sufficient for an army of one hundred thousand men. And so the 
Government will pay on tliis expedition so far not less than twenty thousand 
dollars, and perhaps ten times that before the war is over, and lose not less 
than one to ten million dollars in quartermaster. and commissary stores, oc- 
casioned by the improvidence nnd neglect of its major generals here, to eay 
nothing of the disorder and danger growing out of such a state of tilings. 

"The indications are (still) of an attack, which I have also intimated to 
McDowell; we should now have on our rigiit at least six batteries, and two 
regiments of cavalry to warn the rear. With thick woods before us and 
pickets scarce a mile out, we have no defenses whatever, and no means of 
giving an alarm but by the fire of mui5ketry. The troops cover too much 
ground, and cannot support each other, and a violent attack, which we may 
expect, may drive them back in detail. God help us, with 6o many sick men 
in camp, if we are attacked, there being over five thousand unfit for duty. 

" Friday, April 4, 1862. — One of McDowell's pickets was shot in the hand 
about noon. A detail of Taylor's cavalry was sent out three or four miles; 
found four to six hundred rebel cavalry, and fell back, returning about 2 p.m. 

"Everything is carried on in a very negligent way, and nothing but the 
same conduct on the other side can save us from disaster. They can concen- 
trate one hundred thousand men from the heart of rebeldom, and with threo 
or four railroads have far greater facilities for handling troops than we have. 

" Have brigade orders to stack arms at daylight till further orders. Keep 
two companies lying on their arms, and though as quiet as possible, look for 
an attack ever}' hour. 

" Saturday, April 5, 1862. — Rode out to Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and 
found two men (rebel pickets) wounded yesterday, who died last night at the 
Widow Howell's. About 7 o'clock a.m., tho rebels drove in Lieutenant Crary 
from the Widow Howell's, getting possession of their dead men. Heard in the 
evening that the rebels had established three guns (six pounders) opposite 
Hildebrand's brigade, on our left, across the valley. Hear of five of their 
regiments arriving to-day. 

" Sunday, April 6, 1862. — A clear cool morning. Rode out to the pickets at 
sunrise, and soon after the enemy were seen advancing past the Howell 
house. Directly one of Colonel Hicks'.s regiment, 40th Hlinois, was shot 
through the heart, at not less than four hundred yards. Rode to McDowell's 
quarters, (not up,) and then back to the pickets, and ordered the iTien who had 
fallen back to advance to the Howell fence. Returned to camp for prepara- 
tion, and at about 7 a.m. the attack commenced on Hildebrand's and Buck- 
land's brigades. This might have been expected, but we were really not 
ready for a fight. No hospitals at Pittsburgh, ner even means to carry off the 
wounded." 

"Apiar, 25, 18H2. 

"The undersigned hereby certify that most of the facts above set forth are 
correct from their own knowledge, and that Colonel Worthington's remarks 



122 siiiLon. 

and anticipations are in correspondence with his general conversation for ten 
daj's before the battle of the Gth of April, 1862." 

William Smith, Maj. 4(lth Reg. 0. V. I. 

J. W. Heath, Capt. Co. A, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

A. G. Sharp, Capt. Co. B, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

Jno. Wiseman, Capt. Co. C, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 
F,P. N. Upton, Lt. c'dg. Co. D, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

Wm. Pinney, Capt. Co. E, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

P. A. Crow, Capt. Co G. 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

M. C. Lilly, Capt. Co. H, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

C. C. Lyblasd, Capt. Co. I, 46th Reg. 0. V. I. 

I. N. Alexander, Capt. Co. K, 46th Reg. 0. V. I." 

"3d Charge. — Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. 

"Spccificntion 2d. — In this, that the said Colonel Thomas Worthington, of 
the 46th Ohio Volunteers, did print, or cause to be printed, on a sheet for 
circulaliou, what purported to be extracts from his diary of the Tennessee 
expedition, containing false and libelous matter, calculated and designed to 
injure his superior otlicers,- Colonel McDowell and General Grant and General 
Sherman. 

" Sj)ec\jicalion 3cZ.— In this, that the said Colonel Worthington did print, or 
cause to be printed, for circulation, what purported to be extracts from hia 
diary of the Tennessee expedition, designed to secure for himself a popular 
reputation for pirophecy and foresight, while said diary was not made con- 
temporaneous with the dates set forth in it, but was fabricated or manufac- 
tured after (he occasion, to fulfill some base and dishonorable purpose. 

"To which the pirisoner pleaded not r/uilti/." 

General Sherman's testimonj^, having direct reference to 
the cliarges, was as follows: 

" As to tlie 3d charge, 2d specification, he says, of these facts I can testify, 
that, about the 10th instant, (August, 1862,) one of my staff brought a sheet 
of printed matter, which was left for me by Captain Giesy, of the 46th Ohio. 
Tliat sheet contains matter false and libelous. Though marked private and 
confidential, it bears on its face evidence of its intent for circulation. Under 
date of Marcli 29, 1862, by this paper, he uses the words: 'Sherman has refused 
to sign a requisition for seventy-two axes for my regiment — making it twenty- 
two.' I did so rightfuUj'. I knew wiiat axes were on hand and expected, and 
was the judge, not Colonel Worthington, of their distribution. (There were 
none to be had.) He says, 'a slight abattis miglit have prevented an attack.' 
What business was it of his whether his superior officer invited an attack or 
not? The Army Regulations will show him that no fortifications can be made 
except under order of the commanding general, (thus making Grant respon- 
sible.) 2h have erected fortifications would have been evidence of weakness and 
would have invited an attack. Tiie entry of March 31, 1862, must have been 
fabricated after the date, for our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on 
the ground five days after this entry was made. Colonel WortJunyton might 
have thought an attack imminent, because for weeks he was predicting the 
worst, and hoping it might happen. The entry of April 3, 1862, is false and 
libelous. Troops were arriving from every quarter by water; wagons were 
coming to the landing from camps in the interior; high water contracted the 
levee to a very small space, and many other causes, well known to Colonel 
Vf ., produced confusion, which no general could have prevented, and which 
no one could charge to General Grant. (Nothing was charged to General 
Grant.) 

"I admit that Colonel Worthington was wandering up and down the river 
hunting for clothing and axes, but the assertion that Sherman had forbidden 



Sherman's evidence. 123 

his quartermasters to receive anything is an ahsurditj/, (but nevertlieless a 
fact, as is proven.) Now, in this connection, while Colonel Worthington was 
wandering up and down after axes, I will show what the men in front were 
doing." 

Iler'e follows a statement of seoutings on the 2d and 3d 
of April, in which nothing but rebel cavalry was encoun- 
tered. He then proceeds to testify as follows : 

"And here I mention for future history, that our right flank was well 
gaardeil by Owl and Snake creeks, our left by Lick creek, leaving us simply 
to guard our front. No stro7iger position was ever held by an army. There- 
fore, on Thursday, two days before the battle, when Colonel Worthington 
was so apprehensive, (for his personal safety,) I knew there was no hostile 
party within six (three) miles, though there was reason to expect an attack, {ihsit 
day.) I suppose Colonel McDowell, like myself, had become tired of his con- 
stant 2^rog)iostications and paid no attention to him, especially wlien we wera 
positively informed by men like Buckland, Kilby Smith, and Major Ricker — 
who went to the front to look for enemies, instead of going to tiie landing, 
(for axes to save his men from slaughter.) And here I will state, that Pitts- 
burgh landing was not chosen by General Grant, but by Major General Smith. 
I received orders from General Smith, and took post accordingly ; so did Gen- 
eral Hurlbut; so did his own division. The lines of McClernand and Prentisa 
were selected by Colonel (now General) McPherson. I will not insult General 
Smith's memory by criticizing his selection of a field. It was not looked to 
so much for defense, as for ground on which our army could be organized /or 
offense. 

" We did not occupy too much grounil. General Buell's forces had been 
expected rightfully for two weeks, and a j^lacc ivas left for his forces, although 
General Grant afterward had determined to send Bucll to Hainhurgh as a sepa- 
rate command. 

"Buteven as we were (without defense) on the 6th of April, you might search 
the world over and notrfind a more advantageous field of battle — flanks well 
protected, and never threatened; troops in easy support; timber and broken 
ground giving good points to rally; and the proof is, that 43,000 men, of 
whom at least 10,000 ran away, held their ground again^^t 00,000 chosen 
troops of the South, with their best leaders. On Friday, the 4th, nor officer 
nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can 
prove. 

"On Friday, April 4th, our pickets were disposed as follows: McDowell's 
brigade, embracing Worthington's regiment, looked to Owl creek bridge, and 
had nothing to do with any other road. Buckland and Ilildebrand covered 
our line to the main Corinth road. Pickets, one company to a regiment, 
were thrown forward a mile and a half to the front, videttes a mile farther, 
making a chain of sentinels. 

"About noon of tliat day Buckland's adjutant came to my tent and re- 
ported that a lieutenant and seven men of his guard had left their post and 
were missing: probably picked np by a small cavalry force which had hovered 
around for some days, and which I had failed to bag. I immediately dis- 
patched Major Ricker, with all my cavalry, in a tremendous rain, to the 
front. Soon after I heard distant musketry, and finally three cannon shots, 
which I knew must be the enemy, as we had none there. 

"This was the first positive information any intelligent mind on that field 
had of any approaching force. Before that, no scout, no officer, no respon- 
sible man had seen an infantry or artillery soldier nearer than Monterey, 
(five miles out.) For weeks and months we had heard all sorts of reports, 
just as W'e do now. For weeks old women had reported that Beauregard was 
coming, sometimes with 100,000, sometimes with 300,000; when, in fact, he 



124 SHILOH. 

did not leave Corinth until after even Colonel Worthington had been alarmed 
for (his) safet}'. 

"As soon as I heard the cannon I and rny staff were in the saddle and off 
for the front. We overtook a party of Buckland's and Hildebrand'a brigades 
going forward to the relief of the pickets. On reaching a position in ad- 
vance of the guard-house, a mile and a half from Shiloh, they deployed into 
line of battle, aiid I awaited tlie return of my cavalry and infantry, still to 
our front. 

"Colonel Buckland and Major Ricker soon returned, and reported en- 
countering infantry, artillery, and cavalry near the fallen timbers, six miles 
(three miles) in front of our camp. We then knew that we had tJie dements 
of an army in our front, but did not know its strength or destinatioti. Tlie 
guard was strengthened, (not the fact,) and as night came on we returned to 
camp, and not a man in the eamp but knew we had an enemy to the front 
before we slept that night. But even I iiad to r/uess its purpose. No general 
could have detected or reported tlie approach of an enemy more promptly 
than was done," (on that occasion.) 

(Here was read a letter of General Sherman to General 
Grant, dated April 5th, 1862, giving an acconiit of the 
affair as above stated.) 

"Thus, while Buckland's brigade, in the execution of its 
proper duty, was guarding safely our front, a colonel of 
another brigade, in a safe corner, was looking for an attack 
every hour, (probably every minute. W. P. G.) 

"As to the journal entry of April 5th, I have but little to 
say. As to tlie three guns on Ilildebrand's left, he could 
have heard no such thing, for our troops crossed and re- 
crossed the ground all day Saturday, (and, as will be seen, 
reported the artillery. W. P. G.) 

"I say it was impossible for him to have heard as to the 
three guns on our left across the valley. The position is 
well-knowu, and was within our pickets. (Fact.) If he 
heard so, it was his sworn and bounden duty to have re- 
ported the fact to his commander, which he did not do." 
(He says he was tired of such reports.) 

Here follow personal rellcctions on Colonel AVorthing- 
ton, and imputations of publisliing foolish reports of Shiloh, 
little dreaming, he continues, "that one who Jiiicio so well 
would do so 7nuch," cj^c.y and closes by saying, "I have given 
a history of events during the iveek preceding the battle of 
Shiloh, and state further, that from the 31st Alarcli to the 
2d of April, with part of my division, I was up the Ten- 
nessee river to Eastport. From the 2d to the 7th of April 



Sherman's ;evidence. 125 

I have given an account. On the 8th of April my division 
pursued the enemy over the same ground six miles. On 
the 9th, 10th, and 11th of April I was up the Tennessee 
and broke the Bear-creek bridge, the original object of the 
ex'pediiion ."^ I therefore repeat, that my command did ne- 
glect no proper precautions, but was as industrious, and 
vigilant, and patient as any part of " the troops constituting 
the Army of the Tennessee." 

(The diary extracts were applicable to the management 
of the whole of the army of the Tennessee. W. P. G.) 

Sherman's evidence reviewed. 

Time and tedium may both be economized by examin- 
ing tins testimony in chief of General Sherman, without 
waiting tor his cross-examination by the defense. It must 
be recollected that the weight or point of the charge is, that 
the diary extracts, foreboding danger and charging neglect 
and design in braving the danger without preparation — that 
tliese diary extracts were Avritten after the foretold danger 
had occurred. If the specification is true, tliat is, writing 
the diary after the event, the charge is establislied ; other- 
wise, the charge is not in accordance with the facts, or not 
true. If the statements of the diary are proven true, they 
cannot, in law, be taken as libelous, neither can they be 
taken as libelous or false, if it is proven they were writ- 
ten before the event, when they were mere conjectures, 
and by no means libels or fixlsities. 

It may further be considered that all statements of the 
diary not pronounced and proven false by the prosecutor are 
to be taken as true. Proceeding on such data, the entry 
of IMarch 2Gth, that an attack is indicated by the country 
people, and by the fact, not denied, that the rel)el pickets 
are around and too near us, is admitted as true. The entry 
of March 27th, that the attack on our pickets by the rebel 
cavalry is an indication that they are covering some for- 

* If tliat only was the object of the expedition, why not remain at Sa- 
vannah ■.' Because then lie couhi not have invited a battle so easily. This 
is one of the strongest points against these juggles. 



126 SHILOH. 

ward movement, is thus admitted by the prosecutor as true, 
and so proven by the event. The entr}^ of March 28th, that 
an attack on our camp woukl not be dangerous to an ene- 
m}' under existing neglect or design, is also admitted as 
true, and so proven by the event. 

Saturdaii, March 29th. — The refusal to allow the requi- 
sition for the axes is admitted, and an inference is plain, 
from the prosecutor's evidence, that there were axes to be had, 
which is contradicted by the evidence of the quartermaster 
and his sergeant, who both swear that no axes could be 
had till after the battle. lie (Slierman) does not deny that 
an abattis (fallen trees) would prevent or avert an attack, 
except by stating on oath that defenses would have invited 
an attack. "What a statement for any otlicer to make, and 
he a West Point graduate. How insane, or idiotic, or what? 
for it can be nothing less than insanity, or idiocy which is 
worse, or a mere spiteful, childish, womanish denial, for 
the mere indulgence of contradiction — to say that an abattis 
would not have averted an attack which he had invited, 
which he does not deny. 

31ondaij March Sis/. — It is stated that, through the 
pickets, there are indications of attack. We having heard 
on gocxl authority of many thousands of the enemy being 
five miles off, at Monterey, toward Corinth: and Captain 
Sharp, 4Gth Ohio, testifies that there were five thousand 
rebel troops at Monterey the 1st of April, 1862. 

General Sherman testifies that this entry of the 31st of 
March must have been fabricated after its date, because 
our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on the ground 
five days after it was made. Su}>pose they were on the 
ground, &c., as they were not — for he says that from the 
31st of March to the 2d of April part of his division was 
up at Eastport, and there is an inference that the charge of 
making tlie entry after its date was elicited l)y his (Sher- 
man's) supposition that the writer intended to indicate this 
absence as a sure means of inviting an attack, as it was, 
while the entry, for other reasons, had been made before 
his return. JSTor is it true that either " squadrons, regi- 



Sherman's evidence. 127 

raonts, and brigades" ^Ycro on the ground (in onr i'vont)Jice 
davs after the 31st of Murch. lie says ho was away the 
1st, till the 2d, late on which, and the 3d, he had scouting 
parties out at niglit, wliich is one day, and perhaps a httle 
more, of the live. lie was out on tlie 4th, in the afternoon, 
part of a day, and tirst tells of knowing there were the 
elements of an army in liis front. This is two days of the 
five. He tells on this day, the 4th, that he did not know 
the destination and pur[)Oso of an enemy from whom there 
was reason to expect an attack the 3d. On the 5th ho says 
he had no cavalry. But to go back to the 31st of March, 
the main entry of which is, that Sherman is inviting an 
attack for which we are unprepared. This was not only 
the case, but the troops wore purposely kept unprepared. 
All knew tliat the woods in front should have been cut 
away. The colonel of the 46th had cleared off the woods 
and other obstacles in front and rear, and other regiments, 
seeing an Old Graduate preparing for danger, would have 
followed his example, on the right, at least, as they after- 
wards fortified on the march to Corinth. But axes could 
not be had on requisition, and there was not one grindstone 
in cam}) till two came up for the 46th Ohio on the 5th, late 
in the afternoon.''' Quartermaster Giesy, of the 46th, tes- 
tified that he never could get either clothing or tools before 
the battle. The quartermaster sergeant. Parsons, testifies 
that he never could get even the twenty-two axes, a requi- 
sition for which was allowed, tdl after the battle, and that the 
division quartermaster would receive no stores turned over 
to him before the battle, the meaning of which is tliis : In 
the early, and indeed in all stages of the war, to save time 
and attention, &c., all sorts of stores, and especially tools, 
went anywhere or nowhere; one regiment would got the 
supply of three or four, and thus two or three were 
destitute until the over-supplied regiment turned the sur- 
plus over to some quartermaster, to be redistributed. But 



* Ordered by its colouel; the quartermaster keepiag no such imple- 
ments. (W. r. G.) 



128 SHILOH. 

Slierman would not allow Lis quartermaster to receive 
stores in this way, lest he (Sherman) should be made respon- 
sible. This he said himself, as can easily be proven by at 
least one ofRcer of volunteers, who remonstrated with him 
on tlie consequences at Pittsburgh. These consequences 
were, that there were no tools to fortify, and these stores 
were thrown awa}^, unless turned over by one regimental 
quartermaster to another. In this way a few axes were 
got on the 5th of April by the 46th from the 57th, but it 
was too late. And in this way, by refusing even the yncans 
of defense, even ammunition, was dug the graves of the 
thousands who alone held their ground at Shiloh, and hold 
it^'et; and this is justified on the ground that defenses 
would liave invited an attack. 

In liis evidence as to the entry of the 31st, Sherman up- 
sets his whole charge of '•'•feibrlcaiion,'" made the moment 
before b}- his own evidence, that for weeks Col. Worthing- 
ton had been predicting the worst — that is predicting, he 
says, defeat for ivant of defenses. It is not the fact that 
Colonel W. openly predicted defeat,* but he expected it, 
and witli a really energetic eneni}^ it would have occurred 
about the 1st of April, 1862, or ten days before that date, 
on the junction of Johnson with Bragg, at Corinth, the 
20th March. The entry of April 3, that there was disorder 
at the landing, Sherman declares to be false and libelous, 
but swears there was coi fusion no general could have pre- 
vented. What's the dilference between confusion and dis- 
order ? The entry of April 3d suggests indications of an 
attack. 

In the cross-examination he swears it is false that there 
were indications of an attack on the 3d, because no stronger 
jjosidon 2cas ever held by an army — clearly a sequitur ? though 
while lie knew there was no hostile party loithin six miles 
on the 3(1, there was reason, he swears, to expect an attack. 
Here he swears the same thing to be false and true. lie 
says afterwards, on the 4th of April, there was no hostile 

*See McDowell's evidence. 



SHERMANS' EVIDENCE. 129 

party known before that day nearer than Monterey, which 
is hut five miles out on the map wliich General Grant says 
was made by Colonel McPherson ; and General Buell states 
Monterey at the same distance; and Captain Sharpe, the 
picket officer of the 46th, states this skirmish of the 4tli at 
two and a half miles from camp, which is likely the dis- 
tance, and not six miles. The diary entry of April 3d 
states that the pickets are scarce a mile out, meaning, of 
course, those of the 46th Ohio. This Sherman also swears 
is false, and also swears that the Howell Iwuse, proven a 
main picket station of the 46th Ohio^ was but three-fourths 
of a mile in front of his right center brigade. (See cross- 
examination.) 

The entry of April 3d suggests that the troops cover too 
much ground — {i. e,, the divisions are too far apart.) Tliis 
General Sherman swears is false, and testifies that we did 
not occupy too much ground. "General Buell's forces had 
been expected rightfully for two weeks, and a place or gap 
was left for his forces, though General Grant afterward 
had determined to send Buell to Hamburgh," (four miles 
above.) 

Here again is evidence, pitched up and knocked down, 
as are infidels in the Mohammedan "m/erwo." Monkir 
pitches them up on a red-hot fork, and Nekir knocks them 
back with a white-hot sledge to all eternity, or sufficiently 
purified for true believers. The military term "'occupy- 
ing two much ground," means that there are gaps in a line 
of troops. Sherman swears that that gap is no gap, if 
intended to be filled ; that the intention of filling it has 
been altered ; and he swears in terms that the intention to 
fill the gap with troops intended for another post makes a 
falsehood of the suggestion that there was any gap to be 
filled in the line. So it was left open over a mile wide for 
the enemy, by which to attack our flanks and rear, as he 
says in his report the enemy did to some purpose on the 
6th of April, 1862. Having thus answered its intended 
purpose of letting in the enemy, without making use of 
Buell's troops, either to fill the gap at Shiloh or fall on 
9 



130 SHILOH. 

tlie re1)el riglit and rear at Hamburgh, he chjses the gap on 
the plan of the Lattle, which Badeaii says was drawn by 
McPherson and corrected by both Grant and Sherman. 
These being all West Pointei's, who dare deny the perfec- 
tion of the map made since the battle? — to back up Sher- 
man's evidence. To fill this gap on the im])roved and 
corrected and certified battle ])lan of Shiloh, Prentiss is 
allowed an additional brigade he had not in the battle, and 
McClernand has very kindly furnished the flank of a brig- 
ade to fill up that line for which the imaginary brigade of 
Prentiss was insufficient. So, on the map corrected since 
the ai)pro])riate use of the same gap by the enemy on the 
Gth, we find a front respectably })atched up for future his- 
tory, to accompany Shei'man's equally trutliful letter of 
January^ 1805, for future history, as he says. 

But^ badinage thus provoked aside, how long will it be 
that such evidence proves even a West Point graduate 
fitted to command all the armies of the Union, with nothing 
better to prove his capacity? It may also as well be re- 
peated here, as will be seen by battle plan No. 2, that 
Sherman's reported position of the three front divisions, 
if true, entirely upsets this patched-up art-angement, and, 
with flanks to the front, leaves a gap of two miles, where 
there was really but one mile before, and this arrangement 
is not much, if any, worse than that which existed with 
regard to these divisions at 7 a. m. on the Gth of April, 
]8()2. ]>ut io return to the present commander-in-chief, as 
to his genei-alship and vigilance two days before the advent 
of that battle, on which I'eally rest his position and repu- 
tation as a great military strategist and tactician, such as 
was wanted by the Washington ring for the sole purpose 
of S})inning out the war. 

The diary of April od further suggests, that the scattered 
condition of the troops, (denied by General Sherman, see 
map 2, with flanks to the front,) in case of a sudden attack, 
might drive them back in detail — all of which occurred, 
according to the diary, as is generally admitted, and among 
others by General Sherman himself in his report and by 



SHERMAN ,S EVIDENCE. 131 

liis iuhiiirers. The diary of Friday, tlic 4th, barely refers 
to the ])icket affair ol' that afternoon. The brigade orders 
to stack arms were sugg-ested by Colonel W. to Colonel 
McDowell. The negligence charged refers to the desti- 
tution of tools and defenses, the failure to close U}) the 
gaps and make roads in rear of the lines, to cut away the 
timber and brush in front, and make some preparation for 
the imminent attack. 

In his evidence, as to the entries of April 3d, is a digres- 
sion by General {Slierman, whicli this narrator is com})elled 
to follow, as it refers to the choice of the ground on which 
tlie battle was fought. No one had imputed the choice 
of this ground to General Grant, though it is plain it had 
his approval before it was occupied by the Union army. 
Bowman says that on the 14tli March General Sherman, 
with the leading division of Grant's army, passed up the 
Tennessee; so of course he was under the orders of General 
Grant, who the day before (the 13th) had been '^relieved 
from his disgrace," &c., and reached Pittsburgh the 17th. 
Orders were first given by Sherman to unload tlie boats 
of the camp e(|uipag(j the 18th, and the camp was not 
really established till next day, lOth. Bowman, indorsed 
by Sherman, further says, that Halleck decided to advance 
up the Tennessee river as far as practicable by water, then 
to debark on the west hank, &c., &c. 

Grant is then plainly responsible for the debarkation at 
Pittsburgh landing, and doubtless had Halleck' s authority 
to land on the west side. No objection to Bowman's state- 
ment was ever made by either Grant or Plalleck, and there 
is am})le ground for Whitelaw lieed's statement that men 
of rank and ability have denied that the choice of this camp 
can be laid on General C. F. Smith, as charged by Sherman 
in the course of this evidence, when it was irrelevant and 
uncalled-for: thus ])roving tlie choice his own. 

Smitli was a pru(h'nt soldier, when in a healthy state of 
mind and body; which he was not, entirely, after the cap- 
ture of Fort Donelson. 

It is a slander on his memory, of which Sherman affects 



182 SHILOH. 

to be so careful, to say that he ever approved of such an ex- 
pedition as that to Eastport^ under such circumstances, 
when the roads were impassable and flooded, and when 
Grant supposed not less than 40,000 of the enemy were 
along the railroad between Decatur and Corinth, as was 
the fact; when Badeau considered Grant's situation at 
Pittsburgh in imminent need of Buell's force of 40,000 men, 
and Grant, aware of the danger, "had not been at Savan- 
nah one hour, on the 17th, when he sent up Smith and 
McClernand as fast as boats could carry them." On the 
14th he (Sherman) was under command of Grant, acting 
under orders of Halleck, to establish a camp on the ivest side 
of the river. Sherman went up, then, on the 14th, he says, 
under Grant's orders, and came down to Pittsburgh on the 
16th, under Smith's orders, as he swears — Monkir and Ne- 
kir again. On the 18th he issues the first orders to go 
into camp at Shiloh, Grant then being at Savannah, but 
Smith again in command, if Sherman is worthy of credit on 
his own contradictory evidence, which less credulous people 
than this commentator might doubt, if he were not com- 
mander-in-chief, &c., at present. 

Sherman says he had orders from General Smith, and 
took post accordingly. Took post on the 18th and 19th, 
under Smith's command, when Grant was himself at Sa- 
vannah, on the 17th, ordering Smith up, as Badeau says, 
and says in terms, that he and Grant, as to the history of 
Grant, are responsible for each other, as to the facts. "Par 
nohile fratrum ! " Yet Sherman says Smith's own division 
took post, under Smith's orders, thus contradicting Grant 
and Badeau. What ought such evidence to be worth from 
any one except a cowmander-in-chief, or the President him- 
self, as to who located camp Shiloh? And then, after this 
endeavor to shift the responsbility, as to the clioice of the 
camp, from himself and Grant to 0. F. Smith, he proceeds 
in the most nonsensically extravagant laudation of the lo- 
cation : 

"Even as we were, (without defenses,) on the 6th of April, 
the ivorld alForded no more advantageous field of battle." 



Sherman's evidence. 133 

For the purposes intended was doubtless a mental reserva- 
tion for wliicli lie very likely had antecedent, as he did have 
subsequent absolution, and a very substantial blessing and 
testimonial from Halleck. Though this matter must bo re- 
peated, yet to maintain the thread of this digest of indiges- 
tive evidence, it may or must come in here. 

''Flanks well })rotected," says the commander-in-chief, 
"and never tlireatened; troops in easy support; timber and 
broken ground giving good points to rally," &c. Now, if 
we are to believe his division report of April 10, 1802, the 
flanks, in many cases, were turned merely by a threatened 
advance of the enemy, and the protection of the creeks was 
nothing, not even equal to tlie twig that abraded the back 
of his bridle hand, to the extent of a half dime of surface, 
and passed for a ball through it. Troops in easy support, 
he says, when no separate divisions were nearer than four 
hundred to eighteen hundred yards, with interposing woods 
or hollows. Timber and broken ground, which enabled the 
enemy to approach within half musket-shot of his front, 
and was far more advantageous to an advancing foe than to 
a retreating force, which it was distinctly understood he 
calculated and expected the force under his command would 
and'perhaps was intended to be. So says Whitelaw Reed. 

And he jjroceeds to prove the advantages of this field, by 
stating that, in consequence of the strength of the position^ 
but 10,000 or more (rf* the troops who held their ground ran 
away, while the main body was not driven back farther 
than two and a half to eleven miles^ or from Shiloh to Snake 
creek and Savannah, Against these 60,000 chosen troops of 
the South there were some 3,000 of the Union soldiers, who 
alone held their ground, and hold it yet. They died, the 
price of that blood-stained ground, for the possession of 
which no soldier on either side need to have lost a drop of 
blood, had Buell's troops, on Saturday afternoon, been sent, 
as intended, to Hamburgh, four miles above. 

Who for this sliall, in tlie I'utiire, be held responsible — 
Halleck, or Grant, or Sherman ; or those wlio, to prolong 
the war for political purposes, made the sacrifice necessary, 



134 SHILOH. 

as Sherman says — not only for the purpose he avows,* but 
for tlie promotion and emolument of those wlio upheld this 
horrid policy at the capital and in the field? 

But to return to the evidence: "On Friday, the 4th," 
says General Sherman, "no officer nor soldier, not even 
Colonel Wortliington, looked for an attack, as I can prove." 
"Grant had marched twelve miles," Badeau says, "from 
Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, in half a day." 

The distance from Shiloli churcli to Corinth is about six- 
teen miles, and the distance from Hamburgh to Corinth, 
being about the same, was marched by the 81st Ohio in 
seven hours, during the winter of 1863; hence the danger 
of so close an enemy. 

It will be shown, also, that General Sherman believed 
this very day thal^the enemy was in sufficient force in his 
immediate front to justify tliem in an attack and justify 
him in expecting one, this 4th of April, 1802. Soon after 
noon lie says he heard distant musketry, and finally three 
cannon shot, which could not be ours. 

This was the first positive information of any approach- 
ing force — nearer than Monterey, (five miles.) He at once 
rode out one and a half miles, and there waited the return 
of Colonel Bucklandand Major Ricker, who reported encount- 
ering infantry, artillery, and cavalry. "We then knew," 
says Sherman, "we had the elements of an army in our 
front, hut did not knoio its strength or destination ' — or desti- 
nation ! Here is a major general who has testified tliat there 
was reason to expect an attack on the 3d of A})ril, the day 
before — who has had reason to believe the enemy had over 
60,000 men at or near Corinth ; who knew, or tliought he 
knew, the rebel army liad marclied from Corintli on the 
morning of the day before, (tlie 3d ;) — and lie here makes 
oath that there was no reason to expect an attack after 
twenty-four hours had elapsed since the actual or supposed 
march from Corinth had begun ! If he did believe in this 



*It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, should come off, to test 
the manhood of the two armies; that is, for the mere purpose of a battle, (as, 
this writer charged at the time,) to get him promoted. 



Sherman's evidence. 135 

absence of danger, was lie fit for a commander? And if, in 
the presence of sucli danger, he, on the morning of the 5th, 
removed his cavalry and artillery from his front to the rear, 
as he did remove them, is he an idiot, or worse? 

Bnt he repeats this assumption of ignorance. He had 
to guess the piirpose of this enemy in his front, who had an- 
nounced hiurself by the discliarge of artillery and mns- 
ketry. He sees wolf-tracks al)out a sheep-fold, or a hawk 
liovering over a chicken yard, and has to guess alike the 
pur})ose of the wolf or hawk, or enemy lying before liim. 
But this is no worse than swearing tliat there was no gap in 
a line, because it was to have been filled by Buell, wlio was 
to have been sent up to Hamburgh. He tlien adds, with the 
utmost self-gratulation and self-approval, that no general 
could have detected the approach of an enemy sooner than 
he had done — by allowing that enemy to approach unmo- 
lested within gun-shot of liis camp. After such testifying 
as this, it is superfluous to say anything about his statement, 
in terras, that he had, on the 3d of April, gone tlimugh and 
one mile beyond Monterey,* on the road to Corintli, where 
there had been 5,000 or more of the enemy for near a week 
before. He tells us, through Bowman, that the importance 
of the crisis was apparent, and that Buell was tardy in his 
march towards Shiloh, knowing the danger threatening the 
Army of tlie Tennessee, as Badeau says, on and after the 
17th March. Or that seventeen days before this time (the 
4th of Aprilj 1862) there was danger, and yet Sherman 
swears, on the 4th, there was none, and proves it as above. 

"Thus, while Bucklatid,'" he continues, "was guarding 
safely our front, the colonel of another brigade, in a safe 
corner, was looking for an attack every hour," thus again 
upsetting his charge of fabricating apprehension of an at- 
tack, after the event had imssed. This witness then proceeds 
to say that Colonel W. could have heard of no such tiling 
as rebel artillery across the valley from the camp ; and this 



*If he went out, as he says, six miles, lie must have gone a mile beyond 
Monterey, according to his official map. W. P. G. 



136 SHILOH. 

same evidence is thrice repeated in the course of his exami- 
nation. He states that he has given a history of events dur- 
ing a week preceding the battle — ^^From the Id to the ^th 
of April I have given an accoimt." What account has he 
given of anything occurring Friday night, or Saturday, or 
Saturday night, or Sunday, or Sunday night? Not a word. 
As will be seen, he denies everything material which occur- 
red, and which plainly, as the lightning fortells the thunder, 
foretold the bloody storm of death and destruction Grant and 
he had invoked, and which was hovering over that beguiled 
and fated army. The storm, which he of course avoided 
doing anything to avert, and of which^ for his own personal 
purposes, was the veriest demon, from the fatal whirr of its 
iirst deadly shaft, till it had strewn its myriads of murdered 
and mangled victims over its crimsoned track; all of this 
slaughter and destruction inuring to the benefit of those 
who were and now are their blood-stained architects, whether 
in or out of the Army of the Tennessee in the West, or the 
political war "ring" at Washington. 

Note. — The most fallacious part of the statement by Sherman, as to what 
occurred during the week before the battle, is that, in which he swears that 
our squadrons, regiments, and brigades were on the ground (in front, of course) 
five days after the 31st of March, 1862. He then swears, as noted, that from 
the 31st to the 2d he was at Eastport; and he also swears on cross-examina- 
tion that he had no cavalry at his command on the 5th of April, the very day 
before the battle. He says not a word of what is made known by Colonel 
Stuart and Lieut. Fitch, that the artillery was also withdrawn on the morn- 
ing of the 5th. He is silent about the pickets being driven in and the rebel 
artillery in his front the same day. And in this state of facts he swears that, 
knowing a hostile army to be in front, which there is evidence he believed 
had GO, 000 men, he did not know their destination and had to guess their 
purpose. 

He had then no squadrons, regiments, or brigades out on t,he 5th, and his 
five days are thus, by his own showing, reduced to two, on neitherof which was 
he ever three miles beyond the front of his camp. Could Argus, of the hundred 
eyes, have been more vigilant? But his five days of activity, stated as such, 
are on oath reduced to little over two; and yet again, on oath, these two are 
at the close of his evidence increased to seven, like Falstaff's men in buck- 
ram, to which are gratuitously added three days after the battle in going up 
to destroy the Bear-creek bridge. 

This point, being at the time undefended, passes among his deeds of chivalry 
into the same category as the heroic action related by the venerable jihiloso- 
pher, such as the valiant destruction of a very dangerous but aliandoned 
rebel camp and tlie more glorious capture of a hospital — empty, or filled with 
sick and wounded men — our modern Franklin does not say. Such an omis- 
eion! 



Sherman's cross-examination. 137 



CHAPTER X. 

SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND THE COUNTER EVI- 
DENCE AGAINST HIM. 

"I was perfectly willing that the enemy should attack us and think Beau- 
regard made a fatal mistake when he did it; but I deny that the enemy had 
a battery near the Howell house that afternoon, April 5, 1SG2." [Shennan's 
cross-examination August, 1862) 

Captain Sbarpe, 46th Ohio, was sworn and testifies: 

"I saw the piece of artillery myself to the right of the Widow Howell's 
house. I re])orted the circumstance to General Sherman, who said hew»uld 
have the (his) artillery in readiness." {Record of Colonel Worthington' s trial 
at Memphis, August, 1862.) 

General Sherman, being asked what entries of the 3d of 
April were false in this diary, replied, as above stated, that 
it was false to state that Sherman had forbidden his quar- 
termaster receiving anything, (stores;) that there were indi- 
cations of an attack, is false; that we covered too much 
ground, is false; that our pickets were only a mile out, is 
false, kc. ; and on question as to whether he heard of any 
rebel artillery near the Howell house Saturday'' afternoon, 
he answered that lie had not. He testifies that on Satur- 
day, the 5tli, he had no cavahy subject to his orders, but 
about dark that evening eight companies of the 4th Illinois 
reported to him for duty. He testified " that no pickets were 
driven out of the Howell house on Saturday. The house," 
he says, " which I call the Widow Howell's house, was in a 
field, near a lane, in Buckland's front, about three-quarters 
of a mile from his center. Our pickets were a mile in front 
of that house. I was perfectly willing the enemy should 
attack us, and think Beauregard made a fatal mistake when 
he did it; but I deny that the enemy had a battery near the 
Howell house that Saturday afternoon. The house was in 
a large field, and no place for pickets. It was not a picket 
station, and pickets there icere of no use. The fork of the 
road in front was the key-point of the attack, and that point 
was watched." " Did you know," asked Colonel W., " that 



138 SHILOII, 

the pickets were clriv^eu iti from Weaver's liouse on Satur- 
day?" "Aiiswei". I know of no sucli house; no sueli house 
was a picket station. None of (he pk-J^ets were dricen in/' (on 
Saturday, April 5th.) 

"I know," said the prosecutor, at the close of his ci'oss- 
examiniition, "that Colonel Worthington k)iew Ids dudes 
well, and wondered that he should disregard them." 

On question bj' Colonel Worthington, whether he, to 
Sherman's knowledge, had ever neglected any duty in his 
regiment, Sherman answered, "I will allege none except 
such as are charged here; I leave that to his b)i(j(idicr." 

The evidence above given will show what ground there 
was for the charge of conduct unworthy of an ofiicer and a 
gentleman, and for the speciiication that he had fabricated 
a false diary after the event, (the battle,) and this, when 
none but an idiot would fabricate or write anything but 
tlje facts that really occurred after their occurrence. 

On being called by the defense, General Slierman testi- 
fied as follows: "The charges were sid^stantially drawn by 
me. I placed the subject-matter in the hands of the judge 
advocate for trial. I heard nothing of any (rebel) guns on 
our left (front) on Saturday. I do not know Captain Sharpe; 
I may have seen him; I did not tell an}- person on Satur- 
day afternoon that I would have the artillery harnessed up, 
unless for inspection." (His artillery hud l)ocu withdrawn.) 

REBEL ARTILLERY ON THE 5TH. 

Colonel Buckland, (a great friend of General Sherman,) 
testifies: "All I heard of artillery on Saturday was tliis: 
Some of m}^ pickets thought they had seen the glimmer 
of a brass gun. I looked, but could see nothing of the 
kin(h I went over to General Sherman's headquarters and 
reported that some of the pickets thought they had seen 
artillery, but that I could not discover any." 

Captain Sharpe, of the 46th Ohio, testified that "there 
was a piece of artillery near the Howell house, to the right, 
on Saturday evening. lie supposed it was rebel artillery. 



Sherman's cross-examination. 139 

It was pointed to our camp. It was first observed iu 
the early part of the afternoon. I did not see it nntil 5 
p. m. I reported tlie circumstance both to Colonel Mc- 
Dowell and General Sherman. General Sherman said he 
would liave the (his) artillery in readiness. I saw the 
piece of artillery myself to the right of Widow Howell's 
house." 

Lieutenant Crary, picket officer of the 4Gth Ohio, testi- 
fied as to the artillery as follows : "Saturday afrei-noon, 
April 5th, I rode along the pickets of the 40tli Illinois. 
They reported that they had seen several pieces of artiller3^ 
posted near the Ilowell house, southeast of the house. I 
may have reported the number of guns at three, l)ut I do 
not recollect doing so. I heard of some artilleiy that 
afternoon o[)posite Hildebrand's brigade, (the left.) I re- 
ported to Captain Harlan, on Colonel McDowell's staff." 

Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Walcut, 46th Ohio, testified as 
follows : 

"I do not rememlier hearing of any artiller}' on Saturday, April 5, except 
Captain Sharpe tlioirght there was some. When leaving Paducah there was 
nothing but corn for the mules. We had but little ammunition." 

Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Walcut was a 
particular friend and admirer of his patron, General Sher- 
man. (W. P. G.) 



Evidence as to inckcts of Sherman's division at Shiloh, Saturday, 
Aprd 5, 1862. 

Colonel Buckland, commanding the 4th brigade, testi- 
fies: 

"The pickets fell back Saturday morning without m}' orders." 

(Much of Buckland' s testimony has been eliminated from 
the record, and it was unwillingly given, unless in favor of 
Sherman.) 

Colonel Hildebrand, couimanding 3d brigade, testifies: 

" The infantrj- pickets were driven in on Saturday. I endeavored to re- 
place them, but was prevented by the rebel cavalry. This was near Lee's 
house. Pickets were driven from that position some time in the afternoon of 
Saturday, the 5th April." 



140 SHILOH. 

Captain Sharpe, chief picket officer of 46tli Oliio volun- 
teer infantry : 

" I went out on picket duty about the 25th March. Before Shiloh I made 
headquarters at Weaver's. About the 1st of April made a post at Widow 
Howell's. From Mrs. Howell's to Weaver's is three hundred or four hun- 
dred yards. Moore's is not more than half a mile from camp. There were 
two pickets fired on at Moore's March 2r)th to 27th by two cavalry. I was 
at a picket skirmish Friday evening, the 4th of April, about two and a half 
miles from camp. The pickets were driven from the Howell house on Saturday 
about 7 a. tn. There were no pickets that I know of in front of the Howell 
house on the Corinth road. I never saw Colonel McDowell at picket there 
while I was there. I never saw General Sherman there. I was at Pea 
ridge (5 miles) about April 1st. Drove in their pickets, and was informed 
by farmers that there were 5,000 infantry tliere. The pickets of McDowell's 
brigade on Saturday were at Moore's, (half mile from camp.) Howell's was 
recognized as one of the picket posts of the 1st brigade, 5th division. The 
Howell house was on the left of our brigade. There were no jiickets between 
my post and the enemy. I reported to Colonel McDowell habitually. I do 
not know of any pickets from any of the other brigades in front of the Howell 
house on Saturday, the day before the battle. 

" Question by Colonel W. Were not the enemy in jyossession of the Howell 
house all day Saturday f 

" Answer. They were. 

"Captain H. E. Giesy, company F, appeared, and was sworn. 

"Questio^i by prisoner. Do you recollect my order for two companies to lie 
on their arms ? 

" Answer. I recollect your ordering two companies to lie on their arms the 
Friday before the battle. We had been drilling two weeks in the manual of 
arms, and you directed them to practice in loading and firing." 

" Question by prisoner. Where did you first see the charges now under in- 
vestigation?" 

(Ruled out by the court as im})roper and irrelevant. Cap- 
tain Giesy was the officer who obtained surreptitious pos- 
session of a proof sheet of Colonel W's diary extracts, and 
took the same to General Sherman, for which he was pro- 
moted to tlie majority of the regiment over seven or eight 
older in rank and abler captains.) 

Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the brigade, testi- 
fied as follows, on question by Colonel W. : 

"I do not know that I ever heard you predict any actual disaster. On 
Monday or Tuesday before the battle you insisted that we would be attacked. 
and complained of the want of tools." 

Lieutenant George F. Crary, 4Gth Ohio, sworn: 

" Question by prisoner. Did you see me on Saturday morning out with the 
pickets? 

"J.. I saw you out there early in the morning. We were driven away 
about 7 a. m., (Sept. 5, 1862.) I heard a rebel drum beat Friday afternoon. 
The beat appeared to be m more than one regiment." 

Colonel David Stuart, 55th Illinois, testified: 

"Had no artillery on that day, (day of the battle.) It was taken away 



Sherman's cross-examination. 141 

Saturday morning, and annexed to General Smith's division. If the artil- 
lery had remained, I think I should have lost it, from circumstances that 
occurred during tlie battle." 

Timothy N. Ward, hospital steward, sworn, testified: 

"That while at Fort Pickering Colonel Worthington had visited the hos- 
pital almost daily. He had generally visited the hospital regularly on the 
march." 

Colonel T. Kilby Smith, 54th Ohio, sworn, testified: 

"That his camp, in Sherman's 2d brigade, was about three'quarters of a 
mile from and west of the river. When Lick creek wasfordable at the Ham- 
burgh ford, it was fordable above," (everywhere.) 

(Much of an omission here. W. P. G.) 
Testified further : 

"That, when shown the diary extracts, he was told that they were to be 
considered confidential. That Colonel W. had told him at the time that he 
had written or intended to write a letter to go to him (Halleck) with the 
diary extracts." 

Lieutenant J. A. Fitch, Waterhouse's battery, sworn: 

"On the evening of April 5, the battery was near Sherman's headquarters, 
about sixty rods from (and in rear of) Shiloh Church. Barrett's battery was 
on our left. The park faced to the river. Came into camp on the 5th April, 
(at dark." ) 

(This puts the flank of the artillery to the front. W. P. 

It will be seeen by Colonel Smith's evidence that there 
was no use for the 2d brigade wliere it was. Watching the 
ford was all a pretence ; and Lick creek, as a defence, was 
utterly worthless, being fordable all the way up when ford- 
able at the Hamburgh crossing. 

Lieutenant Fitch swears that the artillery was not parked 
in line of battle, as Sherman says it was in his report. He 
also testified that he came in at the same time as the 4th 
Illinois cavalry — about dark. (Record mutilated, as in 
many other cases.) 

observations on the testimony of the defence. 

It is plain that, as to the flibrication of the diary after the 
event, tlie point of the charge and specifications of conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, Sherman has set- 
tled the matter by his evidence against the truth of the 
charge and specification. The question then arises, what 



142 SHILOH. 

is the mental constitution of any man who repeatedly and 
deliberately convicts himself of every charge against liim- 
self in the diary, on which he founds the charge of false- 
hood and libel? 

Swearing it is false^, and admitting on oath that it is true 
in most cases, and swearing against notorious facts as to the 
pickets and rebel artillery, plainly because he had tailed to 
mention them in his report, and failing to mention them, 
because such mention would be evidence of more than the 
neglect charged by the diary itself — Is such a man of sound 
mind or substantive integrity, or not? Eminent lawyers are 
of opinion that this evidence against plain facts cannot prop- 
erly be considered perjury, because the statements are so 
easily overturned outside his own evidence, if that were not 
sufficient. Calling these statements, then, the mere ebulli- 
tions of ill temper or unguardedness, or vindictiveness, they 
demonstrate at least one thing ; that is, the perfect confi- 
dence of impunity, confidence in association or league with 
these, or toleration or license from those for whose benefit 
or whose objects these reckless actions or contradictory or 
anomalous statements are made ; and the same reckless con- 
fidence, not only of impunity, but of oflicial approbation, 
runs through all this commander's words and operations, 
down to tlie Jo. Johnston treaty at Durham station, where 
the object of his employment for the protraction of the war 
having ceased, it became necessary to check a career which, 
if permitted further, might have exposed all the nefarious 
jobbing, juggling, and selfish, intriguing policy of the po- 
litical cabal at Washington througliout the war. On the 
theory of his employment for such a purpose, and on no 
other, can his unaccountable and extravagant words and 
actions become intelligible. His outrageous order of March, 
18G7, attaching all the great military bureaus to Ids person- 
al staff, and his bullying letter to Congress as to his pay, 
are all traceable to the same source, and require to be curbed 
in time, by putting him out of a place he is unfit for. And 
now to a brief exposition of the balance of the evidence 
brought out on this cross-examination, for the purpose of 



Sherman's crops-examinatiox. 143 

» 
obtaining which this trial was striven for with rather too 
much success, according to the result, by the prisoner in the 
case. 

The truth of all the diary extracts, charged by the pros- 
ecutor as false, having been proven, these extracts require 
little more attention. The withdrawal of the cavalry pick- 
ets on Saturday morning, when plainly more necessary than 
before, was so extraordinary an incident, that (General Sher- 
man, after swearing that his squadrons of cavalry, &c. , were 
in tlie front from the 1st to the 6th of April, expunges his 
veracity, as usual, by tlie evidence that he had no cavalry 
subject to his command on Saturday, the 5th of April, 1862. 

From Senator Sherman's speech in the Congressional 
Globe of May, 1862, it will be seen that this same with- 
drawal of his cavalry })ickets has been stated in a letter to 
his brother, the Senator, thus making Grant clearly respon- 
sible for a measure calculated to induce an attack ; to pre- 
vent^ by the capture of a picket, any news reaching the enemy 
of Buell's vicinity, and doubtless intended to lull tlie Union 
army into security, when on the verge of destruction. The 
driving back of the pickets of three brigades is clearly proven 
by Buckland, Hildebrand^ and officers Sliarp and Crary. It 
is plainly proven that all day of the 5th, after 7 a. m., the 
Howell house, a most important picket station, three-fourths 
of a mile from Sherman's center, was in possession of the 
enemy. 

His persistent swearing tliat no rebel artillery was or 
could possibly have been seen or heard of in liis front 
that day (the 5th) is clear proof, if any were wanting of 
his entire knowledge of tlie fact proven by liis especial 
friends, Buckland and Walcot, and picket officers Crary 
and Sharpe, 46th Ohio. Not a word of what this evidence 
disclosed was dispatched to Halleck, (who did not want it,) 
nor to the War Ofiice at Washington, as retjuired by arti- 
cle 34 of the Army Regulations; nor was such news wanted 
there, and if there, it would have been, long ere this, re- 
moved or destroyed. This evidence was examined at the 
Judge Advocate General's office. This false swearing could 



144 SHILOH. 

not have been unnoticed. What is then the inference? 
Wliat else than that this promotor or rectifier of justice was 
also in the interest of the combined cabals in and out of Con- 
gress, in the Cabinet, or in the field? And here it may be 
mentioned that, as part of the plan to prolong the war with- 
out making the policy public^ article 34, section 448 (per- 
haps) of the Army Kegulations, requiring the commanders 
of armies in the field, generals of divisions, &c,, to forward 
from day to day their orders issued, and important infor- 
mation obtained, was dispensed with in this campaign, es- 
pecially in the case of General Sherman, and, of course, 
that of other ofiicers in the war. 

(Sherman swears he was perfectly willing the enemy should 
attack us, and thinks Beauregard made a fatal mistake when 
he did it. He thus proves the truth of the diary entry of 
March 31st, that he was inviting an attack for which we were 
not prepared, which he has denied, yet, in contradiction, 
as usual, he tells Colonel Buckland reprovingly, that on the 
4th he might have brought on an attack, for which we were 
not ready on that day. He was, of course, less prepared 
on the 5th, when the cavalry and artillery were withdrawn. 
And on the 6th, with no axes before that day to clear off 
and defend the front, we were not prepared for anything 
but the defeat that followed. So, while expecting an attack 
(it cannot be too often repeated) on the 3d and on the 4th, 
and more than ever defenceless, with an enemy in gunshot, 
on the 5th he writes to Grant he has no expectation of an 
attack. And knowing all the incidents of Saturday, Grant 
dispatches an order to Halleck, ^' Not the least danger, hut 
ivill he preparedif there is" — for a defeat. W. P. G.) 

Sherman swears that he was willing that the enemy 
should make the attack, but made a fatal mistake in making 
it. Here is a plain expression of his mental reservation, 
that, as he knew, the attack would have been fatal to the 
enemy if Buell's troops had been sent up to Hamburgh at 
any time before daylight, or even later, on the 6th, to fall 
upon the rebel right and rear, in camp little if any thing 
over a mile, by Grant's and Badeau's map^ from that place. 



SHERMAN'S CROSS-EXAMINATION. 145 

All this Sherman tells lis should have been done when he 
says the attack was a mistake, which, instead of being fatal 
to Beauregard, was fatal to 13,000 Union troops. What 
else could have made the rebel attack fatal to them but the 
exposure of their right and rear, which would have been 
fatal if Buell had been sent up as intended. It is one of 
the most unaccountable events of the war that A. S. John- 
son should have "Occupied such a dangerous position a sin- 
gle moment. The only reason which can be given that it 
was not fatal to his army is, that Grant and Sherman, act- 
ing by authority, designed and preferred the slaughter and 
loss of 13,000 Onion troops to a total defeat of the enemy, 
in whicli Buell's troops should have had a part, or preferred 
a defeat, because essential to prolong the war, as this de- 
feat did prolong it. 

Beauregard himself, as has been written, was aware of 
the danger of an attack where he was Saturday afternoon, 
and a single messenger from Grant Saturday afternoon or 
night, with news that Nelson's division was at Savannah, 
would have scattered the hostile army like autumn leaves. 
Grant knew, and it is believed was urged to attack by 
McPherson, who knew, from a reconnoissauce, that the 
enemy were at the bend of Lick creek, northwest of Ham- 
burgh. 

Sherman closes this remarkable and almost unconscious 
disclosure of his intentional neglect or failure to send up 
Buell's troops, by the repeated denial, on oath, that there 
Avas hostile artillery Saturday afternoon near the Howell 
house. And he swears this, while he knew that the enemy 
had more than one battery two or three miles out the day 
before, with nothing to prevent them taking possession of 
our picket stations next day, as they did. This evidence 
against plain facts is clearly to cover the criminal with- 
drawal of liis own artillery, to show the enemy that he had 
no suspicion of their immediate presence ; a presence made 
known by their cannon and musketry the day before, as 
well as by Major Ricker's assurance that he had met the 
10 



146 SHILOH. 

van of Beauregard's army on the 4tli in the afternoon. 
This is another phase of Shermanic strategy. 

He then ^jroceeds, in his usual absurd and self-contradic- 
tory way, to swear that there were no pickets at the Howell 
house, or, if there, were of no use there. That, neverthe- 
less, the key-point towards his center was the fork of the 
road in front of the house, and that that point ivas loafched; 
yet lie says in the same breath it was no place for pickets. 
How was it watched except by pickets or guards, or senti- 
nels, supposed to be out of sight of the camp? He was 
right in his statement that the road fork near the house 
was a key-point, where hostile marching columns could 
unite for the attack on his center, as they did next morn- 
ing. The first rebel troops seen by this narrator on San- 
day morning were marching past the Howell house. That 
was the reason, (the direct road to our center passed this 
point) why it had been held by the hostile artillery the day 
before. Here is where part of Sherman's artillery should 
have been, instead of in his rear, and this is one key of his 
perpetual denial of artillery at a point which proclaimed 
Grrant's criminal neglect and his own; or, if this was 
the result of design, the design made them the mere hired 
instruments of party operators in patronage and blood. 

Then, as if to clinch the flimsy fabric of his evidence with 
a handful of sand, he swears wildly that no Union pickets 
were driven in on Saturday, the day before the battle. This 
was sworn in the face of the direct evidence of his whole di- 
vision, had it been called up, and the question again arises, 
what could have given him confidence in impunity and ap- 
probation, except the contract and collusion established by 
his every act as a commander, and every word as a witness 
against an officer he had commended for his conduct on the 
field ; an officer who had striven hard without avail, against 
his opposition, to rescue that army from the bloody and dis- 
astrous fate for which, by him and Grant, it had purposely 
been prei)ared. 

General Grant, as has been related, was out at Shiloh 
Saturday afternoon, and remained on his boat at the land- 



Sherman's cross-examination. 147 

ing till near 11 p. m. of tliat day, the 5th. If it has not 
been recorded, it may have reference here that Grant, in his 
history by Badeau, barely mentions that he rode out to 
Slierman's lines the day after the 4th, and concurred with 
him that there was no danger of an attack both had expect- 
ed, according to Sherman's evidence, on the 3d and 4th pre- 
vious. But to conceal that this was the 5th, he states 
immediately after, that in returning from the front on the 
ifh Grrant was hurt by a fall from his horse. It is however 
distinctly to be understood from Badeau that on the 5th, 
after giving an order to Nelson, Grant having made all his 
pre})arations for removing his headquarters to Pittsburgh on 
the morrow, did not go out to Shiloh, but remained to meet 
Buell, as that officer had desired, Buell having, by dispatch 
on the 4th, desired to meet him at Savannah on the 5th. 

Now, Avith such plain subterfuge, planned with so much 
secretive care, plain to any narrator seeking for truth, what 
respect or indulgence can the author of such petty deception 
merit, whatever his position, and supposing his service as a 
commander had been anything but worse than negative in 
its character. Especially when, upon such subterfuge, ig- 
norance is feigned of the occurrences of April 5th, when, with 
all these occurrences before him, he dispatches to Halleck 
that day or night that he has not the faintest idea of an at- 
tack he evidently has been expecting for at least three days 
before. He knew everything about the driving in of the pick- 
ets on the 5th, and the presence of rebel artillery in sight 
through the woods, from the Union picket posts within a 
few hundred yards of the camp. Sherman testifies on oath, 
and writes to his brother, the Senator, that Grant had taken 
away his cavalry pickets early Saturday morning, and this 
is confirmed by Major Kicker, 5th Ohio cavalry. Grant 
knew also that, as Captain Stuart swears, the artillery of 
Sherman's line had, the same morning, been taken to the 
rear, and Stuart's was not returned at all. 

All this had been done on the morning of the 5th, with 
the knowledge that on the 4th, as Sherman swears, he 
knew there were the elements of a hostile army in his front, 



148 SHILOH. 

wlien their drum beats had been heard, yet these " great 
commanders were innocent of the destination and purpose 
of this army, ' ' so welcomed by them to their open front and 
unsusjiecting troops. Tlie cannon and musketry with which 
Sherman says they announced their presence on the 4th 
appears and remains at our picket posts all next day to take 
a regular rest and brush up for attack, and yet a dispatch 
goes to headquarters that as Sherman says all is quiet along 
my lines, and Grant repeats, "All's well," as it was for the 
protraction of the war by the destruction of a Union army 
of 40,000 men. And then, because of the place and power 
thus attained, it is gravely argued that these commanders 
must be treated with all the respect and consideration pur- 
chased by crimes like these. If there is any other explana- 
tion, let it be made known. 

Now, to sum this matter up again with truth, and not with 
fiction, or silence, or concealment, as has been always done, 
what is the condition of affairs on Saturday night, the otli 
of April, 1862, under which the commander at the camp 
writes to the commander at Savannah that "he does not 
apjirehend an attack on his position? " 

By his own evidence, well sustained in this case, Sherman 
had reason to expect an attack on his position on the 3d of 
April. He admitted to Buckland apprehension of an attack 
on the 4tli oi April, on which day Nelson is informed that 
he is not wanted till the 8th. The enemy drive in his pic- 
kets, and occupy his nearest picket station with their can- 
non on the 5th, on which day he not only sends no cavalry 
pickets out, but his cavalry and artillery are withdrawn to 
the rear. All such active and energetic preparations to meet 
the enemy are made on the eve of battle, in accordance with 
the Grant-Shermanic strategy and tactics of keeping all 
flanks presented to the enemy^ and avoiding defences, which 
invite an attack. These are the prei^arations in accordance 
with the dictates of the protractive policy. Grant knows on 
the day of these organizations for defeat, i. e. on the 5th, 
that Nelson's division of say 7,000 men is at Savannah be- 
fore noon of that day, s])ite of advice to keep back and not 



Sherman's cross-examination. 149 

intrude on his and Sherman's battle-ground till wanted. 
And this intrusion is the more impertinent, since Grant and 
Sherman knew Saturday afternoon that the right flank and 
rear of the adventurous Southrons is little over a mile (by 
Badeau) from the Tennessee river at Hamburgh, two miles 
above our left at Shiloh. Grant knows that by a movement 
of our army that night, or in early morning, a few miles out 
on the lower Pudy and west Corinth roads, his troops will 
be in position to attack the rebel left. He knows that the 
divisions of Lew. Wallace at Crump's, and Nelson with Buell 
at Savannah, can run up to Hamburgh at any appointed 
hour of the night of the 5th, or early morning of the 6th of 
April, 1862, when there will be say 14,000 Union troops on 
the rebel right and rear, and near 40,000 opposite their left 
and center. And he knows that by such simple dispositions 
of the Union troops the hostile army must be scattered or 
captured without material bloodshed. 

And now, was it because of his unwillingness that Buell's 
troops should have a share in such success, or because of 
secret instructions, under agreement to prolong the war, 
hy the loss of a hattle, that he foregoes all this easy advant- 
age, and allows our army to sleep in false security? Does 
he, for the furtherance of this ^^pi^otr action," hide from his 
own and from Buell's troops the presence of tlie enemy, 
leaving them thus exposed to wanton slaughter, and sacri- 
fices 13,000 Union soldiers to his own blind and bloody 
jealousy, or for the political purposes of the Washington 
cabal, let his preparations for disaster reach their legiti- 
mate or illegitimate result. If his reasons were personal, 
what, in comparison to this, was the whole crime of the 
rebellion, and wliy should he so long have enjoyed power 
and impunity instead of punishment? If unde r instructions 
or by agreement, what })unishment would be too severe for 
both principals and instruments of such atrocity? If it was 
mere stupidity, stolidity, or incapacity, what should be the 
fate of his employers, and why should he remain in power 
where he is? Whatever the private motive — whatever 
the party or public policy — the salient result is plain and 



150 SHILOH. 

prominent. A glorious and next to bloodless victory 
was given up to the enemy — worse than thrown away — on 
the 6th ; exchanged for intended disaster by the Union 
commander ; bartered for future place and patronage by the 
Washington cabal; and 40,000 Union troops sold, labeled, 
and consigned to a bloody and disgraceful defeat. 

Who can, on the evidence of the above-stated trial, with 
collateral incidents and facts, put any other construction on 
the acts and neglects of these commanders before, on, and 
after the 6th day of April, 1862. 

The great effort of Grant and Badeau, Sherman and 
Bowman, has been to impress upon the public, as they seem 
to have done successfully, that if Buell had been up in time, 
not only would the disaster of the 6th have been prevented, 
but they would have attacked the Confederate army. Buell 
laas up in time, and the most favorable time for the utter 
rout of the enemy, yet they made no use of these troops, 
when, as all admit and none deny, an attack would have 
been a victory. This refusal, then, of these Army of the 
Ohio troops, when they were upon time, and exact time, 
is ample evidence of keeping Buell back, even if that of 
General Ammen and Grant's dispatch to Nelson, of April 
4th, were wanting. And for this "tardiness" Buell has 
been branded with disloyalty, and, to prove it, the record of 
his inquiry court, proving the criminality of his accusers, 
has by them been made away with. The two salient points, 
then, to prove the protractive i^ai' policy upon the admin- 
istration of 1862, are, first, the placing of Buell, who was 
for the capture of the upper Tennessee, under Halleck, who 
prevented it; and, second, the keeping back of Buell from 
the field of Shiloh, and eventually driving him from the 
army, and the advancement of Grant, not only for keeping 
him back, but for refusing his troops, when they came up 
in time to defeat the enemy, Ajjril 5, 1862. 

The diary extracts, on which is founded this commentary, 
and on which it was endeavored to establish a charge of 
unmilitary and ungentlemanly conduct against its writer — 
these diary extracts were written ten years ago to fulfill 



Sherman's cross-examination. 151 

their present mission, as is witnessed by one of the aids of 
Sherman, under whose charge the 1st brigade of his divis- 
ion was devoted to the ^ infernal gods." This was in sub- 
stitution for himself in a very anti Koman Decius style ; but 
the evidence of the intention above stated is as follows from 
the record: Major W. D. Sanger, aid to Greneral Sherman, 
was sworn, and, among other things, testified, "that Colonel 
Worthington had told him, shortly before leaving the camp 
at Shiloh, that he wanted to make a rej)ort of the Tennessee 
expedition, and throw the responsibility of our defeat where 
it belonged. He stated that it rested upon Generals Grant, 
C. F. Smith, and Sherman, and he was determined to show 
them up to the people of Ohio and the world." 

This evidence shows that this treatise had its origin on 
the field of Shiloh, with no possible political bearing or 
purpose whatever. He did suspect from Halleck's words, 
few as they were, and his movements, slow as tliey were, 
that there was an influence beyond liim and his coadjutors 
at work. If traced, as it is, to a cabal inside or outside the 
Cabinet, or war office, it is all the same to this relator, and 
had he traced that influence to his father's coffin, he would 
have torn it open all the same, to expose such hitherto un- 
recorded infamy, without regard to parties, circumstances, 
or men, dead or alive. 

This dealing in human lives and limbs, and public safety, 
may have a petty parallel in the example of some seven by 
nine German duchy, whose prince sold his subjects to the 
king of England during our rebellion of the Revolution. 
This prince was not satisfied with anything but the death 
of his subjects wounded under the English contract for 
their blood and bones. If wounded, they came back upon 
his hands; if dead, they were paid for at so much a head. 
That was his '■'logic of events," and very conclusive pocket- 
logic it was. Perhaps it may have been one of the lilliputs 
of Cassel, but whoever it was, it was no viler a bargain 
made by him with Britain than that between the "cahal" 
and these commanders. 



152 SHILOH. 

They were to carry out the ^^ policy" and were to he car- 
ried through the war^ as they were. It was the war that 
carried them along, not they who really carried on the war. 
It was a clear case of Dundreary philosophy — the tail be- 
came the biggest and accordingly wagged the dog, who was 
commanded therefore by his own tail — and thus the last in 
merit are the first in place and power. It should be stated 
that, in April, 1862, the writer may have believed General 
C. F. Smith to blame for the alfair of Shiloh, but he has 
long since discovered, and Halleck's dispatches show, that 
he was, in his illness and unfitness for duty, made the helj)- 
less instrument of a wicked purpose. Occasion also is taken 
here to withdraw his charge against Sherman, of complicity 
wdth the enemy, made, not in defence of the charges against 
the prisoner, for he made none that would thwart his ob- 
jects, one of which was to get out of such a command, but in 
defence of his diary extracts and their principles of war, and 
against Sherman's plain criminality on his own evidence. 

He closed his unfinished defence as follows : 

" I did, in extreme cases, report to General Sherman, but all social com- 
munion between us had ceased after the 19th of March, 1862, when I had 
reluctantly concluded that he was utterly unfit for his position, and he 
knowing that I knew it, I had nothing to expect but that he would disgrace 
myself and regiment, if he could, as has since occurred. From what I heard 
from him within a week after my arrival at Paducah, I concluded that he 
could not safely be trusted with any 'separate and important command.' 
Every day has more and more and more confirmed this conviction ; and if 
anything more was wanting, the manner in which this trial has been brought 
on, * * '^ and the false and contradictory evidence given here by him, 
cumulate the conclusion that he is utterly unfit and incompetent for any 
responsible command. 

"Should he wish to change sides, he could bring ample arguments to show 
that his action has been unfavorable to the Union. * * * I knew per- 
fectly well that he knew of the rebel artillery in our front on the 5th of April ; 
and how could he ignore the fact when he had heard those guns on Friday, 
which should have been hunted up on Saturday, as they were not. Saturday 
was by the rebels made a day of rest within cannon shot of our camp; and 
if there was ever an invitation to an enemy to make an attack, when, how, 
and where he chose, that invitation was given to the rebel army on the 5tli 
and 6th of April, 1862, by Major General W. T. Sherman." 

Sherman was engaged in a viler service than that of the 
enemy. In that, there might have been personal danger 
with doubtful advancement; in the other there was imme- 
diate advancement without other effort than that of mischief 



Sherman's cross-examination. 153 

to the service, such as he afterwards wrought at Vicksburg, 
Jackson, Meridian, Chattanooga, Oostanauhi, Kenesaw, 
Peach Tree creek, Durham station, and on many other 
occasions during the war. 

He is absolved from all service in the rebel cause. It was 
much too honorable for such a man, as his evidence and acts 
have shown him to be. 

Evidence nded out hy the court. 

Deerfield, Waeeen County, Ohio, January 11, 1872. 
General T. Worthington, Morrow, Ohio. 

Dear Sir: In answer to your inquiries, I have to say that I was assistant 
surgeon of the 20th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel C. C. Marsh, at the 
battle of Shiloh. That General Sherman was first seen by that regiment when 
his two center brigades were driven past and through the left of General Mc- 
Clernand's camp, to the right and rear of his division, (the 1st,) about 9 a. m., 
April 6, 1862. That General W. T. Sherman, during the remainder of the day, 
kept in rear of his fragmentary troops, but did not seem at all active in rally- 
ing or encouraging them to any effort, simply holding his proper position, and 
notliing more, in the rear. 

In the afternoon he and his staff were simply spectators of what was doing 
in McClernand's division, which, though much thinned out, kept well together 
till 4iV p. m. I was at the landing on duty about 4 p. m., when Hurlbut's 
division was driven in. On returning to my proper position soon after, I found 
that immediately after Hurlbut's retreat the troops on our extreme right, 
fragments of Sherman's division, had been driven back towards Snake creek 
bridge, as stated in General Sherman's report. Besides the 17tli and 20th Il- 
linois, specified by General McClernand's report, as alone retaining their 
organization after^i.^ p. m., the 11th Illinois, though much reduced, kept well 
together. What troops were left of these three regiments at 5 p. m. would 
not have exceeded eight hundred men in line. 

Much indignation was expressed after the battle at what was considered 
the negligence of Generals Sherman and Grant. No one imputed any effect- 
ive action that day to General Sherman, and Colonels Marsh, Hare, Crocker, 
and many others, were considered, under General McClernand, as having 
been infinitely more efficient in keeping any troops in line till 5 p. m. than 
Sherman or Grant : the first a mere spectator, and the latter scarcely seen or 
even heard of anywhere on the field. As to General Grant, his utter incom- 
petence was considered his excuse for allowing his army to be surprised and 
defeated. At Donelson his conduct, in keeping off the field, was the same. 
It was not disputed that had not Generals Buell and Nelson, with Colonel 
Ammen's force, arrived with assistance al>out 5 p. m., the Army of the Ten- 
nessee would have been dispersed or captured, as stated in General Grant's 
report. From a little after 5 p. m. till dark the firing on our extreme left was 
at least if not more severe than on any part of the field during the day. 
Yours, respectfully, G. W. Henderson, 

A&st Surg. 2Qth III. V. I. 

The above statement is verified by General McClernand, who, writing the 
same date from Springfield, Illinois, says: 

"Sherman's division, losing its organization in the morning, occupied no 
definite position from that time till near dark. In the meantime General 
Sherman was without any real command. Grant may have seen Sherman 
before or about noon loithout his division. I saw not General Grant, nor 
received word from him during the day." 



154 SHILOH. 



CHAPTER XI. 

GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD, AND ON HIS BOAT 

AT NOON. 

"Grant was on every part of the field in person, constantly under fire, and 
making unwearied exertions to maintain his position until Nelson and Lewis 
Wallace should get up, but the national forces were losing ground every hour. 
(Badeau's Life of Grant.) 

"Grant was never discourged, and rose to the height of a hero when the 
storm had burst." (Whitclaiu Eeid.) 

" Commanding Officer advance forces BuelVs army. 

" Near Pittsburgh, April 6, 1862, (near noon.) 
" If you will get upon the field, it will j^ossihb/ save the day to us. The rebel 
forces are estimated at 100,000 men. U. S. Grant." 

"About 1 o'clock p. m., April G, I reached Pittsburgh landing. I found 
Grant on his boat, with two or more of his staff', in the ladies' cabin. I pro- 
posed we should go ashore, and his horses were accordingly taken ashore. 

"D. C. BUELL." 

Too mucli space has perhaps been devoted to the yiirjlit 
before the battle, if too much attention can be paid to events 
which preceded the most inexplicable battle, and most 
far-reaching results of any one before on record. "We 
now bring Grant on to the battle-field of Shiloh, where he 
achieves nothing but to discover that, in his conviction, it 
is lost, as will presently appear, and that he acted accord- 
ingly, and perhaps discreetly, and Hudibrastically. 

As Lieutenant Moore says, Grant reached Pittsburgh 
about 10 a. m., perhaps a little before. He thence per- 
haps sent a verbal order to General Lew. Wallace, and the 
order to General Wood, recorded in Badeau's history. Gen- 
eral Sherman says nothing about seeing him in his division 
report, till 3 p. m. In his letter of January, 1865, he says 
he saw him about 10 a. m. The time must have been half- 
past 10 or 11, as General Grant was seen by General Veateh 
on the Corinth road about that time. He must have seen 
Sherman while his iirst brigade was detached, as Sherman 



GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD. 155 

says, to join on McCleruand's right. Both doubtless gave 
up the brigade for lost, as nothing else seemed possible. 
Grant, however, saw that without speedy assistance the 
day iDcis lost, beyond a peradventure. He returned to his 
headquarters near the landing about noon, or half an 
hour earlier, and there found fugitives from the extreme 
right of this detached brigade, which, with its command- 
er, declared that the first brigade on the extreme right was 
broken and scattered, and the rebels would soon be at the 
landing. Whereupon he wrote as below, and despatched 
the note by a boat which passed Crump's landing, with a 
message for Wallace, about noon. General Buell, at any 
rate, got the note about that time, or a little later, on his 
way up to Pittsburgh landing. Here is the letter: 

"Commanding Officer advance forces BiieWs army. 

" Near Pittsburgh, Aj^ril 6, 1862, (noon.) 
"The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. 
The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, 
both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon 
the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a 
move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. Tlie rebel forces 
are estimated at over 100,000 men. My headquarters will be in the log build- 
ing on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide 
you to your place on the field. Respectfully, U. S. Grant." 

The first inference from the letter is plain, that the day 
is given up, without reinforcements, by which it can only 
possibly be saved. The second is, that if there are 100,000 
men in his front, it will be bwt bringing men to "rtc/c? to 
slaughter'' to bring up Nelson's 6,000 or 7,000 troops. The 
third inference is, that the mention of these 100,000 hos- 
tile troops is intended, as it might be calculated, to keep 
reinforcements, of a force like iSTelson's, back. The fourth 
is, that having left a staff officer to attend to the reinforce- 
ments. Grant has returned to the field, which by this note 
he had plainly given up for lost. If so, there was sone chiv- 
alry in the deed. Badeau's history strengthens such an in- 
ference in the mind of a careless or admiring reader, as he 
says (page 80) "that Grant was on every part of the field 
in person, constanthj under fire., and making unwearied ex- 
ertions to maintain his position till Nelson and Lewis Wal- 



156 SHILOH. 

lace should get up. But the national forces were slowly 
losing ground each hour. Still, if only Nelson and Lewis 
Wallace would come ^ip, the day might even yet be saved." 

So that Grant was on the field, striving against impossi- 
bilities, if Wallace and I^elson did not come up, and very 
serious improbabilities if they did even get up in time. 

Some one has written, that the struggle of a great-souled 
man against gigantic odds is a spectacle worthy the im- 
mortal gods. 

Here, then, was an example: the ubiquitous Grant every- 
where, with the might and terror of a Titan, piling Pelion 
upon Ossa, the fiery soul of Hector, and the sword of 
Achilles, and also the long how of Ulysses, only to be drawn 
by Grant and Sherman, his long-bowman, with Badeau at 
hand with the thunderbolts of Jove — struggling, as it 
were, between Scylla and Charybdis, (or at any rate, be- 
tween hawk and buzzard,) on that field embattled by an 
even mightier foe — it was '■'■ires grand — magnijique" — when 
at about 1 p. m.,with himself and horses on his boat — the 
Tigress — with his cigar of course, and engaged in his usual 
and habitual recreation, Buell found him as follows: 

" AiEDEiE, Ky., Feb. 25, 1872. 
" It couLl not have been later than 1 o'clock p. m., when I arrived at Pitts- 
burg landing, on the 6th of April. The steamer on which I was, landed 
almost against, but a little above, the one which Grant used. On inquiring for 
him, I was informed that he was on board his steamer. I went there, and 
found him in the ladies' cabin, with two, possibly three, officers of his staff, 
whose names I do not now remember, if even I ever knew. I did not par- 
ticularly observe them. I understood that they had all — Grant and his staff — 
recently come in from the field. After getting what information I could from 
him, and arranging with him to send steamers to bring up Crittenden's division 
from Savannah, I proposed that we should go ashore. His horses were ac- 
cordingly taken ashore. D. C. Buell." 

It is useless to waste time or strength, or ink or paper, 
drawing inferences, which draw themselves, like a cork 
without a screw, when you cut the string off". 

It is very plain that it was no use, with less than 20,000 
men, to struggle with 100,000 on such a field. He had 
found himself of no use there any how, which is more, by 
the loss of at least 5,000 men, than could be said for Sher- 
man. Sherman was the ablest tactician at a drill, the oldest 



GRANT ON AND OFF THE BATTLE-FIELD. 157 

graduate, higher in military art in his class than Grant, and, 
what was more, had the most influence at Washington; 
and Sherman had given at least two examples against hope. 
At 10 a. m., or earlier, Sherman had turned over his last 
brigade to his aids, who in turn had turned the brigade 
over to the enemy. They in turn had nearly turned its 
right flank, and its commander had returned to the land- 
ing, and made such a report to Grant of the defeat, by 
the turniuo; of the 46th Ohio and 6th Iowa on the rio^ht 
flank, that Grant, thinking it best to keep up appearances, 
wrote Nelson that, if he came to attack, he must expect to 
meet 100,000 men. Like a discreet commander and horse 
fancier, he thereupon, after turning over this weight of 
responsibility, turned his attention to his horses, and be- 
took himself to his boat. What were his intentions re- 
main, as the historical philosophers say, "enshrouded in 
the womb of time." His memories, however, most likely 
recurred to Fort Donelson, where he had found such com- 
fort on Commodore Footo's gunboat, while the battle was 
raging above; and, perhaps, concluded that Floyd, when 
he left his command at Donelson, had, doubtless, done 
the best thing possible, under the circumstances. All in- 
ferences on this affair are deferred to a generous public, 
who may, or may not, suspend a conclusion. 

Note, — No charge of cowardice is here preferred, or so 
intended, against General Grant, who has, perhaps, the 
same courage of calculation held in common with practiced 
soldiers or oflicers having a military education. 

In absenting himself from the field, and keeping out of 
the battle; in neglecting to send for Buell's troops, whose 
arrival occurred at 10 a. m, of the 6th and noon of the 5th; 
in having all his boats at Pittsburgh, to prevent their com- 
ing up ; in doing everything for a defeat, and nothing for 
victory, he was but carrying out his contract, or obeying 
orders^ for which he has been paid in full long ago. Here 
is further proof that he expected the attack, while keeping 
Nelson back : 



1/58 APPENDIX. 

" General Grant to General Buell. 

" Savannah, April 6, 1862. 
"General D. C. Buell : Heavy firing is heard up the (river,) indicating 
plainly that an attack has been made upon our most advanced positions. I 
have been looking for this, but did not believe the attack could be made be- 
fore Monday or Tuesday, 7th or Sth. 

"This necessitates my joining the forces up the river, instead of meeting 
you to-day, as I had contemplated. 

"I have directed General Nelson to move to the river with his division. 
He can march to opposite Pittsburgh. 

"Eespectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. Grant, 

"Maj. Gen. Commanding y 



APPENDIX 



For want of time and means, a large part of Chapter IX 
is omitted, and also chapters headed "Sherman's Last Bri- 
gade," "Sherman on and off the Field," "Sherman's First 
Brigade," and "Sherman's Letter to the U. S. S. "Magazine 
of January, 1865." These may appear in a future edition. 

The following statements, part of the chapter as to Sher- 
man on and off the Field, are given as all of that chapter for 
which there is present room or time : 

Sherman's report. 

General Sherman having omitted to state in his report 
anything more as to what occurred when he was in front of 
Appier's regiment than that his orderly was killed, the 
omission is in some sort filled hy Lieutenant Cutler's state- 
ment, in which all officers and men of the 53d Ohio con- 
curred. They were, however, deterred from signing with 
Cutler by fear of Sherman's resentment. 

In a letter to Hon. Ben. Stanton, June 10, 1862, Sherman 
states that his orderly was killed 500 yards beyond Appier's 
regiment. Which statement is right? 

Lieutenant Cutler's statement. 

"The undersigned hereby certifies, that in a speech made to the 53d Ohio 
Volunteer Infantry, a few days after the battle of Shiloh, General Sherman 
said that Avipler was a brave man ; that he had told him (Sherman) that he 
did not order the regiment to retreat; that he would rather take Appier's 
word than that of the whole regiment, who were a pack of cowards; that it 
was true the regiment had been put in too exposed a position ; that he had 



APPENDIX. 15 

intended to alter it, but that, in consequence of their cowardice on the day 
of the battle, they should remain where they were. He said furtlier, in con- 
nection with the battle, that Beauregard and A. S. Johnson were gentlemen 
and honorable men, (he knew them personally,) who would scorn to do a 
mean thing; that if the 53d was attacked and retreated again, he would take 
as much pleasure in pouring shot and shell and canister into them as into the 
rebels. 

"I certify that the regiment waS attacked at 7 a. m.on the 6th of April, 
(1862,) or a little before that time. General Sherman was just in front of the 
regiment when his orderly was killed, immediately on which he rode rapidly 
ofl toward the rear; that the regiment left the rear of its camp about twenty 
minutes afterwards, and General Sherman could not have seen and spoken to 
Colonel Appier in the camp as late as 8 a. m., (on the 6th,) or even an hour 
before that time. We further certify that it was General Sherman's wish that 
Appier should continue to command the regiment, and urged him to do so ; 
but Colonel Appier declined on the ground that he did not think himself fitted 
for the command; and further, that from the left of Mungen's to the right of 
Appier's camp the distance was at least 300 yards, with low swampy ground 
between the camps, and to the left of the 53d was an open field near a mile 
long, while there was thick brush not over 100 yards in front. 

"Also, that the artillery did not fire on the rebels as they crossed the val- 
ley, nor until half an hour after we were attacked. 

"Geo. E. Cutler, 
" First Lt. Co. (?., 53c/ 0. V.I. 

"Memphis, Tenn., Sept. 1, 1862." 

The report of General Sherman states that McDowell con- 
ducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. 

The statement of his aid-de-camp (afterwards Lieutenant 
Colonel Upton, a gallant officer) shows how McDoweW con- 
ducted the attack, and how near at the time General Sher- 
man was to the extreme right, as he says he was, when he 
saw Grant at 10 a. m. of April 6, 1862: 

"I hereby certify that on the 6th of April, 1862, General Sherman was not 
seen by the 1st brigade of his division before the firing commenced, at about 
7 a. m. ; nor did I see him that day till at or about the time he ordered the 
brigade to fall back, about 2 p. m. 

"Also, that after the 46th regiment O. V. I. had fallen back after its first 
fire, about noon, I was, with Colonel McDowell, Captain Harland, Commis- 
sary Moreland, and Quartermaster Ingram, to the left of the brigade, on the 
edge of an open field, in which Taylor's battery, not then firing, was located. 
That there came suddenly a thick shower of balls, when I and Harland dis- 
mounted. Colonel McDowell and the quartermaster and commissary rode 
rapidly off towards the river, and I saw nothing more of Colonel ]\IcDowell 
for half an hour afterwards, also near Taylor's battery, who said that his com- 
mand was gone; that it was no use further exposing themselves, and they 
might as well go to the landing, towards which he immediately rode. Not far 

from the landing, near a battery, he was requested by Major , of the — 

regiment, to assist in rallying the broken troops; he remained doing so but 
a f(jw moments. I knewnothing of his having had a fall from his horse, but 
when he last rode away from the right of Taylor's battery he complained of 
having been hurt. Edward N. Upton, 

"First Lt. Co. D., A6th Rcgt. 0. V. I. 

"Camp No. 7, May 15, 1862." 

"Witness: Oliver P. Brown. 



160 APPENDIX. 

General Sherman, in his report, having stated that at 10 
or 10| a. m. he drove hack the rebel left and relieved the 
pressure on McClernand's front, by means of McDowell's 
1st brigade, the statement of Major Smith tells how and 
how far this driving back was done, and how Shermaii 
did it: 

" Camp before Corinth, May 23, 1862. 

"Major J. B. Smith, 40th Illinois, says that about noon on the 6th of April, 
1862, the regiment came into an open field, near a Union battery, about 400 
yards south of an old house in the north end of the field, where it was met by 
General W. T. Sherman. There, on consultation, or after conversation with 
Colonel Hicks, in which Sherman said there was a rebel battery before us he 
wished taken, he (Sherman) ordered the regiment forwards towards the same. 
General Sherman, as we started, being to the rear of the left flank. That after 
marching at quick time some 300 or 400 yards, we were ordered to halt and 
lie down on rising ground, in sight of the battery, not exceeding two hundred 
yards in front, which battery, however, was not seen when the regiment 
started. 

" We remained in this position some twenty or thirty minutes, when we 
fell back about 300 yards, when we were again rallied, and advanced about 
100 yards, where we remained till ordered to retreat by an officer I did not 
know. 

"In the first advance we lost about 180 men, (including Colonel Hicks, 
badly wounded,) killed and wounded. After the first advance we lost about 
40 men. 

"After General Sherman's first order to advance I saw no more of him that 
day. J. B. Smith, 

''Maj. -iO thill. 

"T. WoRTHiNGTOK, Col. 4.6th Ohio." 

The most extraordinary statement in Sherman's report is, that at 10 a. m. 
Buckland and McDowell's brigades were conducted so as to join on McCler- 
nand's left flank. This is a fiction as regards Buckland's brigade, which, by 
his report, was utterly disorganized on the first retreat at 9 a. m. The single 
1st brigade was then by him deserted, as he says, in the hottest of the fight, 
while he liimself sought refuge under the rear of McClernand's right wing, 
tlie second descrtlo7i of his troops that morning by 9 a. m. This, as Badeau 
says, was "commanding McClernand's division, as well as his own." Here, 
then, was W. T. Sherman, a West Point graduate of high-class grade, in com- 
mand of a division of about 7,000 men, during a battle where there was more 
terror, confusion, and bloodshed combined, than any other fought within this 
century, or perhaps any other, who abandons his only available troops to his 
subordinates at a time when a skillful commander was most wanted; when, 
as he reports, regiments, brigades, and divisions were successively swept back, 
and the most trifling accident might drive back McClernandin slaughter and 
confusion, he thus exposes this remnant of his troops, this forlorn hope of the 
army, as it turned out to be, to seemingly inevitable destruction. Who would 
believe it, if not in his report; yet in this one respect that report is true, ex- 
cept that these troops were not permitted by the enemy to join McClernand's 
right, nor did he expect it. From 9 a. m. till 2 p. m. this deserted force, with 
the loss of near half its number, or 700 men, prevented the turning of the 
Union right flank, and prevented its being driven back till 2 p. m. that day, 
without aid or encouragement from Sherman or its brigadier. 



APPENDIX. 161 



JOKE ON SHERMAN. 



An odd statement, and, still more oddly, a true one, of Slierm.an's report, 
that it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the musketry fire 
of the two days' battle to which he so freely exposed his men — more especially 
those of the first brigade, turned over, he says, in the hottest of the fight to 
his aides in derogation of himself; this characteristic benevolence, so 
like Grant, for his horses, taken together with tlie evidence of Colonel fcJtuart, 
that his artillery would liave been caj'tured on the 6th had it not been taken 
back on the olh Afiril, started a joke among the wags in camp, that iSherman 
had withdrawn his artillery lest it, should be captured, and his cavalry lest 
the horses should be hurt. Though so much more careful of the horses while 
living, all were treated with the same neglect when dead — buried, or cov- 
ered up, where they fell. Very inconsistent and contradictory conduct, but 
just like the "Great Coiinnaiidrr" — \V. T. Sherman. 



G liANT'S C0NTRADIC110N8. 

The following letter from General Grant is in direct contradiction of hi.s 
report that Buell's troo[)s s'aved the landing, transports, &c., from capture, 
April (j, 1 H62, and is part of ont; of the chapters exchideil for want of room, &c. 

"Washington, D. (;., April 7, 1872. 
General W. W. Belknap : 

"Give my congratulations to the gallant Society of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, and regrets that public duty prevented my being with them on the 
anniversary of one of the hardest-fought battles of the rebellion. The battle 
of Shiloh, though much criticized at the time, will ever be remembered by 
those engaged in it as a " brilliant success," won with raw troops over a 
superior force, and under circumstances the most unfavorable to the Union 
troops. U. S. Grant." 

Grant's force was not less than 5.'-), 000, purposely scattered ten or eleven 
miles along the river, by two or three miles back. The Confederates had 
less than 41,000 men. The " icnj'avorable circumstances" had been purposely 
arranged by himself. The "brilliant success" was a disgraceful defeat, whicli, 
but for Buell, Nelson, and Ammen, would have been entire capture or rout 
of the Union army, devoted by him to ruin. 



GRANT'S NOTICE OF "SHILOII" AND WHAT COMES OF IT. 

Before tlie last jjages of this incomplete work went to press, and on the 
morning that Grant's notice of Shiloh appeared in the Washington Hepjib- 
lican, the writer found tliat a resolution of the House as to missing rebelMon 
records applied only to that of Buell's court of inquiry. He thereupon re- 
turned thanks for the notice to the proper editor of the liepublican (Grant) 
in writing; and in order that the President might try conclusions as to the 
"missing records," if he chose, before the highc'st national tribunal, he pre- 
sented to Congress the memorial as follows: 

Washixc.ton, I). C, Maj/ 24, 1872. 
To .the Cont^ress of the United States : 

This relator respectfully presents, /oj- reference only, a treatise on the Ten- 
nessee or Shiloh campaign of 1S()2, to prove that the campaign was mainly 
fruitless after February, 18f)2, by reason of the policy for protracting the 
war previously adopted; and also to prove that for the purpose of such pro- 
traction, the defeat of the Union army at Shiloh, April 6, lS(r)2, was the result 
of that policy, carried out under direction of the late General Halleck by 
General Grant. 

The first overt act for continuing the war in Tennessee, against all inilitarv 

11 



162 APPENDIX. 

principles, one year or more, was perfected by the order of March 12, 1862, 
placing General Buell under the immediate command of General Halleck, 
who permitted the junction of A. S. Johnson's army from Decatur with the 
rebel armj'' at Corinth, resulting in the disaster to the Union army at Shiloh 
April 6, 1862. Evidence of the iirst overt act to secure that defeat is found 
in the dispatches of General Halleck of March 3d and 4th, herein submitted. 
These dispatches are fictitious and deceptive on their face, and intended to 
place the responsibility for the position of the battle-field of Shiloh on C. F. 
Smith. 

This protractive policy, and its terrible consequences, required the sitp- 
pression or destruction of all siiecial army records, and the entire abrogation 
of all established principles and practice of military law, of wliich this rela- 
tor has am2)le evidence, as to the Shiloh campaign of 1862. No such records 
can be had at the War Department, for tJiey are not there. 

The dispatches of General Halleck, March 3 and 4, 1862, to the War De- 
partment and to General Grant, are authenticated in Badeau's military life 
of Grant. General Halleck's dispatch of March 4th to General Buell was 
obtained from General Buell himself. 

For the purpose of obtaining a correct history of this campaign, never yet 
publishe'3, this relator respectfully suggests and requests that a competent 
commission 'be at once appointed to rescue from destruction such army rec- 
ords as remain, and replace as far as possible those abstracted from the War 
Department at Washington, D. C. 

Respectfully, 

T. WORTHINGTON, 

Late Colonel iSth Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry. 



The writer earnestly requests all honorable soldiers and good citizens to 
sign and forward this and the above memorial to the next Congress, and to 
tiieir State Legislatures: 

Washington, May 30, 1872. 
To the Congress of the United b'tates. 

The undersigned respectfully submits (for aiding reference to official evi- 
dence only) a treatise on the Tennessee campaign of 1862, the special records 
of whicli iiave hitherto been suppressed or removed from the War Depart- 
ment. He requests that, by an appropriate commission, there may be an 
examination into the truth of the matter stated in said treatise, to deter- 
mine — 

1st. Whether the war of the rebellion in Tennessee in 1862 vva,s not pur- 
posely continued one year, or more, for purposes outside of the i>rosecutioa 
of the war; and whether, in the year 1862, the usual rules of war in this 
campaign, and all established military law, were not utterly disregarded. 

2d. Whether tlio disaster to the Union army at Shiloh, April 6, 1862, was 
not the result of design on the part of one or more officers of the United 
Stales army, including the officer then in command of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee. 

3d. Whether the evidence given by General W. T. Sherman, and his con- 
duct during tlie battle as stated in his division report, is such as renders such 
an officer a safe depositary of his present command of the national array. . 

4th. Whether there should not be such additions made to the Army Regu- 
lations and tlie Articles of War as will guard against the acts and neglects 
stated in the treatise herewith submitted. 

5th. Whether the Judge Advocate General properly performed his duty in 
taking no notice of such evidence on the part of a commander and prosecutor 
as that set forth in the treatise. 

6th. Whether, from any lap.se of time, an examination into the offences 
charged should be remitted, and whether there is or not any redress for the 



APPENDIX. 163 

proven wrong inflicted, without offence against the Army Regulations or 
Articles of War. 

7th. Whether the officers named as offenders in the treatise hold their 
present positions by meritorious conduct, or by collusion with those in power 
at Washington intrusted with the conduct of the war in 1862. 

T. WOKTHINGTON, 

Late Col. 46</t lirgt. 0. V. I. 



WARNING TO THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR LEADERS IN ANY 
FUTURE WAR, AND AGAINST FAITH IN MEN OF MERELY 
MILITARY REPUTATION. 

Since the issue of the first chapter of " ShiloJi," the writer has observed 
that the crimes proven therein, withnui ground nf denial, are considered of so 
terrible and atrocious a character, that most intellects shrink in horror from 
their contemjilation. 

If there was any room for doubt or extenuation, any e.xcuse or explana- 
tion, the treatise on Shiloh would be largely quoted and have a wide circu- 
lation at once. But the military crime of giving fictitious and deceptive 
! information in an invasive war, and of continuing the same at the expense 
1 of so many hundreds of millions of money and rivers of blood — the deliberate 
[location of an army on a field chosen for its slaughter — the studied prepara- 
'tion of at least one array, by its commander, for destruction and disgrace — 
the deliberate desertion of "their troops in obedience to a cruel policy, by 
■'one or more commanders, at the moment of greatest danger, and the brutal 
consignment of their victims to scattered, shallow, and nameless graves, ivhere 
they jell, constitute crimes which, if recognized, separate their perpetrators 
from all social intercourse and all human sympathy with honorable men. 
Such crimes, of the most atrocious and basest description, were denominated 
under tlie general term of '^perducllium" by the Roman law. The crimes 
of these men are too monstrous for record in any modern criminal calendar. 
For such horrors nothing is left but silence as to their perpetrators, and thus 
througli their infinite atrocity they escape unpunished. And not only that, 
but, to avoid the unfolding of such terrible records, such guiltiest of men are 
allowed to hold the highest civil and military positions in the Republic, and 
with tlie multilude to live on with the reputation of "characters" whom the 
people have delighted to honor. 



WARNING! 

"IF SUCH THERE BE, THE MORAL OF THIS WORK." 

First. The most intelligent people on earth may, for more than ten years 
together, be deluded by their trusted political leaders, as to the means and 
manner of conducting a civil war. 

Second. Men with no merit as soldiers, and with less than none as gene- 
rals, may be imposed upon this nation and the world as the greatest com- 
manders of the age. 

Therefore it is the conviction of this writer, that we know and care less 
about military laws and affairs, and are the merest politicians and money- 
grabbers of the world. 

X A state of affairs producing such generals and rulers as Halleck, Grant, 
and Sherman, distinguished for nothing, but worse than good-for-nothingness. 

A state of affairs dangerous in the extreme, but even'productive of future 
benefit, if it can teacli us how worthless is military reputation, and how 
exceedingly to be avoided in the choice of our rulers. 



164 APPENDIX, 

GRATEFUL CONCLUSION. 

Grant having impudently sftt forth in his "organ," of May 24th, inst., 
that this relator of hidden liistory is "an agency set in operation," and "a 
man put forward " to disclose the infamy of " eiuiuence," he therefore avers 
what may easily be proven, that he has had nothing but discouragement and 
disapprobation from nearlj'- all, and direct commendation from but two 
subscribers to his work — perhaps but one. 

He is under the greatest obligations to two school-mates of fifty years 
ago, both now United States Senators, and to his printer especially, for get- 
ting on so far with an imperative professional and public duty, which no one 
else on earth could have performed. 

His depth of obligation to all who have made advances at such risk can- 
not be expressed in words, but may be conjectured, when he avers that for 
months together, and most of the time since 18G2, he has subsisted on a 
peck of corn meal a week for himself and dog, with a pound of lard for his 
griddle, say 25 cents, or less, "and water from the spring," withouc even the 
hermit's "scrip with herbs and fruits supplied.'' This he has done, that he 
might urge his claims each winter for army supplies furnished his own regi- 
ment and other troops in 1861, and obtain, if possible, an investigation of 
the case, now submitted to the people as the court of last resort in all cases 
whatever. 

Note. — A few hundred copies of the Blunders of the Rebellion, written in ISG!), are 
attached to copies sent to first subscribers. 



PRINCIPAL ERRATA, 

Mninlii owbif] to the writer's haste, for want of time. 

Page 15, line 15 from top, mere for men. 

Page 15, line 1(1 from top, and before "consider." 

Page 21, line IS from top, eveii after "idlers." 

Page 30, line 21 from top, 1st, 2d, 3d, for 2d 3d, 1st. 

Page 37, line 25 from top, Sherman for Thomas. 

Page 41, line 4 from top, siiice for as. 

Page 41, line 9 from to]), and for or. 

Page 43, line 4 from bottom, times lor lines. 

Page 45, line 11 from top, Horton for Norton. 

Page 45, line 16 from bottom, comma [ , ] after " work." 

Page 49, line 2 from bottom, 61, 62 for 62, 63. 

Page 50, line 13 from bottom, same for newer. 

Page 52, line 6 from bottom, dash [ — ] after " horc." 

Page 65, last line, of, not on Badeau. 

Page 82, line 7 froiii top, faced, not face. 

Page 82, see pages 80, 81' map 2. 

Page 91, line II from top, enemy, not army. 

Page 91, line 16 from top, add, as to cutting off the enemy. 

Page 117, line 14 from bottom, comma [ , ] after "reader." 

Page 117, line 15 from bottom, small t for capital T. 

I'age 134, line 14 from top, has been for will be. 

Page 138, line 18 from top, acjain after "called." 

Page 143, line 12 from top, such for these. 

Page 149, line 8 from top, Purdy, not Pudy. 

TERMS: 

One Copy, One Dollar. Tkn Copies, Six Doli.aus. 
For sale by— • 

Shillington, Washington, D. C. 1 Baltimore News Oompant, Baltimore, Md. 

Applegate, PouNDSFORD, & Co., Cincinnati. American News Company, Npw Y<irk. 

R. W. Carroll, & Co., Cincinnati. | Central News Company, Philadelphia. 

Capital Oppiok, Wasliington. I). C. 



No. 1. 



BLUNDERS OF THE REBELLION 



AND THEIR 



DEAD-SEA FRUIT, 

111 Six Niirabers, 



GENERAL REYTEAT OF THE CAUSES AVHICII PROTRACTED 

THE WAR, (QUADRUPLED ITS I]XPENSE, IN WASTE 

OF LIFE, MONEY, AND NATIONAL CREDIT, 

AND BY THE 

REJECTION OF ALL METHOD, PL.\N, OR PROYIDENCE, IN AND OUT 
OF THE ARMY, HAS PRECIPITATED PRESENT RESULTS 



FUTURE DANGER TO THE UNION. 



By T. WORTHINGTON, 

ForiiK r Brig-, Gen'l of Ohio Militia and Col. 46th Reg't Ohio Vols at the battle of Shiloiu 



WASHINGTON CITY 
1869, 



Entered aecordino- to Act of Congress, in tho year 1809, by T. Wor.THiNGTON, in the Clerk's office of 
.Lnteici aecoiam,^ ^c ^^^^ Supreme Court of tlie District of Colnmbia. 



Washington, D. C, 3Iarch 18, 1869. 
Hon. Senator Wilson, 

Of Massachusetts. 

Sir; In the winter of 18G3, as now, you were chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs in the Senate. As such, I made known to you certain facts rela- 
tive to the battle of Shiloh and the Tennessee campaign of 1862, which I thought 
required investigation by the Committee ort the Conduct of the War. 

That investigation I thought was especiall}^ required, for the simple reason that 
the generals most directly coneerned, ni general, and that one, to whom had been 
particularly accorded the salvation of the army of Tennessee, by themselves and 
friends in and out of Congress, had steadily resisted such an investigation, and 
have continued to resist it since the conclusion of the war. I had not at that time 
the following letter of objections to the court-martial, by which I was tried on false 
charges, at Memphis, August, 1862. The delay of this letter, with that of the rec- 
ord, is strong presumptive evidence against the truth of the charges. Had it 
reached the War Office in due course of mail, even after the delay of the record, 
I would doubtless have been restored to service, and General Sherman's trial 
would have been the proper result. An examination of the record will at once 
disprove the groundless assertion of General Halleck, that General Sherman had 
saved the day on the 6th of Api'il, ,1862. 

The result of that utterly groundless statement of General Halleck is now before 
the ))eople of the Union in such a combination of circumstances as are without a 
parallel in history, in the advancement of unworthy men to the highest civil and 
military positions under the Government. 

The consequences of that result are beginning to appear in the appointment of a 
general stall' officer as head of the War Department. In the attachment of the 
great military bureaus to the personal staff of the General-in-Chief, who may or 
may not control the tens of millions of accounts, contracts, &c., yearly passing 
through the Quartermaster General's bureau, at his will, and in the nomination 
of a distinguislied general, lately in arms against the Union, to a place of trust and 
emolument; and this to the exclusion of men at least equally meritorious, who 
fought against the rebellion in the ranks of the Union armies. 

To these points I the other day respectfully called your attention, with the letter 
first above alluded to. That letter proves directly that to get clear of an obnoxious 
subordinate there were at least two or more llagrant infractions of the Articles of 
War, by the present highest civil and military officers of the Republic, in which 
was implicated the present Secretary of War. The question then arises, which will 
again occur in the course of this communication, are men who could thus violate 
the Articles of War, who dul make use of their positions to subserve strictly personal 
purposes, and who did inflict wrong where there v/as every reason for forbearence 
or reward J'*are such men, who have steadily resisted investigation into a campaign 
out of which has resulted their present advancement, worthy of that implicit con- 
fidence claimed by themselves and friends from the National Legislature? 

It is very certain that no man is fit to be President who requires the restraint of 
the tenure-oj- office law, and still more obvious that no man is fit to be trusted who 
demands its unconditional repeal; and this seems more especially the case wlien the 
President has evinced a determination to appoint none but favorites or benefactors, 
because they are such, to places in his gift. As an educated soldier of the late war, 
and a citizen who has never sought or enjoyed the power or emoluments of civil 
or political position, I respectfully submit the following record of the past. For 
its results your distinguished position will have rendered you in some sort respon- 
sible ; with that past your present action is bound by inevitable links. Let it be 
hoped for the party of the Union, that its present action may not, lik* the past 
blunders of the rebellion, produce little else than Dead Sea fruits for the future of 
the Republic. Very respectfully, 

T. WORTHINGTON, 

Late Col. iQth Begt. 0. V. I. 



Letter of Objections. 

(Copy.) Fort Pickeei^'G, September 17, 1862. 

AruuTANT General U. S. A. 

Sir: I would most respectfully call yonr attention to the record on case of the 
trial of Col. Thomas AVorthington, 46th regiment O. V. I., b}- general court-martial, 
at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, on the 14th August, 1862, and submit 
whether from the evidence it is not apparent that Major General Sherman is the 
accuser or prosecutor. It also appears manifest of record that the court was 
ordered bv General Sherman. Is this not an irregularity, (see sec. 65 Article of 
War act, 20th May, 1830,) for which the record and proceedings should be set 
aside ? 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
[Signed] T. Worthington-, 

Col. iGth licgt. 0. V. I. 

Endorsemtnts on the above. 

Headqitartees 46Tn 0. V. I., 

September 17, 1862. 
Col. Worthington a.sks that the proceedings of his court-martial may be examined 
and set aside. 

[Signed] CrrAs. G. WALeuTT, 

Lt. Col. Com'g 4.Qth 0. V. I. 

Headqxtarters 2r) Brio. 5th Div., Fort Pickering, 

September 18, 1862. 

Respectfully forivarded. Jno. Adair McDowell, 

Col. (Uh Iowa Vols., 2d Brig. Comd'g. 

Respectfully forwarded. 

Col. AVorthington knew that the subject-matter of the charges were made by 
General Sherman, and placed in the hands of the judge advocate. 

He might have excepted to them before pleading, but he did not, but actually 
courted the trial, and waived all objections on tliis point. T/ie original proceed- 
ings were sent to the Adjutant General's office, AA'ashington, D. C., before any 
order was made by me, and sent back with the endorsement of the Judge Advocate 
General, that they did not require the orders or approval of the President. 

Had Col. AVorthington excepted to his trial at the right time, viz, before plead- 
ing, his exception would have been good. Bat it is now too late, as he boastingly 
waived all objections and courted investigation. The original proceeditngs will be 
sent to the AV'ar Pepartment/or record. 

[Signed] AV. T. Sherman, 

[No date, T. W.] MaJ. Gen. Comd'g. 

Headquarters Dist. AVest Tennnessee, 

Jackson, Tenn., October 18, 1862. 
Respectfully forwarded to the Headquarters of the Army, AVashington, J). 0. 
[Signed] ■ U. S. Grant, 

Maj. Gen. 

Adjutant General's Office, 

November 1, 1862. 
Pv,espectfully referred to the Judge Advocate General for report. 

By order of the Secretary of AVar. 
[Signed] Thomas M. A^incent, 

Asst. Adjt Gen. 

Returned to the Adjutant General November 9. Sec mem. within. 
The mem. within is as follows: [In pencil, T. AV.] 

" Returned to the Adjutant General. The Secretary of AVar will direct what order 
£hall be issued in t-his case." 

[Signed] C P. Buckingham. 

Jirig. Gen., A. A. G. 



[Enclo.sod is also a slip of papor, on which i;? written in pencil as follows, and 
doubtless from Adjutant General's oflice: T. W.] 

NOVKMKKU II, 1SG2. 

" Jirprnlcd drnvkcirness awl puhlisJiuu/ libellous matter of his suprrior officers, 
Col. M('Doivell and General'^ Grant and Sherman. 

[It will bfi perceived tliac (he al)ove letter, of September 17th, does not appear as 
forwarded from Jackson till October 18, and is not reported on by the Judge Adv. 
GeiKjral till November lOth, lSr,2. The promotions consequent upon Col. Wortli- 
ingloii's ilb-_':i! di'^!iii-"n! bv 'General Sherman liad been made over a month before, 
and to c>i'. ■■i^jding, au'J other infractions of the Articles of War 

in the iJi:i 'ii's trial, and above all to cover up tiie misconduct 

of i.'ol. W^'i ri.iig'ji;, ]' ' ■'■ bottle of Shiloh, his dismissal was 

r-'.'Mumended, as a \' 'aw of July 17th, 1862. 

The delay in ap[.; i>-- '- ■• Secretary of War on the 

request of General ('. i'. i ; delivery of this letter 

to Gol. Worthington.prev' intended purpose, which 

had been to dismiss an otiir,-r whose iruup,- iidd liie (extreme right of the Union 
army on the (Uh of .April, lSii2. without aid or encouragement from General Sher- 
man, long enough to secure from ruin the .'\i-my of Tennessee till the ari'ival of 
the Army of tlie Oldo at 5 p. m. of that terrible day. — T. W.] 



Ab<tr,'rt ::/s and Jindinf/s of tin: court b,/ vitich Colonel Wvrtldngton, 

' Volunteers, was tried at Memphis, in Augiist, 18G2. 

He.vdquauteks, 5t]i Divis., Army of Teijne.sske. 

Memphi.?, September 16, 1862. 
[General Uidcr iNo. 83.] 

Before a general court martial, assembled at Memphis, Tennessee, August 14, 
1862, t^'c , kc, was arraigned and iried Colonel Thos. Worthington, IGth regiment 
Ohio Volunteers. 

niere follow the charges, of which the main charge, to which the others were 
I.;-: cly accessory, was the third — "for conduct u'nbecoming an. ojjiccr and a (jentle- 
:i"j.n" — [the speciiica'.ions umJer which were as follows; — T. W.J 

In this, that the said Colonel Tiioimis Worthington, of the Kith Ohio A'olunteers, 
di'l print, ■'■ ■■■■".^■- f. i"- tuintc!<l, on a sheet for circulation, what purpoi'led to be 
-.xiiacl- the Tcnncfsee ex|ie'.Iition, containing false and libellous 

m.iU'r. < . -,gued to injure his superior officers, Colonel ilcDowell 

aii'l G'licrai tiraiiL ;iiu.i General Sherman. 

In ib;s, that the said Colomd Worthington did prjnt or cause to be printed, for 
ci( dilation, what ]iur]'0iied to be extracts from his diary of the Tennes.-ce exj'edi- 
tion, designed \o secure fur himself a })oi ular reputation for prophecy and fore- 
sight, which said diary was not made coutenif.oraneous with the dates set forth in 
it, but was fabricated or manufaciured, oi'ier the occasion, to fulfill some base and 
dislionorable purpose. 

To which tile prisoner pleaded not <juilti/. 

;'l"ii'^ court found Colonel Woribiiigton guilty of the first specification wliere 
s!;ii.ti. t'lot is, ])rintiiig the iliarv extracts for circulation, &o., and sentenced hnn 
I., be ■■ cashiered."— \:''\\'.] 

II. Tlie procee<lings in the foregoing case were referred to the President of the 
T'nite 1 Stales, under the iVnh Article of War, and returned with the endorsement, 
till! Ill time of " war" the approval of tiie sentence in such cases by the Tresideut 
1^ II ■! i.-.|nisite, but is within the power of the ofticer assembling the court. 

Tlio liiidings and sentence are accordingly approved, and Colonel Thomas 
Worthington ceases to be liu otlicer of the volunteer army of the United States 
from this date. 

By order of Major (.'Jeneral W. T. Shekman : 

Captain L. M. Dattox, 

A. A. A. General. 



Judge Advocate General's Office, 

November 19, 1862. 
Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of Wur. 

Sir: I beg to call your attention to the record of the proceedings of a general 
conrt-martiai held at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, under General Order 
No. G9, issued by Major General Sherman, on the 12th August, 1862, and wliich 
resulted in the dismissal of Colonel Thomas Worihington from the service. 

Tliis officer now complains of the proceedings as irreguLsr, and insists that the 
finding and sentence are inoperative, and should be disregarded, because Major 
General Sherman, by whom the court-martial was ordered specially for his trial, 
was also hi.s "accuser or prosecutor" in the case. 

The objection seems to me well taken. The act of 29th of May, 1830, sec. 1, 
declares, that "wlienever a general ofBcer commanding an army, or a colonel com- 
manding a .separate department, shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any officer 
in the army of the United States under his command, the general court-martial, 
for the trial of such officer, shall be appointed by the President of the United 
States." 

During the progress of the trial, Colonel Wortliington formally objected, in 
writing, " to |iroceeding further without knowing by whom the charges were drawn 
or ailvanced." His objection was overuled. This was irregular. Ever\^ officer 
on trial before a general court-martial is entitled to this information, since without 
it he can never certainly know whether the tribunal before which he is arraigned 
lias been legally constituted or not. Major Genera,l Sherman now states in writing 
that the subject-matter of the charges were made by him, and placed in the hands 
of the judge advocate. This, it is believed, constituted him an "accuser or prose- 
cutor," in the sense of the act of 29th May, 1830, and from him as such the power 
to appoint the court-martial was expressly withheld and given to the President. 
His action, therefore, in ordering a court-martial specially for the trial of an officer 
against whom he had preferred the charges to be investigated being without legal 
sanction, the court itself was without color of authority, and its proceedings and 
findings are a nullity. 

The matter of defence now urged, did not, as the comm.anding general supposes, 
constitute a plea in abatement, which should have been presented at an eaidier stage 
of the proceedings. The irregularity suggested, does not call in question merely 
the jurisdiction of the court to try Colonel AVorthington, but its existence as a 
legally organized tribunal. It is never too late to insist on so radical and fatal 
a defect as this. It is of the highest importance that the administration of public 
justice, as well in the military as in the civil service, should be not only pure, but 
unsuspected. This, however, could not be the case where a commanding general, 
with all the moral power which belongs to his position, is permitted at once to prefer 
charges against his officers and to organize courts-martial for their trial. 
[Signed] Jos. Hqxt, 

Judge Advocate General. 

It appears from the above letter and opinion — 

1st. Tliat when General W. T. Sherman executed the sentence of an illegal court 
by his General Order 33, (herewith submitted,) he had not referred the record to 
the proper department in obedience to the Articles of War, or this opinion would 
have been sooner given. 

2d. 'J'liat he had not even submitted the same to General Grant, commanding 
the district, who therefore reexecuted the sentence October 1, 1862. 

3d. That there was and is no such endorsement on the record by tlie Judge Advo- 
cate General as that stated by General Sherman in his order executing the sentence. 

4th. That Judge Advocate General Holt would not likel}'' return a record with 
such an endorsement of the findings and proceedings of a court, pronounced by 
him a iiullify and ivilhout color of authority. 

Sth. Tiiat the record did not leave Jackson, Tennessee, before the 14th October, 
1862. 

6th. That General Grant must iiave issued his order of October 1, 1862, reexe- 
cuting the sentence, without knowledge of its previous execution by General 
Sherman. 



Till. That Judge Advocate McCoy acted in disobedience of the Article.' of AVar 
in retaining the recoi'd for at least six weeks after the trial and two weeks after 
the illegal execution of the sentence by General Sherman. 

Stii. That Acting Adjutant General Rawlins was accessory to this disobedience, 
and repeated the same, by retaining the record from the 1st to the 14tli October, 
1863, if not longer. 

9th. That Generals Sherman and Grant were both accessory to ibis infraction 
of the Articles of War by their several staff officers. 

lOtli. That General Sherman's order 83, September 16, 1862, which should be 
part of the record, is not on file in the Judge Advocate General's office, and was 
not forwarded to General Grant. 

lltli. That Colonel Worthington's letter of objections, September 17, 1S62, on 
which was based Judge Holt's opinion declaring the proceedings and findings a 
nullity, was retained by General Sherman till after the record bad reached General 
Grant. 

12th. That, if not so retained by him, General Grant or GJencral Rawlins, or 
both, are responsible for its retention in Tennessee till October 18, 1862, or after 
that date. 

13tli. That the question of Colonel W.'s exclusion from, or return to, service 
turned on the delay of this letter, can now be proven. 

14th. Tliat the promotions consequent on Colonel AV.'s ilismissal v>'ere illegally 
made, not only before the record had been examined by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral, but before the same had reached the War Department at Washington, and 
were, therefore, void in law. 

15th. That Colonel W. was not dismissed as a worthless officer, injurious to the 
service, because his letter of objections, to which was attached a slip, in pencil, with 
reasons for the recommendation for his dismissal, was not acted on by the Secretary 
of War ; such inaction being based upon General G. P. Buckingham's request that 
the matter might be delayed till Colonel W reached W'ashington ; and tliat, in a 
request for the papers relating to his dismissal, this letter, with Judge Holt's re- 
port on the case, came into his possession, a copy of which is herewith submitted, 
with the endorsements thereon. 

16th. There is, therefore, no record of Colonel W.'s dismissal, except by the 
illegal order, No. 83, for the execution of an illegal sentence by a court without 
color of authority, as declared by Ju<lge Advocate Cxeneral Holt. 

17th. That General Grant, when approving Colonel W.'s honorable discharge, 
Januar5'8, 1867, could not have been awnre that the sentence of the court, therein 
referred to, was without color of authority, and its proceedings declared a nullity 
y the Judge Advocate General. 

18th. Tiiatif Colonel W. had been dismissed by any other proceeding, said dis- 
missal v/ould, doubtless, have been revoked on the face of his honorable discharge. 

19th. Tliat the detention by General Sherman, &c., of Colonel W.'s letter of 
Septen:ber 17, 1862, affords ample evidence against the validity of his charges and 
the findings of his illegal court. T. W. 



Eitracts from a Diary of the Tennessee E.rpedition, 1862, by T. JVorthington, Col- 
onel 4i'6th Regiment 0. V. 1. 

Wednesday, March 26, 1862. — At Camp Shiloh, three miles from Pittsburg 
Landing. A couipanv being called for picket duty to-day, detailed Captain 
Sharp's Company B. Indications of an attack, if the country people are to be 
believed. Their pickets are around, and too near us, showing a strong efiective 
force. 

TiiURSi).\Y, March 27, 1862 — This afternoon two of Sharp's pickets were fired 
on bv the rebel horse, about 4} p. m., not a mile from camp. A disgrace to the 
army that such should be the case, and an indication that they are covering some 
forward movement, yet Sherman is improvident as ever, and takes no defensive 
and scarce any precautionary measures. He snubs me, and has no time to hear 
even a suggestion. 



Friday, Marcli 2S, 1862. — Having suggested to McDowell the sending out of a 
stronger picket, he ordered tliii'ty more men, which were immediately volunteered. 
If Beauregard does not attack us, he and the chivalry are disgraced forever, if for 
iiothing else. 

Saturday, March 29,1862 — Sherman has refused to sign a requisition for 
seventy-two axes for lay regiment, making it twenty-two ; and while a slight 
abattis might, prevent or avert an attack, there are no axes to make it, nor is there 
a sledge or crowbar in his division, and scarce a set of tools out of my regiment. 

Monday, March 31, 1862. — Further indications through the pickets that an 
attack is ivvmiiicni, and though I do not fear the result, a sudden attack, if vio- 
lentl}- made, as it will he, may throw us back for montJis. The men are discouraged 
at our delay here and the close vicinity of the rebel pickets, which should be driven 
off. Sherman is inviting an attack, which I hope may occur, but for which we 
are unprepared. 

Tuesday, April 1, 18(i2. — Have now over one hundred rounds of ammunition 
for all available men, and feel easy on that point. (Jrdei'ed the captains to send 
in accounts of clothing, &c., wanted, which the quartermaster is very careless 
about getting. Still no axes, which now he cannot get if he v/oidd, and which are 
worth more than guns at ])resent. 

Thursday, April 3, 18G2. — Rode to Pittsburg Landing. The place is crowded 
and in disorder below, with noise and gambling on the bank above, across the 
road from the post office. Hunted up and down for clothing and axes, and found 
that Sherman had forbidden his quartermaster from receiving anything. That 
General Smith's quartermaster will answer no requisitions outside of his immediate 
command, and the post quartermaster, Baxter, (Grant's,) will only answer the 
requisitions of the division quartermasters. The reason that Sherman's quarter- 
master will not receive anjr stores is, that he has no place to put them. There 
are now at least six boats hired by the day at the Landing, (as I hear,) at no less 
than two thousand (ip2,000) a day, when two thousand dollars with that many 
men could, in ten days or less, put U[i store-houses sufficient for an army of one 
hundred thousand men. And so the Government will pay on this expedition so 
far not less than twenty thousand dollars, and periiaps ten times that before the 
war is over, and lose not less than one to ten million dollars in quartermaster and 
commissary stores, occasioned by the improvidence and neglect of its major gen- 
erals here, to say nothing of the disorder and danger growing out of such a state 
of things. 

The indications are (still) of an attack, which I have also indicated to McDowell ; 
we should now have on our right at least six batteries, and two regiments of cav- 
alr}' to warn the rear. With thick woods before us and pickets scarce a mile out, 
we have no defences whatever, and no means of giving an alarm but by the fire 
of musketry. The troops cover too much ground, and cannot support each other, 
and a violent attack, which we may expect, may drive them back in detail. God 
help us, with so ma.ny sick men in camp, if we are attacked, tliere being over five 
thousand unlit for duty. 

Friday, April 4, 18G2. — One of McDowell's pickets was shot in the hand about 
noon. A detail of Taylor's cavalry was sent out three or four miles; found four to 
six hundred rebel cavalry, and fell back, returning about 2 p. in. 

Everything is carried on in a very negligent way, and nothing but the same 
conduct on tiie other side can save us from disaster. They can concentrate one 
hundred thousand men from the heait ')f rebeldom, and, with tliree or four rail- 
roads, have far greater facilities for handling troops than we have. 

Have brigade orders to stack arms at daylight till further order*. Keep two 
companies lying on their arms, and though as quiet as possible, look for an attack 
every hour. 

Saturday, April 5, 18G2. — Rode out to Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and found two 
men (I'ehel pickets) wounded yesterday, who died last night at tlie Widow Howell's. 
About 7 o'clock a. m. the reljols drove in Lieutenant Crary from the Widow How- 
ell's, getting possession of their dead men. Heard in the evening that the rebels 
had established three guns (six-pounders) opposite Hildebrand's bi'igade, on our 
left, accross the vallej'. Hear of five of their regiments arriving today. 

SuNDAV, April 6, 1S62 — A clear cool morning. Rode out to the pickets at sun- 



rise, and soon after the enemy were seen advancing past the Howell liouse. Di- 
rectl}^ one of Colonel Hicks's regiment, 40tli Illinois, was shot tlirough Iho heart, at 
not less than four hundred yards. Ilode to McDowell's quarters, (not up,) and 
then back to the pickets, and ordered the men who had fallen back to advance to 
the Howell fence. Returned to camp for preparation, and at about 7 a. m. the 
attack commenced on llildebrand's and Buckland's brigades. This niigliL have 
been expected, but we were really not ready for a fight. No liospitals at Pittsburg, 
nor even means to carry otf the wounded. 

Apkil 25, 1862. 
The undersigned hereby certify tliat most of the facts above set forth are correct 
from their own knowledge, and tliat Colonel Worthmgton's remarks and anticipa- 
tions are in correspondence with his general ccHivcrsation for ten days before the 
battle of the 6th of April, 1862. 

WiLLi.-\M Smitit, Maj. -leth lleg. 0. V. I. 

J. V\^ Heath, Capt. Co. A, 46th Reg. (3. V. I. 

A. G SiiAKP, " B, 

.T.N'o. AVisI':m.\n, " C, " " 

Ya>. N. Upton. Lt. c'dti. D, " 

Wm. Pinxky, Capt. Co. E, 

V. A. Cuow, " Ct, 

M. C. Lilly, " II, 

C. C. Lyblaxd, " I, 

I. N. At,e.\;axdee. " K " " 



FoKX I'ayette Statiox, M. and C. Raileoad, Texx., 

Jail/ nth, 1S62. 
Major General Hallkck : 

When 1 first had the pleasure of seeing you, on the ITth of last April, I was not 
aware that you had written that it was the unanimous opinion of the army at 
Sluloh that General Sherman had saved the day on the (Jtli, &c. Had I known it, 
I would have at once dissented from that opinion, and would have sent, through 
the regular channel, the enclo.sed extrn.cls froui my diary, which I then said were 
equivalent to grave charges against General Sherman. You then refused to see 
them, but said I might scud them through the regular channel, and submit such 
observations as I thought proper on the battle of Shiloh. Afterwards, I think at 
Monterey, you said you had expected a communication from me, hoping, perhaps, 
to see something spicy, as j^ou expressed it. 

I first saw your recommendation of General Sherman for major general at Camp 
No. 7, and but for subsequent events up to the present, time would have taken such 
a course with the enclosed extracts as will eventuallj' lead to their publication. 

Having a little leisure here, I have had the extracts copied, and you now have 
them, with such crude remarks as I can hastily throw together, referring you to a 
report of the proceedings of ray regiment, &c., for their proper understanding. I 
hold General \V. T. Sherman responsible for the condition of the army at Shiloh up 
to the 7th of April, and besides what occurred in his own division, for everything 
arising out of that condition, directly or indirectly. And this for the reason that 
to him was confided the advance of the expedition of Tennessee. He is, or is sup- 
posed to be, a man of more intellect than any general officer engaged in that bat- 
tle. There was a general disposition to give him every opportunity to develop his 
military abilities before and especially on the second day of the battle, and the 
chiefs of the army have concurred, without dissent, and equally without investiga- 
tion, according to your statement, in giving him the most favorable and prominent 
position in the result of those about equally disastrous days. Far more disastrous 
in their immediate results, as they will doubtless prove in their ultimate conse- 
quences, than the writer of the diary anticipated. General Sherman was entirely 
aware of everything occurring or likely to occur, which is expressed or implied, or 
supposed probable, in the above extracts. He had, or might have had, almost 
perfect means of knowing from day to day, whatever occurred at Corinth, or 
among the rebels near there. He might have controlled the position of all the 
live divisions at Shiloh. His request or remonstrance would have been equally 



10 

regarded and acted upon. But that he made any such, with or without effect, has 
never been asserted. He should then be held responsible not only for the position 
of the wliole army, but for the manner in which it was brought into action. His 
own division was as well posted as any other. So far as his division was concerned, 
on the 6tli.of April, no division could have been much worse handled. And, first 
the position naturally was strong, yet unimproved it was weak, as was proven by 
the result. 

On the other hand, of tlie six conditions desirable for a tactical position, as very 
ably and concisely set forth in " Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science," 
all but the third could have been, and that was partially fulfilled.* Yet the first 
was not fulfilled, as to the debouches, &c. ; nor the second as to the artillery ; nor the 
fourth as to the desired viev^ of the enemy ; nor the fifth as to the protection of 
the flanks ; nor the sixth as regarded a safe retreat. 

All this has no doubt been obvious to yourself, and can now be established by 
a glance at the ground. No means of satisfying any important one of the above 
conditions need have conflicted with another. Two thousand axes in six hours 
would have fulfilled the whole of these conditions, even including No. 3, yet not 
one of them was satisfied, and we know the consequences. 

That great rule of war, which requires the calling in all detachments on the eve 
of a battle, was violated by leaving Stuart's brigade near two miles off, when it 
might have been called in as late as 7- o'clock a. m. on the 6th, or even later, and 
in conjunction with the first brigade and Behr's battery, which remained idle, 
could easily have repulsed the first attack of ten rebel regiments and not over a 
single battery. This result would also have obviated any necessity on tlie part of 
Stuart's brigade to protect the left flank of the position, for which I have only 
heard since the battle it was specially detached. 

So far as General Sherman's handling of the division is concerned, it is obvious, 
first, that with twelve regiments and three batteries, but five regiments and two 
batteries were used to repel the first attack at 7 a. m., Appier's, the 53d Ohio, 
being so isolated that it could neither give or receive support, and Stuart's brigade 
being in the same condition; second, that the first brigade was utterly ignored, 
when it might have sooner and easier decided the fate of the day tlian at length 
it did; third, that Behr's battery, which might have been drawn off with the first 
brigade, was thrown into the victorious path of the rebels, one gun excepted ; 
f)urth, that the artillery was not in position till half an hour after the attack 
c immenced. That neitlier battery was on either flank of his centre, and oddly 
enough, that the only battery (Behr's) which could and should have delivered a 
most eflective flank fire at short range, was left idle till given up as above stated ; 
fifth, all the artillery was useless by noon, from capture or want of ammunition. 

The fact, if it is a.fact, tliat Barrett's battery was out of ammunition in less than 
five hours after its attack commenced, while there was ample ammunition at the 
river, reminds me that in your " Elements," <tc., above referred to, it is ruled that 
every battery should have ammunition suflicient for a day or twelve hours, which 
was here utterly disregarded. 

The condition, then, of Sherman's division about noon was, that Stuart's brigade, 
left alone on the extreme left, after a heroic defence, was finding its retreat inevit- 
able, as afterwards occurred, without assistance to or from its proper division. 

Waterhouse's batter}'- had been useless three hours by no fault of its officers. 
Barrett's was out of ammunition, with ample stores less than two miles off, and 
Behr's or Morton's battery had been " turned over " to the rebels, who were using 
it against us ; Hildebrand's brigade, after the retreat of the 53d Ohio, twice drove 
the advancing enemy back over the brow of the height in front, and had it been, 
as it might have been, properly supported, would have changed the whole fate of 

* Note.— From cliapter 5th of "llallcck's Elements of Military Art nud Science," page 115 ; "The 
first roiuiition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that the debouches (outlets) shall be more favor- 
able for lulling on the enemy when he has approached to the desired point, than those which the enemy 
can have fur .-utackiiig our own line of battle. Second. The artillery should have its full effect on all 
the avenues of approach. Third. We should have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops unseen, 
if possible, by the enemy. Foni-th. We should Iiave a full view of the enemy's manuocvres as he ad- 
vances to the attack. "Fifth. We should Inive the flanks of our line well protected by natural or 
artificial obstacles. Ki.xtli. We should liave some meaua of effecting a retreat without exposing our 
army to destruction." 



11 

the day. At noon, however, it did not exist as a brigade, and Colonel Ilildebrand 
had taken command of several portions of disintegrated regiments, and was keep- 
ing back the rebel advance about the middle of McClernand's camp. Much the 
same may be said of Buckland's brigade, from which its left regiment, the 70lh Ohio, 
had been entirely separated, and which was at tiiis time entirely destitute of inte- 
gration, yet its best and bravest men, with scraps of other regiments, were striving 
hopelessly against a victorious and superior force, just reinforced by five guns of 
Behr's battery, all of whicli might have been avoided by a liitle providence tweu- 
ty-four hours before that time, and a slight exercise of tactics at 9 a. m. 

Fortunately, about tiiis time (noon) McDowell's neglected brigade, having care- 
fully avoided an attack on the rebel rear or Hank, found its right suddenly out- 
flanked bjf a superior force of rebels in ambush. A bold and instant change of 
front to the right by the 46th Ohio, and an advance of thirty yards, with a steady, 
crashing fire, disconcerted and drove them back, thus rendering the brigade effec- 
tive for two hours, which time miglit have been indefinitely extended by a proper 
disposition of the troops and proper attention to tiie artillery so causelessly with- 
drawn. To make things worse, I have also heard that Barrett's battery was not 
out of ammunition, but was withdrawn for the purpose of making a charge, or an 
advance, by the 40th regiment Illinois volunteers, Colonel Hicks, on a strongly 
supported rebel battery out of sight, and some five hundred yards in front- Here 
was a gross violation of a general rule of Napoleon's, referred to on page 292 of 
*' Halleck's Elements," &e. ' The consequences in this case entirely sustained the 
rule, for tliis gallant little regiment, (four hundred and fifty strong,) after an ad- 
vance of three-fourths of the distance, was compelled to retire before a tenfold 
force, with the loss of near half its number, and Colonel Hicks incurably wounded. 

Had the artillery then present been, as it might have been, in a condition for 
service, this reckless charge or advance would, as it should, at any late, have been 
avoided, and even the capture of General Prentiss delayed till the arrival of Gen- 
eral Buell, but one hour after Prentiss surrendered; or even if, instead of this 
advance on the artillery by the 40th, the whole force of the first brigade had been 
thrown l)ack into a strong and wooded position a few hundred yards in the rear 
at the time the first brigade came up (noon,) the same result might and probably 
would iiave been attained 

The above is a mere sketch of the operations of Sherman's division from 7 a. 
m. till 2 p. m. on that terrible day. Seven hours, frauglit not ouly with immi- 
nent risk to the Army of Tennessee, but, as events are proving, with the whole 
course and possibly the event of tlie war, lengthened for months, or perhaps 
years, by the manner and result of these operations. 

I have neglected to say, tliat General Sherman was in the camp of the 53d Ohio, 
the weakest part of his line, when the attack commenced, ani wliere his orderly 
was killed, when he rode instantly away to his centre, and there remained in 
general till it was driven back, as the report sets forth. 

The conclusions, so far as General Sherman is concerned, from the above state- 
ments are. that, first, his utter disregard of the immediate and obvious indications 
of an aitack after Friday noon, as shown bj^ his leaving all things as they were; 
second, his utter disregard of his artillery, with respect more especially to its am- 
munition ; third, his failing to make any provision for his own wounded and sick 
men: fourth, his fatuity in leaving useless his right brigade, to say nothing of his 
left, either of which might, if thrown on eitlier rebel flank, have driven back the 
first attack even as late as 8 a. ra. ; fifth, his unaccountable sacrifice of five guns 
of Behr's battery, when the whole might have been, as one gun was, preserved with 
the first brigade ; sixth, his useless and reckless waste of life in the charge by Col- 
onel Hicks's 40th Illinois regiment; seventh, his so hastily leaving the weakest 
and most exposed part of liis line, where his presence would seem most needed-; 
and, eigiith, the fact of his leaving sucli a point so exposed ; — present the strongest 
salients in his connection witii the battle of Sliiloh, on the 6th day of April, 1S62. 

Having derived much of my information from others, I can vouch for nothing to 
which I was not mj-self a witness. Nothing, however, which I have seen or heard 
could suj>port the conclusion that he acted any important part in saving the day 
on the 6th of April, or that it was the opinion of a single regiment of his division 
that such was the case. 



12 

On tlie other hand, the inevitable conclusion from a review of the diary extracts 
and the facts above stated is, lliat General W. T. Sherman did more to prepare the 
army of Tennessee for a defeat on the (5th of April, and m.ore to accomplish that 
defeat in the course of the battle, than any officer on either side, on the bloody field 
of Shiloli. Very respectfull}', yours, 

T. WORTHIi'GTO', 

Culoncl idth Ohio Volunteer Infantry. 



Camp Neak Monterey, May 7, 1862. 
Major General Halleck: 

SiK ; I consider it my duty to call your attention to the enclosed "Circular." 

However creditable to the zeal of General tSherman, it certainly can do little credit 
to tiie energy of the service, nor is it encouraging to the troops, on whom it is 
calculated to have a depressing effect. If we are to be put upon half rations and 
chance forage at thirteen miles from our base of operations In' a few hours rain, how 
can the armj' hope within an}' reasonable time to effect the object of its oi-ganization 
and put an end to the war? One-third of the men in this army would bridge the 
road to the river in a day with proper tools, which we should have. This done, 
there would be no trouble about getting on material, while the moral effect would 
be equiil to twenty thousand men. 

So far as forage for the horses, &c., is concerned, there is not an elm or cotton- 
wood to a square mile, and they will not eat sassafras. I do not in the least 
appreliend an attack, but see no reason why the enemj' could not bring up artillery 
on account of the roads, having done so a month ago. 

I also enclose Order No. 21, exhibiting far more zeal than discretion. Men with 
the usual camp disease above all things require quiet, and whatever tiieir disposi- 
tion, are not in a condition to studv brigade drill. The object of such orders is 
obviously to produce discontent and demoralization, of which there is an ample 
amount existing. 

If an effort were made to supply the troofjs with fresh bread and better hospitals, 
the efl'ect would be far more obvious in their improved organization than any 
benefit which can i-esult from such orders as the above. 
Very respectfully, 

T. WoirruiKGTOx, Cul 46th Rea't 0. V. I. 



CIKCULAB. 

Our situation from the rain and roads has become difficult, and it becomes the 
duty of every efficient man to anticii>ate our danger and to labor. Every ounce 
of food and forage must be regarded as precious as diamonds 

lioads will be impassable and our bridges sv»'ept away. General Halleck and 
our superior officers will do all the^- can, but their power is limited by nature. 

We must do our part in full. J\Ien must at once be limited m bread and meat. 
All live stock in our lines must be driven in and used, and all grass, wheat, and 
everything fit for forage gathered. Horses will be allowed to eat on bushes, such 
as elm, cotton-wood, and sassafras, gatbei'ed lor this use at once. Particular at- 
tention must be given at once to our roads and defences. Let every axe and spade 
be busy. At daybreak a party from each brigade will open a road by clearing 
the underbrush back to the ridge. In front of the whole line, underbrush must 
be cut to a distance of three hundred yards, and heavy logs felled as a breastwork 
along the front of the artillery and camps. Picket guards and sentinels must be 
visited often, and the utmost vigilance maintained. Monterey is the ke)' point. 
We cannot be assiviled by artillery, because the enemy cannot haul it up, but we 
may be assailed by hordes of infantry night and day; therefore vigilance must be 
kept — neglect at any and all times promptly punished. 

If any sentinel will not be wakeful and intelligent, let him be forced to work. 
Our right is the point of danger, and will receive the personal attention of the 
general, but he can do nothing unless his orders are strictly observed, and these 



18 

are that all articles of provision and forage be put under guard and dealt out at; 
half rations. That the guard to our front be prepared with log breastworks and 
defences, and underbrush cleared to our rear to admit of prompt and easy commu- 
nication, not to retreat on, but to iifl'ord means of drawing assistance, and to move 
regiments from one point to another of our lines if need be. Orders heretofore 
issued cover the \vhole ground, and this is meant to remind all of their importance. 
Maps will at once be jiropared and sent to brigadiers, who should furnish colonels 
and subordinates with copies. 

B}^ order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman. 

J. H. Hammond, A. A. Gcnl. 

Camp No. 3, May oth, 1S62. 



IlEADaUAKTERS FiFTH DIVISION, 

Gkant's Corps d'Ap.meh, April 25, 1862. 
[Orders No. 21.] 

The importance of brigade drill i.s such, that the commanding general will per- 
mit no othcer or soldier to be absent if he can possibly be on tlie ground either in 
the ranks, armed or unarmed, or as a witness. 

Officers to be excuse<l must be in the ho.^pital or excused by the division surgeon, 
Dr. Hartshorn. Soldiers to be excused must be in hospital, on picket, or a sentinel 
on post. The camp guard, except sentinels on post, and all working parties, must 
be called in and put on drill, unless by an order in writing by the commanding 
general. 

No colonel of a regiment, or captain of a company, will undertake to excuse 
from drill, li the men are unable to bear arms, they will form on the left of the 
company, unarmed. If not in hospital, but suffering from diarrhcea, they can be 
hauled to the drill-ground by the colonel's order, and there Ihey must be silent 
and observe the movements of the division. Drill will take place daily at 3 p. m., 
unless it be actually raining. 

By order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman: 

J. H. Hammond, A. A. General. 

Official : W. H. Hari.axd, A. A. A. O. 



Washington, D. C, March 18, 1869, 
Hon. J. A. GAli FIELD : 

Shortly after Geiuiral Sherman had attached IIh; four great Military Bureaus to his 
personal staff, it was slated by a genlleniau of Ohio, connected with the press, that 
this attachment was a '■'■gobbling up " by the General himself : he of the jjress knew 
not on Avhat authority. 

The sauiv! evening, March 13th, the writer called on you for information, and, as 
is (;xpressed in his diary, you answered that the Military Committee had agreed upon a 
rei)()rt, not yet printcul, expressing the oj)inion tiiat the management of these Bureaus 
was rather an administrative than a legislative matter, and, on some such authority, the 
President had tied them to the General's personal staff. 

It seemeil a little singular that you should think such an attachment so much of a 
trifle; and, indeed, so far the measure seems to have attracted little or no attention in 
or out of Congress. Is it, indeed, so much of a tride to place, by a simple order of 
his own, more or less directly under the immediate control of the Army General, all 
the myriad jniilions of dollars of claims, contracts, and accounts perpetually passing to 
and from tlu; Treasury Department? Is it consistent to remove, as has lx;en constitu- 
tionally done, the Treasury Department from the immediate control of the President, 
and ])ei'mit the head of the Army to constitute himself, by a special order of general 
intent, vii'tual comptroller of the Treasury, so far as the tlscal affairs of these great 
Bureaus are concerned, and the fountain or distributor of all their subordinate appoint- 
ments ? 

Is it a ti-iile that the head of the Ai'uiy, in jx-ace or in war, by a mere hieroglyphic 
scratcli agreed on, or by a woi'd endorsed oii any paper, passing either way from these 
Bureaus to or from the Treasury, may accelerate, retard, or condehin it at his will? 

Is it a trille to consider that, if the chiefs of these great Bureaus are members of his 
personal staff, the tens of thousands of attaches and employees of these Bureaas are 
more or less integral fractions or atoms of his staff — more or less dependent ou his 
word or will; and that he may, with entire propriety, claim their appointment or 
removal as necessary to the elli(aent performance of his militaiy duties? 

Add to these (as the nomination of a distinguished confederate officer plainly 
foreshadows) the many thousands of reconstructed but yet unannealed rebels lately in 
arms against the Union. Let them, too, swell these myriads of dependents on a strictly 
mil itary adm i n i stratiou. 

What, in comparison to this devoted army, if once put in an-ay, were the ten 
thousand, or the hundred thousand Cornelii of Sylla in his retirement; or what to them 
were the pnctorian cohorts of the Empire in its decline; and how long miglit it be, 
under the i)resent maturing elements of such a decline, before the institutions even of 
this Republic miglu totter towards their fall? 

Consider, too, the man who, as the militaiy arm of the President, is to control this 
fearful moral force, and these myriads of dependents ou his favor, liis cai)rice, or his 
vindictive will. 



15 

Was he ever known to place any man on his personal staff, and keep 1dm there, 
who was not as entirely subservient as a valet or an orderly ; who had the capacity 
or courage, and much less the disposition, to breathe a syllable of remonstrance or 
complaint on any account, whatever may have been his personal acts or military 
operations ? 

You, it is believed, were in some sort a witness to one of these l)rilliant operations 
the day after the battle of Shiloh, April 8, 1862. You saw that, by means of his 
strategy or tactics, or by the absence of both, or either, one of his best regiments 
was ridden over by a handful of Forrest's cavalry, and but for the presence of troops, 
in whole or in part under your conmiand, a wiiole Union brigade would have been 
scattered without an effort on his part to stay the miscliief he had made, and all tliis 
by a few hundred, or less, of the disorganized troops of a defeated rebel army in dis- 
orderly retreat. * 

If, instead of being such a connnander as he was, he were a nulliou of Washing- 
tons made into one, such an attachment of these Bureaus would be lui incongruity, if 
not an outrage, under any free Government. 

In conclusion, it is very respectfully suggested that the Military Committee of the 
House may in some sort be held responsible for the future conduct of this militant 
pagod, "with front of brass, feet of clay, " as brittle as liis accidental reputation — a 
reputation based upon the omissions of the late Committee on tlie Conduct of the War, 
even now, may it be hoped, to be corrected. 

Yours, very respectfully, 

T. WORTIIINGTON, 
Late Colonel iUth Ohio Volunteers. 



*Sni>n afler forming in line of battle, n, largo body of cavalry rnado a bold and dashing charge on 
the skirmishers and whole regiment. So sudden and rapid wai* the charge, shooting our men vvitli 
carbines and revolvers, they had no time to reload or tix bayonets, and v^ere forced to fallback 
under cover of our cavalry. Unhappily, the cavalry wore not sutiiciently near to render assistance. 
The rebel cavalry literally rodo down the infantry. We sustained a loss in killed, wounded, and 
mi.«sing of fifty-seven men. Nineteen were killed on the spot, thirty wounded, and the balance 
missing. — Extract from Colonel iiUdehrancVs Report. 



«5" The foregoing matter will be part of the Appendix to the proposed work when finished, but 
first published now for special purposes. T. W. 



of drunkenness on duty, as charged, was proven impossible by the evidence, 
to obtain which it wouh.l have been Colonel W's duty, if requisite, to have 
remaineu ' '^isgrcicefuUi/ drunl" as charged, a month nt a stretch, as Grant 
has oftfn been, without any but an evil purpose. Thnt evidence, ^ii\\ other 
facts, proves that the Army of tlie Tennessee had, by its "West Point com- 
mander, been devoted to destruction for the basest personal and political ob- 
jects. All evidence of what occurred during the battle was ruled out, or it 
would have proven then, as is now proven by the Shiloh "pamphlet," that 
each of these commander.-j deserted the troojisat least once that day, and at 
one time when men on both sides were falling at the rate of 3,000 or more 
an hour. Grant was his enemy from and after the time the colonel of the 
46th Ohio found him skulking on his boat at 3 p. m., where Buell had found 
liiui two hours before, with his lior.ses, Szc. Slierman was his enemy from the 
first dav he saw him at Paducah. February 21, 1862, and requestei] that he 
might be detached to occupy and fortify Florence, or might be attached to 
General O. M. Mitchell's command on the Cumberland. Both were his ene- 
mies of course at first from his disposition for a rapid prosecution of the war. 
Sherman refused to attach Colonel W. to the command of Mitchell, w/tose 
enemy he was, for the reason last stated, and for other reasons, but would 
have sent him to the Mississippi, or left him all summer in command of a 
fort at Paducah. The reason now is ]ilain. From tlie above maybe inferred 
of what nature, in regard to the writer, were the acts of charity and friend- 
ship it would take here too much space to enumerate. "Malignity, envy, 
liatred, malice, treachery, and unworthiness," are the synonyms of truth, jus- 
tice, and integrity, with 

"Knaves who feel the halter draw 
With bad opinion of the law." 

Tiiese officers, though for ten years so challenged, never dared, and 
never will dare, put the charges of " Shiloh" to the test of an appropriate tri- 
liunal. Let the public and the future judge between us. 

His honorable discharge was obtained against Grant's four or five years' of 
opposition, and he has never ceased to demand a new trial on the evidence of 
the record, with all its mutilations, which Grant dare not permit, and could 
have to-morrow, if he would. 

The most insolent and Grant-like portion of this article is, that the work 
is printed at the cost of men who would be ashamed to have tlieir subscrip- 
tions known, &c. Many of Grant's friends have bouglit tlie thus forbidden 
book, perhaps, as' a weapon for his defence; but he does not seem to adopt 
the ])rayer, " 0, that mine enemy might write a book!'' and the organ quotes 
it — not a word. 

If the charge of the "or//an" is true as to those who pay for such a book, 
tlie subscribers to the Patriot, Capital, &c., are also denounced, and we are 
under a tyranny more degrading than that of Commodus or Caracalla. It 
reveals nothing, &c., says the "organ." Whj^ not publish extracts, to be 
compared with the mutual admiration and adulation of these officers, and 
their satelites, the B's — whj' not? Because it is made up of true history, 
proven so by their own statements and fictions, and deceptive letters and 
dispatches, if a criminal's plea of guilty may be taken against him. (See 
Sherman's report, that he abandoned his troops to his aids, and Grant's that 
he won the battle; and also that the day was and was not saved by Nelson's 
troops, with Amraen in advance of Buell's army, and much more.) 

The writer is an "Old Whig," and no recruit of the "Reformers," from 
whom lie has had little encouragement, but that arising from curiosity to see 
such effect of his exorcism as shows Grant hideous with additional evidence 
against himself and for the book in the columns of the " organ." 

He is of course, as he has always striven to be, outside the respect of all 
who regard not truth, integrity, and liberty, always the same — " one and 
inseparable, now and forever." 

Washington, May 27, IS 72. T. Worthington. 

P. S. — There was no record up to 1867 that Colonel W.was ever dismissed 
by the President, and in his discharge Grant meanly lugs in the sentence of a 
court tliat was a nullity in law, as he knew. T. W. 



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